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A long cycle of conflicts in the Middle East and North 
Africa started with the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and 
continued with the civil wars which followed the 2011 
Arab uprisings. It still continues unabated after more 
than 15 years. Indeed, violence – which had lately 
declined in both Syria and Libya, and officially ended 
in Iraq with the government’s declared victory over 
ISIS – flared up again in spring 2019.  At the time of 
writing, Haftar’s LNA forces continue their assault on 
Tripoli, while the Syrian regime, backed by Russia, is 
mounting its pressure on Idlib, as is Turkey on Kurd-
controlled areas. In Yemen, the UN-brokered ceasefire 
has proven short-lived and both war and humanitarian 
catastrophes continue. Meanwhile, tensions between 
Iran, the US and Gulf countries have increased to an 
unprecedented level. Whether we are currently in 
the final phase of a prolonged conflict cycle or at the 
beginning of a new, larger and more dramatic war is 
difficult to say. 
What we know for a fact is that the toll in terms of 
deaths, human suffering and economic destruction 
in war-torn MENA countries is enormous and keeps 
rising. The repercussions of MENA conflicts in terms 
of global security, regional instability, refugee and 
migrant flows, radicalisation and jihadism, losses in 
economic growth and development and disruptions in 
oil production are too important to neglect. Stabilisa-
tion and reconstruction remain a priority for all the 
actors – local, regional and international – which over 
time have been involved in these conflicts. 
Recognising the importance of these issues for the 
future of the MENA region and the EU, the Middle 
East Directions Programme held its third annual con-
ference on ‘Exiting war economy dynamics: What 
future for stabilisation and reconstruction in MENA?’ 
(19-20 November 2018). The economic and political 
factors that influence the war economy dynamics and 
the political economy of reconstruction and stabilisa-
tion were analysed by a select group of international 
experts from the worlds of academia and practice. 
Various perspectives and approaches were considered 
in an intense two-day discussion. One of the overarch-
ing conclusions was that the post-conflict realities in 
MENA will not be easily handled with the traditional 
toolbox which has been used in other conflicts since 
the end of the cold war. The situation in MENA calls 
for a critical re-think of contemporary approaches and 
for an active search for new modalities of both analysis 
and intervention.
This eBook includes several important contributions 
presented at the conference and is addressed to an 
audience of both academics and policy-makers. It is a 
continuation of the ongoing MEDirections project on 
the political economy of the post-2011 MENA region 
and represents an attempt to reflect on the features 
of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction in 
MENA. Hopefully, it will provide an opportunity to 
deepen today’s limited debate on this subject.
1.Understanding 
Stabilisation in MENA 
Conflict Countries
While in the context of MENA crises and conflict sta-
bilisation appear to have become a guiding principle 
for the international community, what is exactly 
meant by stabilising war-torn Syria, Libya, Iraq and 
Yemen is poorly defined and highly contentious. With 
the exception of Iraq, these conflicts are not yet over 
and stabilisation policies are implemented in situa-
tions where no comprehensive settlement has been 
achieved and the root causes are not being addressed. 
The complexity of MENA conflicts should call for 
long-term context-specific strategies and actions by 
all parties. What are needed are the conditions for a 
sustainable peace and stability in the region that put 
an end to violence while opening the way to long-term 
stability and development. However, the challenges 
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are daunting and the involvement of many players, 
including Western ones, the EU and its member states, 
remains limited, often circumscribed to security and 
counter-terrorism, and with uncertain policies and 
actions. On many occasions, domestic and external 
players follow different or sometimes even colliding 
courses. As a result, UN mediation efforts and other 
initiatives to bring peace find little traction on the 
ground, leaving space for spoilers, widening the 
ambitions of strongmen and fostering confrontation 
and power projection by regional and international 
actors. This perpetuates conflict further. 
Regional and international players share a limited 
consensus on the drivers of conflicts and on what needs 
to be done to resolve them, and even on the desirable 
end result of stabilisation.1 For instance, when looking 
at current MENA conflicts, many, including in the 
West, see weak states, a proliferation of areas of limited 
statehood and state failure as both causes and conse-
quences of currents conflicts, and also as great sources 
of threat and instability in MENA and beyond. This 
view has a long history in contemporary international 
relations and has informed peace-building action in 
the post-cold war era. In the 1990s and 2000s
“scholars and practitioners of international 
security […] pointed to the growing challenge 
posed by state failures and weakness in large 
parts of the world that may require addition-
al international interventions in the guise of 
‘liberal imperialism’ to ensure that these states 
can provide for the human security of their 
peoples and do not become havens for interna-
tional terrorists and criminals.”2
States and multilateral institutions were also prompt to 
deal pre-emptively with ‘countries at risk of instability.’ 
The discourse on state fragility and state failure, and 
the policies it inspires, lasts to this day.
In the eyes of many, the contemporary MENA crises 
and conflicts are consequences of state fragility. Thus, 
the paramount priority for most players is a rapid res-
1. For an analysis of this dynamic, see Luigi Narbone, 
‘What prospects for stabilisation and reconstruction in the 
Middle East and North Africa?' Policy Briefs Middle East 
Directions 04, 2019, p. 1-5.
2. Andrew Rathmell, “Planning post-conflict reconstruction 
in Iraq: what can we learn?”, International Affairs, 2005, 
81, p.1013–1038.
toration of effective political authority coupled with 
strong and enforceable state sovereignty. Little regard 
is paid to whether the restoration process brings back 
or reinforces authoritarian rule, exclusionary political 
systems and more instability in the longer term. One 
should wonder whether the diagnosis and the therapy 
are correct in the case of MENA conflicts. As Steven 
Heydemann laments in his chapter No Exit: Conflict, 
Economic Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruc-
tion in Fierce States, at least in the case of Syria we are 
dealing not with a fragile state but with a “fierce state, 
in which the ruling elite elevates survival above all else 
and designs institutions to support the aim” and “gov-
ernance […] is managed as an expression of a zero-sum 
existential struggle in which conflict reinforces the de-
termination of a ruling elite to defend existing institu-
tional arrangements by force.”3
The implication might well be that “conflict termination 
in fierce states is likely to be a temporary phenomenon 
[…] and as MENA civil wars have made abundantly 
clear, it is increasingly difficult to view the impact of 
such episodes as limited to the countries in which they 
occur.”4 The value and effectiveness of current stabilisa-
tion policies in building lasting and sustainable peace 
might also be questionable. 
What does all this mean for both the concept and the 
policies of stabilisation?  As Achim Wellemann argues 
in his chapter Reconstructing Syria, Reinventing Peace-
building?, there is little prospect that peace-building 
in the MENA region will follow the model established 
in dealing with previous post-cold war cases. Building 
peace in Syria will not be ‘business as usual.’ So-called 
“liberal peace building – comprehensive programs 
aimed to achieve order, prosperity and participatory 
political systems after civil wars – has little prospects 
for traction.”5 The ambition of transforming post-
conflict countries – using peace-building to achieve 
a multiplicity of desirable objectives such as conflict 
management, security sector reform, democratisation, 
3. See also Nazih Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics 
and Society in the Arab World, New York, I.B. Tauris, 
1996 and Steven Heydemann, “Beyond Fragility: Syria 
and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States,” 
Washington DC, Brookings Institution, June 2018.
4. Steven Heydemann, “No Exit: Conflict, Economic Gover-
nance, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Fierce States”, 
in this eBook.
5. Achim Wellemann, Reconstructing Syria, Reinventing 
Peacebuilding?,  this volume.
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good governance, institution building and economic 
reforms – has receded in the face of the challenges 
posed by the conflicts in the MENA region, both in 
academic and policymaking circles. “After being a 
popular concept as well as practice in international 
security […] [l]iberal peace-building may be on its way 
to the scrapyard of history.”6
There are numerous reasons why liberal peace-build-
ing has lost its attractiveness, even among Western 
promoters. The liberal peace-building experience in 
post-cold war conflicts “has been more difficult than 
anticipated […] fraught with challenges and confront-
ed with a continuing difficulty of understanding local 
politics and dynamics.”7 In addition, “[h]ost states have 
more frequently resisted liberal interventions and have 
pressed for mandates that more closely align with the 
self-interest of authoritarian governments.”8 Finally, 
failures caused by a lack of adequate funding or the pa-
ternalistic approaches adopted – together with the loss 
of international legitimacy caused by doubtful external 
interventions leading to failed peace-building opera-
tions – have also contributed to the downturn.
As the international system moves toward a multi-
polar order where great powers such as Russia and 
China play an increasingly important role, the US and 
the EU – the champions of the comprehensive liberal 
peace-building approach – have either been withdraw-
ing from the international scene or become entangled 
in growing confrontation for regional influence. Their 
narratives and attention have shifted “from ‘peace-
building’ to ‘resilience’ or ‘stabilisation,’ thereby em-
phasising the need for order and control over transfor-
mative change of [the] underlying drivers of conflicts.”9 
As a result, “the US and its Western allies are turning to 
a blend of stabilisation and counterterrorism through 
global and regional partners.”10 
On the other hand, more recent conflicts in MENA, 
such as in Syria and Libya, have been the first since 
the end of the cold war in which regional and interna-
tional actors other than Western ones have been active 
players. It is therefore no surprise that the latter will 
6. John Karlsrud, “From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabiliza-
tion and Counterterrorism.” International Peacekeeping 
26(1) 2019, p.2.
7.  Ibid.
8.  Ibid., p.3.
9. Wennmann, Reinventing Peace, op-cit.
10. Karlsrud, Stabilization to Counter-Terrorism, op-cit.
want to play a role in shaping post-conflict realities. 
Russia and China, for instance, follow a declared, inter-
est-based neo-realist approach which values stability 
above everything else. If anything, in their worldview 
stability is seen as the necessary pre-condition for 
future transformation and development in the region. 
To back this discourse, Russia has gone as far as in-
tervening militarily in Syria, changing the course of 
the conflict there. As for China, it “sees the Western 
approach of exporting democracy and sponsoring 
‘regime change’ as the disease and the cause of regional 
disorder, not order, after a string of targeted countries 
such as Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen descended into 
chaos and created ungoverned space for rising Islamic 
extremism and terrorism.”11 Inevitably, the alternative 
cure proposed by the Chinese will be different, “a new 
narrative of ‘peace with development’ to restore order 
in MENA.”12 The main declared objective of China’s 
offer of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in MENA 
– in addition to ensuring access to natural resources – 
is to avoid conflict countries becoming safe havens for 
terrorists, including Uyghur militants. 
At the same time, stabilisation will also provide new 
players with opportunities to pursue self-interest and 
to project power and influence in the region. The 
military situation on the ground and the way MENA 
conflicts have evolved over time make them different 
to earlier conflicts in the post-cold war era. The in-
creasing internationalisation of the Syrian conflict is a 
good case in point. The international community has 
often proclaimed that there is no military solution to 
the Syrian conflict. However, it has been the balance 
of force and military accomplishments which has de-
termined developments on the ground leading to the 
ensuing authoritarian restorations. The trend also 
seems to be similar in the other MENA conflicts. There 
have been no effective political process and no compre-
hensive settlements so far. Instead, what we have seen 
repeatedly are low-intensity ethno-sectarian conflicts, 
regional rivalries, military confrontations and victories 
which give rise to the reconstitution of authoritarian 
regimes. When the dust finally settles, what we might 
have is, in Welleman’s words, some sort of “authoritar-
ian peace.” 
11. Christina Lin, "Can China have a regional stabilization 
role in MENA?", this volume.
12. Ibid.
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2. Implications for 
Reconstruction 
What does authoritarian peace imply 
for the reconstruction process? 
In liberal peace-building, reconstruction was intended 
as a complex multi-level process, encompassing re-
building houses, roads, electricity grids and other 
basic infrastructure, and also socio-economic recon-
struction, which permits a sustainable return of people 
and allows exiting a war economy, while at the same 
time the country deals with the wounds and cleavages 
created by conflict through transitional justice.
The importance attributed to economic reconstruc-
tion is hardly surprising. As Heydemann says, quoting 
research on the economic impact of MENA wars,  
“Violent conflicts in MENA have shattered 
national economies and caused massive levels 
of human suffering, triggering sharp reversals 
of economic and social development. Between 
2012-2017, Syria dropped 27 places in the UN’s 
annual Human Development Index (HDI), 
while Yemen declined by 20 places and Libya 
by 26. In the Syrian case, a UN assessment 
conducted in mid-2013 estimated that ‘[e]
ven if the conflict ceased now and GDP grew 
at an average rate of five per cent each year, it 
. . . would take the Syrian economy 30 years to 
return to the economic level of 2010.’ […T]he 
most significant economic effects of war are 
caused not by damage to physical infrastruc-
ture, but by the corrosive effects of conflict on 
economic institutions, governance, and the or-
ganisation of economic activity. According to a 
2017 World Bank study on Syria, the economic 
impact of conflict on these factors, measured in 
cumulative GDP losses, is twenty times greater 
than the effects of conflict on infrastructure.”
Economic rehabilitation and the establishment of ap-
propriate governance conditions are essential to put 
post-conflict economies on a path of stabilisation and 
growth.13  
13. Graciana del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States: The 
Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction. Ox-
ford; New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 27.
In addition to macro-economic rehabilitation – con-
trolling inflation, normalising the exchange rate and 
improving economic indicators – attention needs to 
be given to the political economy of the post-conflict 
environment as it creates winners and losers and has 
a long-lasting impact on the way the reconstruction 
process is conceived and implemented, the constraints 
it encounters and, ultimately, whether it succeeds or 
fails. Thus, the process of exiting war economies and 
the struggle that takes place around the economic 
reform agenda in many post-conflict cases become 
battlegrounds for the reconstitution of authoritarian-
ism in the war-ravaged countries of the region. 
There is a widely-shared view that sees conflicts as a 
break in existing patterns of economic governance – 
consisting of cronyism, clientelism, rent-seeking be-
haviours, and corruption to mention but a few. As a 
consequence, exiting a war economy is seen as an op-
portunity for institutional reform and the transforma-
tion of political economies. These views do not seem 
to hold true in the case of MENA conflict countries, As 
Heydemann points out,   
“The very idea of exiting a conflict economy 
implies that conflicts produce economies that 
differ from those that existed prior to conflict, 
and from those it is possible to establish once 
conflict ends. It rests on the assumption that 
conflict is a temporary condition that disrupts 
the otherwise normal functioning of an 
economy.”
There is a high degree of continuity between pre-war 
economic governance, war economies and post-con-
flict economic realities. Economic patterns based on 
personal relations and exchanges of favours, profiteer-
ing, impunity, predation, informality and ample space 
for unchecked illicit practices persist throughout the 
war and post-war times. These patterns also contrib-
ute to the emergence of new players through the re-
arrangement of ruling networks and the formation 
of new coalitions of interests. Old and new networks 
benefit from the way the system re-distributes wealth 
and resources and in turn helps those in power to con-
solidate their control and contribute to the process of 
reconstitution of authoritarian rule. The reconstruc-
tion process includes the use, instrumentalisation and 
manipulation of dominant economic structures to 
serve the needs of the regime.
INTRODUCTION - WHAT DO STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION MEAN FOR WAR-TORN COUNTRIES 
IN MENA? Luigi Narbone
5
In Heydemann's words, reconstruction 
“is a process of ‘reconstructing authoritarian-
ism,’ in which a regime uses pre-war strategies 
of economic governance to reassert its authority 
over a post-conflict society, reproducing the 
economic institutions, norms and practices 
associated with both pre-war and wartime 
economic orders.” 
Evidently, in this context there is little space for gover-
nance reform.
3. The Cases: Syria, 
Iraq, Lebanon
The cases included in this eBook illustrate these points 
quite well. Reconstruction is used by the regimes to 
repay friends and allies, as a method to consolidate the 
interests of clientelist networks and as a tool to distrib-
ute favours to clients and allies, says Joseph Daher in 
his chapter Syria: what kind of Reconstruction process? 
“Reconstruction is one of the main projects by means 
of which the regimes and crony capitalists linked to 
them will consolidate their political and economic 
power while providing foreign allies with a share of the 
market to reward them for their assistance.”14 
The Syrian regime has used reconstruction and 
enacted legal instruments to expropriate property 
from parts of the population perceived as being close 
to the opposition, “to efficiently create large rapid de-
velopment projects that will benefit regime cronies and 
attract possible foreign funding, while at the same time 
operating as punishment against populations known 
for their opposition to the [regime].”
The implications for exiting the war economy and re-
construction are important. In Daher’s words,
“The crony capitalist empowered in the war 
could also impede the possibility of enabling the 
return of sections of the bourgeoisie to re-invest 
in the country and therefore to dominate the 
economy and investment opportunities to create 
a business environment favourable to recon-
struction. 
14. Joseph Daher, “Syria: what kind of Reconstruction pro-
cess?”, this volume.
The risk of a failure of the reconstruction plan 
and more generally of economic development, 
especially in productive sectors of the economy 
such as manufacturing and agriculture, will 
make it much more difficult to end […] illegal 
and violent activities…” 
Similarly, in the case of Iraq, as illustrated in the chapter 
From War Economy to Reconstruction: The Case of Iraq, 
Anne Hagood refers to the extensive ethno-sectarian 
patronage system established after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein and further perpetuated by the post-ISIS 
political and economic environments. The winner of 
these conflicts is not the state but militias: 
“These have developed parallel governance 
and economic structures, filling the vacuum 
left by state institutions yet operating through 
a complex web of state mechanisms. […] This 
dynamic fosters a political, social and economic 
cleavage that translates into competition for 
scarce resources and institutional political rep-
resentation.” 
Under these circumstances, the drivers of Iraq’s 
conflicts, the same ones that gave rise to ISIS in 2014, 
remain largely unaddressed. They are linked “to the 
structure of the economy, and consequently account 
for the lack of reform, the deep-seated corruption, in-
equalities and ethno-sectarian sharing of resources.” 
Dominant parties have developed militias and use 
them to ensure control of territory or resources. Gov-
ernment jobs are used to reward political loyalty; 
contracts to co-opt the private sector; and ministerial 
budgets for personal or party gain. Post-ISIS recon-
struction efforts, similarly to what happened in the 
case of post-2003 reconstruction, are embroiled in the 
distortions and inefficiencies of this system. “With its 
current political structure and modes of governance, 
patronage continues to weaken state institutions and 
enable several actors to perpetuate the war economy.”15
For the success of reconstruction and to ensure 
long-term stability, Iraq would need large and sustained 
domestic and international investment. However, 
the political and economic conditions present in the 
country are not conducive to this and post-ISIS recon-
struction runs similar risks of failure to post-2003 re-
construction: 
15. Anne Hagood , “From War Economy to Reconstruction”, 
this volume.
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“The necessity of overhauling the economy and 
passing legislation that would support a non-oil 
economy and promote job creation, particularly 
in the construction and agriculture sectors, calls 
for a set of political and legal changes that Iraq 
has to introduce but are, nonetheless, essential 
to its development…”
Other important issues concern the human factor. 
MENA civil wars have produced an enormous number 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. 
When and how they will be allowed to return, and 
how their reintegration is handled will determine the 
direction of the economic reconstruction process. 
Again, the reality on the ground is not very promising. 
IDPs encounter similar problems in Iraq. According to 
Hagood,
“A number of Sunni internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) have been largely prevented 
from returning to their areas of origin by PMF 
groups. The latter deliberately target them and 
hence contribute to ‘homogenising’ the demog-
raphy in order to bolster their legitimacy and 
political and economic grounding. Not only is 
this becoming a breeding ground for radicalism 
but it will exacerbate political instability as lon-
ger-term displacement exposes those concerned 
to economic loss, in addition to the longer social 
stigmatisation that will affect these communi-
ties.”
Youth unemployment and a lack of opportunities will 
also be important factors which, if left unaddressed, 
will weigh heavily on the future of post-conflict 
countries, making them breeding grounds for radi-
calisation and potentially causing future conflicts. Due 
to the long cycle of wars, for instance, 35% of Iraqis 
aged 15-24 have not completed primary education. No 
economic recovery and development will be possible if 
these profound educational gaps are not bridged.
In Syria, the return of refugees and IDPs is seen by the 
regime and its allies as mostly a security and political 
question, with little attention being paid to the broader 
economic dimensions. This may increase the dif-
ficulties of returnees in participating in the prevail-
ing economic structures, thus hampering the return 
process itself and the stability of the post-conflict en-
vironment. 
As Lob shows in his chapter Construction Jihad: 
Wartime and Post-War Reconstruction and Devel-
opment in Lebanon, there is a long tradition in the 
Middle East of using reconstruction to achieve the 
political-economic objectives of specific power groups, 
by using established structures to consolidate power 
through reconstruction efforts. Following the model 
of a similar Iranian organisation, since its establish-
ment in 1988 Jihad Al-Bina (JB), or Construction 
Jihad (Jihad-i Sazandig – JS), has assisted Hezbullah 
in wartime and post-war reconstruction and develop-
ment efforts. In addition to infrastructure and housing 
projects, the organisation has delivered drinking water, 
established agricultural cooperatives, offered vocation-
al training, organised farmers and handicraft markets 
and promoted environmental protection. Hezbollah 
“used JB and other NGO service providers to appeal to 
constituents and secure electoral votes […] and repre-
sented a conduit through which the party established 
and expanded its patron-client networks… .” Through 
JB, reconstruction funding and activities helped 
Hezbollah to consolidate its territorial and social base, 
building and strengthening the political and religious 
identity of its members and advancing its military 
interests. However, as Lob says, one of the shortcom-
ings of the model has been its “disproportionate focus 
on physical distribution instead of economic sustain-
ability, even though the organisation and its affiliates 
recognised the need to promote and achieve it.”
To quote one interviewee,
“rather than encourage and train residents to 
develop entrepreneurial ideas, write business 
plans, secure private loans and start businesses 
through personal initiatives, competence, skills 
and merit, Hezbullah and its affiliates make 
locals dependent on their employment and 
services and condition them to continue seeking 
hand-outs by maintaining the proper connec-
tions and working the system to their advantage.”   
The examples provided by the above cases cast doubts 
about the reconstruction process in MENA conflict 
countries and its capacity to return these countries onto 
a path of sustainable growth, allowing the rebuilding 
of physical infrastructure and the creation of jobs and 
opportunities for the young. If the political economic 
dynamics which are emerging in the framework of au-
thoritarian peace risk undermining the reconstruction 
process in MENA, they are also unlikely to address the 
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root causes of the ongoing conflict cycle. If anything, 
what we are seeing on the ground risks making these 
root causes even more intractable and prone to gener-
ating new conflicts. 
Socio-economic issues played a crucial role in trigger-
ing the Arab uprising and the subsequent civil strife. 
Amongst them are the unequal distribution of rents 
from natural resources, the neglect and marginalisation 
of less productive and peripheral regions, the cleavage 
between rural and urban areas, unemployment, 
poverty and growing inequality. Addressing them 
would require political vision, appropriate policies 
and productive investments, leading to inclusive and 
sustainable development and to a conducive business 
environment. In the framework of authoritarian peace 
described above, not only is the success of reconstruc-
tion doubtful but also the possibility of conceiving 
and implementing long-term development visions 
that are necessary for the future of these countries 
appears difficult, such as the diversification of the 
economies away from hydrocarbon dependence and 
their upgrading in the global value chain. With scarce 
prospects for economic improvement, the resources 
for reconstruction will be more difficult to obtain.
The role of external players 
The availability of resources and the willingness of 
external actors to get more involved in the region will 
also be important factors in determining the future of 
reconstruction in the region. After years of multiple 
conflicts and competing priorities in the international 
arena, reconstruction fatigue is widespread among in-
ternational donors and public funding for assistance is 
in short supply.  Because of the way MENA conflicts 
have evolved and the ongoing changes in the interna-
tional order, new realist approaches are prevailing in 
handling post-conflict aid and peace-building activi-
ties.16 Foreign involvement in reconstruction efforts is 
likely to be shaped by short-term political or tactical 
interests and economic considerations, both at the in-
ternational and regional levels. 
Geo-politics, geo-economics and the straightforward 
search for immediate economic gains are important 
elements in MENA conflicts. Post-conflict dynamics 
“are shaping ‘facts on the ground,’ ” as Wennmann says 
concerning Syria. Russia and Iran have been directly 
involved and are key factors determining the fate of the 
16. Narbone, Prospects for Stabilization, op-cit..
Syrian conflict. These two countries will also be major 
players in Syria’s reconstruction:
“Russian and Iranian actors are said to aim at 
securing a foothold in economic and recon-
struction opportunities in efforts also portrayed 
as ‘pay-back’ for support during the war. They 
benefit from a ‘first-mover’ advantage to access 
some of the most profitable opportunities ex-
ploiting the weakness of the regime and the 
limits of European and US entities to become 
more systematically involved due to the 
sanctions regime.” 
Through credit and investment, Iran has taken a 
leading role in Syria’s trade relations during the war, 
and its companies have been awarded contracts by 
the Syrian government to restore and reconstruct the 
electricity supply infrastructure. Similarly, Russia has 
concluded deals for an estimated $850m in heavy 
machinery, electric power plants and sales of wheat 
and cereal. The availability of funds to implement these 
agreements remains uncertain.17
China is a rising extra-regional power in MENA and, 
although it has had no direct military involvement in 
the conflicts, it has an interest in shaping the post-war 
future. As Lin says,
“China’s core interests are sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity, continued economic develop-
ment and the survival of the Communist Party, 
and these interests are supported by MENA via 
the provision of energy resources, consumer 
markets and advanced technology, especially 
from Israel, for China’s economic development. 
The region is a hub for market access in Africa 
and the EU, which is China’s largest export 
market and provides more than half of China’s 
crude imports. With the presence of ISIS, Al 
Qaeda affiliates and thousands of Chinese 
Uyghur jihadists in Syria and the Eastern Medi-
terranean, MENA also becomes a forward front 
to counter terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang 
– the bridgehead of the BRI. China is adopting 
a more robust diplomatic and security posture, 
17. Joseph Daher, The political economic context of Syria's 
reconstruction: a prospective in light of a legacy of unequal 
development, Middle East Directions: Wartime and Post-
Conflict in Syria, 2018/05.
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and proactively supporting the “peace with de-
velopment” narrative to mitigate this risk and 
restore regional order.”
However, China is also economically benefiting from 
wars and reconstruction in the short term. Imports of 
Chinese goods have grown, often replacing imports 
from countries following the sanctions regime, 
and China is well-placed to obtain reconstruction 
contracts, thus strengthening its geo-political and geo-
economic roles. 
Finally, regional powers have used these conflicts to 
promote geo-political and geo-economic interests. 
Because of the regional dynamics at play, they see 
reconstruction as a source of economic profit and 
an arena for rivalry, the projection of influence and 
hegemony.
In this context, Free Trade Zones (FTZs) bordering 
with conflict areas like the ones established by Saudi 
Arabia can be utilised as vehicles to accomplish post-
conflict objectives. As Robert Mogielnicki says in his 
chapter Saudi Free Trade Zones: Conflict resolution 
and reconstruction in Yemen and Iraq, they have been 
set up as multi-actor multi-purpose efforts involving 
collaboration between governments, local businesses, 
multinational firms, international investors and de-
velopment banks to assist in stabilisation, reconstruc-
tion and post-conflict development in the MENA 
region. Saudi Arabia is obviously concerned about the 
political, economic and security dynamics in post-con-
flict Iraq and Yemen, and  FTZs in Saudi eyes provide 
an opportunity to explore alternative means to help 
generate an influx of investment and “navigate the new 
economic realities in the region.” In the case of Yemen, 
for instance,
“[Saudi] government communications specifi-
cally mention ‘reconstruction’ and ‘restoration 
of legitimacy’ as objectives behind the rein-
vigorated FTZ initiative […] FTZs could facili-
tate the movement of a ‘million tons of cement, 
rebar, wood and other infrastructure materials.”
They could also be instruments to re-start trade and 
private investment. However, economic motives are 
mixed with political ones. In the case of the FTZ on 
the border with Iraq, “geopolitical rivalries, regional 
competition from within the GCC and border politics 
remain important factors behind Saudi plans for FTZ 
developments on its northern border.” Iran has opened 
a FTZ at the Slalamcheh border crossing near Basra, 
and lifted visa requirements for Iraqi shoppers. “Saudi 
efforts to create commercial hubs on its border with 
Iraq can be viewed as a means of countering Iranian 
economic influence in Iraqi markets.”18
What emerges is therefore a limited prospect of a 
positive impact of FTZs in helping to address the 
post-conflict needs of Yemen and Iraq. “The predomi-
nantly public-sector nature of FTZs in Saudi Arabia 
– and indeed the Gulf region more broadly – incen-
tivises the government to employ FTZs to accomplish 
domestic and foreign policy objectives that do not nec-
essarily align with reconciliation and reconstruction 
efforts.” “Exogenous factors and shocks to regional and 
domestic institutions can disrupt FTZ development 
and associated activities – thus complicating the ability 
of these initiatives to meet long-term post-conflict 
targets.”
The dynamics described above make the prospects 
for the reconstruction of war-torn MENA countries 
uncertain. The situation on the ground and the current 
regional and international context render it unlikely 
that external players will commit to long-term local 
and regional political processes, or to the type of 
granular action that might be required to tackle the 
myriad needs. It is hard to imagine that the situation 
will change in any near future. Large public funding or 
effective regional or international initiatives to support 
reconciliation or institution-building programmes, 
and to support sustainable stabilisation and recon-
struction, are unlikely. 
Against this backdrop, the most likely scenario is a 
region marked by low-intensity conflicts in a sort of 
no-war no-peace situation. This will demand new 
more realistic approaches to address the challenges of 
building peace and reconstructing the region on the 
part of the international community and the EU. The 
Conclusion of this eBook will try to look more closely 
at the challenges and opportunities they will encounter 
in their actions. 
18. Robert Mogielnicki, “Saudi Free Trade Zones: Conflict 
resolution and reconstruction in Yemen and Iraq”, this 
volume.
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4. The Structure of  
the eBook
This eBook is grounded on the belief that there is 
limited understanding of the current developments 
and dynamics emerging from MENA conflicts and 
their implications for policies designed to respond to 
the challenges they pose for the stability of the region 
and beyond. It is an attempt to frame and analyse the 
post-conflict context and provide some lenses for in-
terpretation and policy action.
The eBook is divided in three sections. Section One 
provides a conceptual framework which helps re-con-
ceptualise stabilisation and reconstruction in war-torn 
conflict countries and to view the current status quo 
through different lenses. They challenge the prevail-
ing narratives in the peace-building and reconstruc-
tion discourse and establish a basis for a re-visiting 
of policy responses to exiting war economies and 
bringing stability back to post-conflict countries.
Section Two includes three case studies in which the 
specific economic, political and social conditions in-
fluencing war economy dynamics and post-conflict re-
construction processes are analysed. They show varying 
MENA experiences and highlight that post-war recon-
struction processes can be hijacked and co-opted to 
further consolidate regime rule, together with ways in 
which external powers can influence domestic recon-
struction processes. 
Section Three draws from two alternative cases of both 
regional and external powers attempting to influence 
the region through business deals and trade, thus 
showing the importance of the role of geo-economics 
and geo-politics in shaping the reconstruction process 
and the future of the region. 
In Chapter Two, Steven Heydemann, argues that the 
ongoing civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen challenge 
key assumptions and raise important questions about 
what it means to exit conflict economies. He takes the 
case of Syria and analyses the mechanisms through 
which the authoritarian regime consolidates its rule in 
the post-conflict environment, setting new standards 
of exploitation and self-preservation. The experiences 
of Syria show that, contrary to what is widely believed, 
the political and economic logics at play are not those 
typical of fragile states but rather of fierce states, which 
put their survival above all other things. Considering 
this, Heydemann believes that the current fragility-
based peace-building approaches of the West are neces-
sarily flawed. He calls for new research and innovative 
approaches to reconstruction to help western policy-
makers to find alternative post-conflict treatments. 
In Chapter Three, looking at the case of Syria Achim 
Wennmann states that traditional international recon-
struction support risks contributing to authoritarian 
stabilisation. Furthermore, the current emphasis on 
stabilisation and counter-terrorism and the reality of 
the military forces and power-based politics on the 
ground substantially reduce the possibility of using 
the traditional liberal peace-building approaches. 
However, building peace remains important and should 
be re-conceptualised and adapted to the situation so 
that it can meet more realistic objectives. In view of 
the MENA conflict constraints, peace-building should 
use a versatile toolbox to aid exiting war economies. 
Wennmann proposes a few ways in which Western 
states can upgrade their peace-building software.
In Chapter Four, Joseph Daher analyses the Syrian 
case, looking more closely at the local dynamics in 
the reconstruction process. The nature of the regime 
as it emerges from eight years of civil war and its re-
silience are based on dependence on foreign actors, 
resulting in a loss of some of its authority. Daher 
laments that “crony capitalists and militias have con-
siderably increased their power,” suggesting that the 
reconstruction process will focus on consolidating and 
strengthening the patrimonial and despotic nature of 
the regime.
In Chapter Five, Hagood shifts the focus to Iraq 
and how post-conflict reconstruction processes are 
informed by identity politics and patronage networks. 
The pervasiveness of clientelism and the fact that 
control of state resources is in the hands of ethno-
sectarian elite members remain serious impediments 
to moving forward. Hagood intricately expands on 
the ways clientelist and patronage networks make 
it difficult to undertake the economic and legislative 
changes needed for reconstruction and economic di-
versification and development.
In Chapter Six, Eric Lob looks at the influence of the 
Iranian government on reconstruction in Lebanon 
since the 1980s through an organisation called Con-
struction Jihad (JS), which is deeply inspired by a 
similar Iranian organisation that helped the Iranian 
regime in the phase of consolidation of its power. Eric 
Lob’s analysis expands on the ways JS infiltrated the 
Lebanese Shia political landscape and maximised its 
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influence. He emphasises the role of JB and the recon-
struction process in consolidating Hezbollah’s power 
and promoting its military mission.
Mogielnicki’s Chapter Seven focuses on Saudi Arabia’s 
use of free trade zones for both economic purposes 
and promoting regional geopolitical interests. Mo-
gielnicki raises crucial questions concerning whether 
or not FTZs can replace international political com-
mitments to assist in stabilisation and reconstruction 
while remaining conscious of the ways in which the 
public and private sector intersect and clash. Through 
the example of Saudi Arabia’s FTZ near Yemen and 
Iraq, we are provided with crucial insights into how 
the early stages of FTZ projects can be instrumental-
ised by policymakers to aid reconstruction in conflict 
territories. 
Lastly, Lin’s chapter eight tackles the ways in which 
China perceives and narrates its actual and potential 
roles in the MENA region. China criticises Western 
narratives on the region and the past failures of US 
democracy-promotion policies. Through the Belt and 
Road Initiative, China promotes its foreign policy and 
economic interests in the region based on a ‘peace with 
development’ narrative and a focus on a stabilisation 
which aims at restoring order through regional devel-
opment and connectivity. Countering the zero-sum 
views which see Chinese and Western approaches 
to the region as essentially in competition, Lin also 
attempts to identify possible areas of convergence 
between Western peace-building action and China’s 
approach which could benefit the long-term stabilisa-
tion of the region.
SECTION 1: 
SHIFTING THE TERMS OF 
THE DISCUSSION
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The very idea of exiting a conflict economy implies that 
conflicts produce economies that differ from those that 
existed prior to conflict, and from those it is possible to 
establish once conflict ends. It rests on the assumption 
that conflict is a temporary condition that disrupts the 
otherwise normal functioning of an economy. It thus 
defines the restoration of economic normalcy as both a 
marker of and a necessary prerequisite for the success-
ful transition from war to peace. An economy is seen as 
having successfully exited conflict, in other words, once 
two distinct conditions are met. First, when economic 
indicators show signs of recovery toward pre-conflict 
levels. Second, when economic activity is no longer 
organised around and influenced by the exceptional 
conditions associated with large scale violence. We 
know reconstruction is working when “the main 
features of an economy no longer stem from the war 
but from the normal conditions of the economy.”1 
In some respects, these benchmarks are an appropriate 
means for assessing post-conflict economic recovery. 
Inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region have been among 
the most destructive in the world (see Table 1).  Violent 
conflicts in MENA have shattered national economies 
and caused massive levels of human suffering, trigger-
ing sharp reversals of economic and social develop-
ment. Between 2012 and 2017, Syria dropped 27 places 
in the UN’s annual Human Development Index (HDI), 
while Yemen declined by 20 places and Libya by 26 
(see Table 2).2 In the Syrian case, a UN assessment 
conducted in mid-2013 estimated that “[e]ven if the 
conflict ceased now and GDP grew at an average rate 
of five per cent each year, it . . . would take the Syrian 
economy 30 years to return to the economic level of 
1. Graham Brown, Arnim Langer, and Frances Stewart, “A 
Typology of Post-Conflict Environments” CRPD Working 
Paper No. 1, Centre for Research on Peace and Develop-
ment, University of Leuven (September 2011), p. 7. 
2. UNDP Human Development Reports, “Human Develop-








Ongoing civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen 
challenge key assumptions that guide research and 
practice on conflict economics and post-conflict re-
construction. They raise important questions about 
what it means to exit conflict economies, and whether 
fragility-based frameworks that define conflict as a 
product of state weakness and poor governance offer 
appropriate starting points for understanding either 
the political economy of conflict or the dynamics of 
post-conflict reconstruction in cases such as Libya, 
Syria and Yemen. Conflict experiences in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) point to shortcomings 
in the underlying logics of scholars and practitioners 
who view conflict as disrupting existing patterns of 
economic governance and creating opportunities for 
institutional reform and the transformation of conflict-
based political economies, especially in the authori-
tarian cases that continue to dominate the political 
landscape of the Middle East. 
Ultimately, the experiences of violent conflict in the 
Middle East highlight the need to fundamentally 
rethink strategies of post-conflict reconstruction to 
address the political and economic logics of states that 
are not fragile but fierce. To advance these claims, this 
paper will first review current approaches to post-con-
flict reconstruction, then draw on evidence primarily 
from Syria’s conflict to critique these approaches, show 
that conflict-based economic institutions, norms and 
practices exhibit high levels of continuity with those 
that defined pre-conflict political economies, and illus-
trate how this continuity shapes logics of post-conflict 
reconstruction in fierce states.
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2010.”3 More than five years later, the conflict continues 
and its economic and social effects have deepened. 
Under these conditions, the process of repairing 
damaged infrastructure, restoring power grids, 
ensuring public access to health care and education, 
and revitalising labour markets by encouraging the re-
sumption of manufacturing, investment, agriculture, 
and trade all constitute important markers of a return 
to economic normalcy. Yet these developments, while 
welcome, tell only one part of the reconstruction story, 
and may in fact be only secondary indicators that an 
economy is recovering from conflict. Recent research 
has focused attention on the economic and political 
sociology of conflict, and the impact of violence on 
what the sociologist Neil Fligstein has called “the ar-
chitecture of markets.”4 
This research finds that the most significant economic 
effects of war are caused not by damage to physical in-
frastructure, but by the corrosive effects of conflict on 
economic institutions, governance, and the organisa-
tion of economic activity. According to a 2017 World 
Bank study on Syria, the economic impact of conflict 
on these factors, measured in cumulative GDP losses, 
is twenty times greater than the effects of conflict on 
infrastructure. The study finds that: 
“disruptions to the economic system have had 
a far more significant impact than physical 
damage, and the longer the war continues the 
more severe will be its consequences, making 
recovery ever harder.  . . .  These disruptions 
reduce the incentive to engage in productive ac-
tivities, and interrupt economic networks and 
supply chains.”5
Citing this study, economists at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) went on to elaborate the causal 
mechanisms through which conflict damages insti-
tutions, networks, governance, and the organisation 
of economic activity. “The deterioration in economic 
governance,” they write, “has been particularly acute 
3. UN Relief and Works Agency, Department of Microfi-
nance, Socioeconomic and Damage Assessment Report: 
UNRWA Microfinance Clients in Syria (Report of the 
Situation in June 2013), Brussels, March 2014.
4. Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic 
Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.
5. World Bank, The Toll of War: Economic and Social Im-
pact Analysis (ESIA) of the Conflict in Syria – Key Facts, 
Washington DC, The World Bank, July 2019 2017. 
where institutional quality was already poor before 
the outbreak of violence, as was the case in Iraq, Libya, 
Syria, and Yemen.” They point to specific effects of 
conflict, including “reduced connectivity, higher trans-
portation costs, and disruptions in supply chains and 
networks.” In addition, they note that: 
“[i]nstitutions can also become corrupt as the 
warring parties try to exert control over political 
and economic activity. Fiscal spending and 
credit, for example, might be redirected to the 
constituencies of those in power. More broadly, 
many critical economic institutions – central 
banks, ministries of finance, tax authorities, and 
commercial courts – have seen their effective-
ness diminish because they have lost touch with 
the more remote parts of their countries.”6
Such practices are certainly evident in conflict-affected 
states in the MENA region. Beyond their impact on 
economic infrastructure, or on social and economic 
development, MENA’s conflicts have altered the con-
figuration of political economies and reshaped social 
structures. They have brought about dramatic changes 
in both the distribution of power, wealth and opportu-
nity, and of inequality, poverty and exclusion. Among 
its other effects, war has reorganised local ecologies of 
rent-seeking and corruption. The conflicts in Libya, 
Yemen and Syria have produced new conflict-based 
networks of economic privilege, marginalising some 
elements among the pre-war economic elite and 
elevating new networks of wartime profiteers, even 
while they cast large segments of society into condi-
tions of intense economic precarity.7
6. Phil de Imus, Gaëlle Pierre, and Björn Rother, “The 
Cost of Conflict”, Finance & Development 54:4, Decem-
ber 2017. See https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
fandd/2017/12/imus.htm#author.
7. Samer Abboud, “Syria’s Business Elite: Between Political 
Alignment and Hedging Their Bets”, SWP Comments 22, 
Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2013; 
Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Local Elites and the Politics of 
Alliance Building”, Mediterranean Politics 21:1, 2016, p. 
64-85.
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The Social Architecture 
of Markets in Conflict-
Affected States
Donor institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF are critical pillars in the global architecture of 
post-conflict reconstruction. For them, highlight-
ing the political and economic sociology of conflict, 
its effects on economic governance, and on the social 
organisation of political economies is both important 
and welcome. It adds crucial dimensions to our under-
standing of the economic effects of war. By implication, 
however, it also changes our thinking about processes 
of post-conflict reconstruction and what it means to 
exit a conflict economy. 
When these factors are taken into account, the effects 
of conflict become far more pervasive than we might 
otherwise perceive. Conflict not only leaves death and 
destruction in its wake; it corrupts and weakens frame-
works of economic governance. It reorganises the social 
structures and the economic networks, through which 
important shares of economic activity take place. To be 
sure, among states that are defined as fragile and seen 
as the most vulnerable to conflict, poor governance 
is acknowledged to be a prior condition that contrib-
utes to the onset of violence. Yet conflict is nonetheless 
seen as itself being a cause of corrupt, predatory, ex-
clusionary practices that are characterised as distinc-
tive of conflict-based economies. Competition among 
warring parties corrupts economic institutions. It leads 
to politically motivated patterns of public spending 
and causes the politicisation and decay of formal 
frameworks of economic regulation and oversight. It 
alters coalitions of winners and losers. These and other 
dysfunctional economic practices or outcomes are all 
defined as the effects of wartime conditions – as con-
sequences of conflicts that upend or destroy pre-war 
economic institutions.  
In this view, exiting conflict economies and restoring 
economic normalcy require more than rebuild-
ing infrastructure or improving employment.8 They 
also involve strengthening economic governance by 
8. On evolving conceptions of post-conflict normalcy see 
Graham K. Brown and Arnim Langer, “Conflict, Post-
Conflict and State Fragility, Conceptual and Methodologi-
cal Issues”, in Elgar Handbook of Civil War and Fragile 
States, Graham K. Brown and Arnim Langer, eds., U.K., 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, p. 13-14.  
restoring the reach of legal and regulatory institu-
tions, improving the rule of law, and renewing citizen 
trust in markets. Indeed, as the Bank’s 2017 report 
notes, “recovery and reconstruction are by no means 
an engineering issue; our results show that the issue 
is primarily an economic and social one, where the 
incentives of Syrian citizens are at the core.”9 In the 
absence of a comprehensive approach to reconstruc-
tion that addresses these issues, the Bank warns, the 
likely outcome is the persistence of economic practices 
that contributed to the onset of conflict in the first 
place.
This focus on conflict as a cause of corrupt, predatory 
economic norms and practices, and on improvements 
in economic governance as indicators that a country 
has overcome wartime conditions has important im-
plications. In stressing these factors, donor institu-
tions have embraced a view that is widely held within 
conflict and development studies that exiting conflict 
economies requires nothing less than the fully-fledged 
transformation of economic institutions, norms, and 
practices. Restoring economic normalcy thus requires 
far more than turning “post-conflict countries into 
functioning states that can offer their citizens basic 
public services.”10 Rather, the aim of reconstruction is 
to overcome the conditions associated with fragility. Its 
goal, therefore, is to put in place institutions, norms, 
and practices that address the economic and social 
causes of violence and provide a basis for effective 
governance and sustainable peace – in other words, 
inclusive, equitable, participatory and accountable 
frameworks of economic governance broadly consis-
tent with those of a developmental state.11 
Such aims are clearly aspirational. They are recognised 
as such by scholars and practitioners in the fields of 
9. Toll of War, op. cit., p. ix. Emphasis mine.
10. Desha Girod, Explaining Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 1.
11. There is an extensive literature on the political dimen-
sions of reconstruction that addresses issues beyond the 
scope of this paper, including the kinds of post-conflict 
political settlements that are most likely to sustain peace. 
Economic governance is integral to such settlements, 
especially in the relationship between economic and 
political inclusion, fairness, and equity. See Charles T. 
Call, Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil 
War Recurrence, Washington DC, Georgetown Univer-
sity Press, 2012.   
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conflict, development, and peacebuilding.12 Why then 
is it plausible to imagine that they might nonetheless be 
achievable? Ironically, perhaps, because the conflicts 
that are viewed as causing economic dysfunction, cor-
ruption, and predation are also seen as creating the 
conditions for post-conflict institutional transforma-
tion! In weakening or destroying pre-war frameworks 
of economic governance, conflict is believed to create 
opportunities to remake economic institutions along 
more effective, inclusive lines. This view of conflict 
has a long pedigree. It underlies the logic of Mancur 
Olson’s 1982 study, The Rise and Decline of Nations, 
in which he argues that war can have the effect of 
weakening the distributive coalitions and “encrusted 
interests” that distort economic outcomes and contrib-
ute to economic decline.13 
The role of conflict in removing vested interests, 
clarifying the causes of crisis, and stripping away en-
trenched obstacles to change is viewed as important 
not only because it creates possibilities for institutional 
transformation. It also creates new constituencies for 
change, opening up space for previously marginal 
social groups to shape more inclusive political settle-
ments, or new social contracts, capable of providing 
more effective economic governance. Among its other 
effects, therefore, conflict is believed to erode the 
popular legitimacy of pre-war institutions and, oc-
casionally, of the pre-war political elite. It is seen as 
creating a local demand for institutional reform among 
conflict-affected populations that perceive pre-war 
economic and political dysfunction and corruption as 
causes of mass violence, and view institutional reform 
12. For example, economist Graciana del Castillo argues 
that post-conflict reconstruction often fails because “the 
standards imposed by the international community . . . 
have been too high and unrealistic. Indeed, donors have 
pushed these countries to become a mirror image of 
them. As if war had no consequences, donors have made 
‘democracy’ and ‘markets’ the guiding principles to build 
the new societies.” Graciano del Castillo, “Economic 
Reconstruction and Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries”, 
CRPD Working Paper No. 25, Leuven: Centre for Re-
search on Peace and Development, 2015, p. 3.  
13. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Eco-
nomic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1982.  
s a necessary condition for exiting conflict.14
Taken together, these understandings of the pathways 
through which countries exit conflict economies 
generate a clear causal chain anchored in five principal 
assumptions:
1. state fragility increases the likelihood of violent 
conflict;
2. violent conflict weakens or destroys dysfunctional 
pre-war institutions of economic governance;
3. the destruction of pre-war institutions opens up 
space for post-conflict reconstruction to transform 
war-torn societies, reform economic governance, 
and mitigate the conditions associated with fragil-
ity that could lead to a recurrence of violence; 
4. because violent conflict is so profoundly destruc-
tive, it creates or empowers local constituencies fa-
vouring institutional reform; and
5. exiting conflict economies thus requires processes 
of institutional reform to create legitimate, effec-
tive, inclusive and accountable frameworks of eco-
nomic governance, in the form of inclusive politi-
cal settlements or new social contracts. 
Over time, these assumptions have generated what can 
best be characterised as a standard treatment for post-
conflict reconstruction programmes – generalised 
‘best practices’ that have become core components 
14. See Sarah Cliff and Nick Manning, “Building Institu-
tions After Conflict: The International Peace Academy’s 
State-Building Project”, Washington DC, The World 
Bank, 2006; UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (DESA), “Governance Strategies for Post Conflict 
Reconstruction, Sustainable Peace and Development”, UN 
DESA Discussion Paper - GPAB/REGOPA Cluster*, 
New York: United Nations, 2007; and Jane Stromseth, 
“Strengthening Demand for the Rule of Law in Post-Con-
flict Societies”, Minnesota Journal of International Law, 
18:2, 2009, p. 415-424.
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of a reconstruction ‘tool kit.’15 Not surprisingly given 
the assumptions underlying what has become a form 
of reconstruction orthodoxy, the standard treatment 
of post-conflict practitioners focuses on processes 
of institutional reform that will increase the chances 
that conflict-based political and economic orders will 
give way to inclusive, participatory social contracts in 
which effective economic governance is a central com-
ponent.16 These processes often include targeted, con-
text-specific combinations of constitutional reform, 
electoral system reform, justice and security sector 
reform, and the reform of economic governance. 
They also frequently include interventions aimed at 
strengthening participatory mechanisms both within 
society (through various strategies of reconciliation, 
social repair, and transitional justice), and between 
society and the state. 
To characterise dominant understandings of post-con-
flict reconstruction as a form of orthodoxy that favours 
and enables specific strategies of post-conflict inter-
vention should not be misread as implying that either 
is intrinsically wrong. Causal links between the con-
ditions associated with fragility and conflict are well 
documented and robust.17 The developmental benefits 
of institutional frameworks associated with inclusive 
social contracts are also supported by strong empirical 
evidence. Nor should the description of certain ap-
proaches to post-conflict reconstruction as a standard 
treatment be read as implying that the reforms as-
sociated with it are linear, automatic, irreversible, or 
inevitably successful. Research and practitioner lit-
eratures on post-conflict reconstruction reflect a keen 
awareness of the precariousness of reform processes 
and the many obstacles they confront.18 
15.The standard treatment is exemplified in the post-
conflict reconstruction strategies set out by the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Fund, established in 2006.  For 
an alternative view, see Steven Heydemann, “Beyond 
Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in 
Fierce States”, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 
June 2018.
16. The World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Ap-
proaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, Washington DC, 
IBRD The World Bank, 2018.  
17. Robert H. Bates, “State Failure”, Annual Review of Po-
litical Science 11, 2008, p. 1-14.
18. Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, eds., Building 
Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Con-
flict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2016.




“In the new Syrian reality, looting 
may as well be the new social 
contract.” 19
Specialists in conflict economics, fragile states, civil 
war, development, and peacebuilding acknowledge the 
challenges associated with exiting conflict economies. 
Nonetheless, the ways these challenges are framed 
and understood flow from the underlying assump-
tions of reconstruction orthodoxy about how conflict 
affects pre-war patterns of economic governance. Civil 
wars in particular are seen as moments of rupture in 
which pre-war institutions, norms, and practices give 
way to distinct wartime economic orders – frame-
works of economic governance that reflect the impact 
of conflict on economic behaviour. The disruption of 
pre-war political economies is now seen as a principal 
cause of the negative economic effects associated with 
violent conflict – some twenty times more destructive 
in the Syrian case than losses to physical infrastructure 
alone. Disentangling economic activity from the grip 
of wartime economic orders thus emerges as a critical 
step in the transition to economic normalcy. 
Civil wars in the Middle East, however, exhibit char-
acteristics that call reconstruction orthodoxy itself 
into question. Conflicts in these cases have followed 
trajectories that challenge its causal claims about the 
effects of conflict on economic governance. They 
thus subvert the subsequent claims about the role of 
conflict in creating opportunities for and constituen-
cies in support of post-conflict processes of institu-
tional reform. Instead, what the examples of Syria, 
Yemen, and Libya demonstrate is that conflict does 
not cause the breakdown of pre-war frameworks of 
economic governance. Rather, conflict-based wartime 
economic orders in all three cases exhibit high levels of 
continuity with pre-war frameworks. In all three, the 
pre-war political economies exhibited attributes that 
are typically presented in the literature as the effects 
of violent conflict, including predatory, corrupt, exclu-
19. Rafia Salameh, "The Looting Years", al-Jumhuriya, 18 
October, 2018. 
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sionary norms and practices, and elite capture of state 
institutions. The norms and practices that organised 
economic activity in the pre-war political economies of 
all three of these cases continued to do so as they broke 
down into violent conflict. As the case of Syria shows, 
moreover – the only one of the three to have undertak-
en reconstruction at the time of writing – continuity 
also characterises the post-conflict processes through 
which the Syrian regime is pursing the restoration of 
its own authoritarian vision of normalcy. 
The path-dependent character of wartime economic 
orders is not unique to the MENA region. Emerging 
research programmes have begun to trace the legacy 
effects of pre-war conditions on wartime political 
orders.20 Echoing the argument I advance here, recent 
literature has also highlighted the path-dependence 
of institutions in critiquing assumptions about the 
destructive effects of conflict on pre-war institutional 
arrangements, and calls for new attention to be given 
to the “connection between pre-war and post-war in-
stitutional settings.”21
In keeping with these observations, the pre-war 
political economies of Syria, Libya and Yemen were 
defined by features that persisted as societies descended 
into violence. In unpacking the structure of wartime 
economic orders in all three of these cases, continuity 
in the organisation of economic institutions, norms, 
and practices is evident along a number of dimensions. 
These include: 
1. the proliferation of informal, highly personalistic 
mechanisms of economic governance that exert 
more influence over economic outcomes than for-
mal state institutions and economic policies;
2. a culture of impunity for privileged economic ac-
tors;
3. predatory and coercive forms of resource extrac-
tion;
20. Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insur-
gent Cohesion and Collapse, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 2014; and Paul Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and 
Wartime Political Orders”, Perspectives on Politics, 10:2, 
June 2012, p. 243-264.
21. Nadine Ansorg and Sabine Kurtenbach, eds., Institu-
tional Reforms and Peacebuilding: Change, Path-Depen-
dency and Societal Divisions in Post-war Communities, 
London and New York, Routledge, 2017, p. 4.
4. porous boundaries between formal and informal 
economic activity, and between licit and illicit 
practices; 
5. dispersed, decentralised, and diffuse structures of 
economic authority in which state functions such 
as regulation, taxation, security, and service provi-
sion are delegated to non-state agents (e.g. Shabiha 
networks in Syria); and
6. frameworks of economic governance that are or-
ganised not to ensure the provision of public goods 
to all citizens, but to control and allocate access to 
state resources to select categories of citizens, often 
on the basis of ascriptive criteria.
In such cases, it is not competition among warring 
parties that corrupts economic institutions, or intro-
duces predatory forms of taxation. It is not conflict that 
shifts economic governance from formal to informal 
institutions, or gives rise to exclusionary, clientalistic 
patterns of resource allocation. Nor is it conflict that 
politicises formal frameworks of economic regula-
tion and oversight. All of these attributes are defining 
features of pre-war political economies. Moreover, 
these characteristics have shown themselves to be both 
highly portable across pre-war and wartime contexts 
and highly adaptable to the exigencies of wartime 
economic orders. In many respects, the incentive struc-
tures that shape the economic preferences of individu-
als concerning savings, investment, and consumption 
reflect institutional arrangements, as well as settled 
norms and practices, that change relatively little in the 
transition from what constitutes peace in an authori-
tarian security state to conditions of mass violence. 
This is not to argue that continuity is present to the 
same extent across every domain of economic gover-
nance. There is variation in the degrees of continuity 
among economic institutions, even in cases in which 
overall continuity is high. The central banks in Yemen 
and Libya, for example, have been more profoundly 
affected by conflict than have the agencies that oversee 
oil production and exports. Nor should we expect that 
every case of civil war will exhibit the same overall 
levels of continuity. Syria’s Central Bank has expe-
rienced far less disruption than its counterparts in 
Yemen and Libya. More generally, Leonard Wantcha-
kon has argued that in the cases of Mozambique and 
Nicaragua, civil wars “almost annihilated the au-
thoritarian political situation that led to war,” easing 
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the path to post-conflict institutional transformation 
and, eventually, democratisation.22 Where insurgents 
prevail over governments, and where insurgent forces 
have had the territorial control, resources, time, and 
ideological foundations to build viable governance 
institutions, levels of continuity can be expected to be 
much lower than in cases like Syria, where government 
forces have prevailed, or Yemen and Libya, where in-
surgents have largely failed to construct alternative in-
stitutional frameworks and exercise their authority in 
ways that are entirely consistent with the regimes of Ali 
Abdallah Saleh and Muammar Qaddafi.
Yet where conditions do provide for high levels of 
continuity between pre-war and wartime political 
economies – as in Syria, Yemen, and Libya – the im-
plications are significant. Continuity affects what it 
means to say that an economy has exited conflict, how 
economic normalcy is defined, and thus how processes 
of post-conflict reconstruction will unfold. Under such 
conditions, as I have argued elsewhere, to exit conflict 
does not mean undertaking a process of economic 
reforms designed to move a political economy toward 
an inclusive, accountable, social contract. Instead, 
it is a process of ‘reconstructing authoritarianism’, in 
which a regime uses pre-war strategies of economic 
governance to reassert its authority over a post-con-
flict society, reproducing the economic institutions, 
norms, and practices associated with both pre-war and 
wartime economic orders.23 To exit conflict economies, 
therefore, becomes a narrower metric based on 
standard economic indicators such as recovery in 
levels of trade, manufacturing, employment, or con-
sumption, reduced inflation, improvements in foreign 
exchange positions and exchange rates, rather than 
governance indicators such as transparency, account-
ability, inclusiveness, or the rule of law. With respect 
to the latter, post-conflict reconstruction will have 
little effect on the core features of a wartime economic 
order which itself mimics the core features of a pre-war 
political economy as summarised above. 
22. Leonard Wantchekon, “The Paradox of ‘Warlord’ De-
mocracy”, op. cit. 
23. Steven Heydemann, “Reconstructing Authoritarian-
ism: The Politics and Political Economy of Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction in Syria”, The Politics of Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction, POMEPS Studies 30, September 2018, 
p. 14-22; “Civil War, Economic Governance, and State 
Reconstruction in the Arab Middle East”, Daedelaus 147: 
1, Winter 2018, p. 48-63.   
What Continuity Is and 
Is Not
It is important to be clear about which features of a 
pre-war political economy exhibit continuity in the 
transition to a wartime economic order and can be 
expected to shape subsequent processes of post-con-
flict reconstruction. As noted above, conflict on the 
scale of a civil war causes massive changes in the or-
ganisation of a political economy, in social structures, 
and in human development. Tables 1 and 2 offer stark 
evidence of the material and human costs of the Syrian 
conflict. In addition, however, all three of MENA’s 
ongoing conflicts have led to significant shifts in the 
social distribution of wealth and poverty, economic 
inclusion and exclusion, and in the composition of 
elite networks that profit from wartime economic ac-
tivities. In keeping with findings in the literature on 
conflict economics, all three cases have experienced 
capital flight, the near collapse of investment activity, 
mass population displacement, and a rapid growth 
of informal and illicit sectors of the economy as state 
regulatory capacity diminishes and national markets 
fragment under the weight of mass violence. 
These elements of discontinuity are far from trivial. 
They become especially acute in the transition to 
post-conflict, when regime appeals to the exigencies 
of war lose their ability to stifle public discontent with 
shortages, disruptions in public services, or the in-
creasingly visible economic differences between those 
who profited from conflict and those who did not. 
During the winter of 2019, for example, these strains 
were evident in regime-held areas of Syria, which ex-
perienced a proliferation of protests against gas and 
power shortages, neglect of wounded veterans, rising 
food prices, and widespread corruption.24 
Thus, emphasising continuity in economic institu-
tions, norms, and practices does not imply that conflict 
leaves economies unaffected. To the extent that con-
flict-driven changes in a political economy introduce 
new sources of tension and strain – sharpening 
tensions among competing elite factions, or between 
regimes and citizens – they can also create conditions 
that compel even recalcitrant authoritarian regimes 
to respond. If such conditions test the capacity of a 
regime to stabilise a post-conflict political order, they 
might also push regimes to initiate previously unthink-
able economic reforms. 
24. Aron Lund, “The Blame Game Over Syria’s Fuel Crisis”. 
IRIN, March 5, 2019. 
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The core claim presented here, however, is more 
limited in scope although pervasive and systematic in 
its implied effects. Where continuity is evident is in the 
weight of informal institutions, norms, and practices 
in shaping the economic behaviour of individuals; the 
subordination of formal institutions, laws, and regu-
lations to informal institutions, norms, and practices; 
and the extent to which economic activity is organised 
on the basis of ascriptive, clientalistic, or patrimonial 
ties.  These characteristics define the organisation of 
pre-war political economies and have shown them-
selves to be highly resilient and adaptive to conflict 
conditions. 
What is necessary to stress, however, is that these char-
acteristics are compatible with different configura-
tions of elite networks, and with any number of other 
changes associated with conflict economies, including 
shifts in patterns of inclusion and exclusion, the frag-
mentation of national markets, the rise of competing 
wartime political orders, the erosion of formal insti-
tutions, and the concomitant expansion of informal 
and illicit economic sectors. There is no necessary 
contradiction between the claim of continuity in the 
underlying features of a political economy and the 
World Bank’s finding that “disruptions [associated 
with conflict] reduce the incentive to engage in pro-
ductive activities, and interrupt economic networks 
and supply chains.”25 There is little question that 
conflict casts a long shadow over economic activities 
that might be appealing under other circumstances. 
What the claim of continuity does imply is that when a 
pre-war political economy exhibits the features found 
in the Syrian, Libyan, or Yemeni cases, economic in-
centives during both peacetime and wartime are 
heavily inflected by the informal institutions, norms, 
and practices that are crucial to how individuals assess 
the costs and benefits of any given economic activity. 
In all three cases, pre-war investment decisions were 
decisively influenced by considerations of corruption, 
predation, personalism, and an understanding that 
formal oversight and regulation were applied arbitrari-
ly according to informal criteria, and not necessarily 
determinative of how economic decisions were made. 
None of these conditions changed as these societies 
collapsed into conflict. None seem likely to change in 
the transition to post-conflict. 
25. World Bank, The Toll of War: Economic and Social Im-
pact Analysis (ESIA) of the Conflict in Syria – Key Facts, 
Washington DC, The World Bank, July 10, 2017. 
In addition, the claim of continuity poses a major 
challenge to conceptions of state fragility, and to the 
relationship between fragility and conflict, on the one 
hand, and between fragility and post-conflict recon-
struction, on the other hand. The concept of fragility 
is the basis on which reconstruction orthodoxy rests. It 
is the starting point for what has become the standard 
treatment in post-conflict reconstruction. Yet the ex-
periences of civil war in Syria, Libya, and Yemen point 
to the limits of the concept, and the risks that arise 
when it is misapplied. 
Fierce States and the 
Limits of Reconstruction 
Orthodoxy26
In the literature on development and conflict, 
fragility is the result of institutional dysfunction. It 
is a condition of states that deviate from a presump-
tive standard defined as effective governance, respon-
sive and accountable institutions, and inclusive social 
contracts. Leaders are presumed to prefer good gov-
ernance over the conditions associated with fragility. 
To the extent that they resist, or delay in implementing 
reforms needed to improve the quality of their insti-
tutions, the fault is often found in a lack of political 
will to make changes that might carry political costs, 
in assumptions about the preferences of corrupt 
leaders for predation and short-term self-enrichment 
over long-term economic growth, or in unrealistic as-
sumptions among post-conflict practitioners about the 
efficacy of institutional reforms.27 
What fragility-based models overlook, however, is the 
possibility that some of the states that such models 
code as fragile, as lacking appropriate institutions and 
unable to govern effectively, might be delivering the 
governance outcomes they were designed to produce. 
Such states are always authoritarian. They have 
typically been constructed by state-builders drawn 
from a post-colonial generation of authoritarian elite 
with military backgrounds. Most have followed a 
26. This section draws on an earlier paper, Beyond Fragility, 
op. cit., p. 5-6.
27. Thráinn Eggertsson, Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities 
and Limits of Reform, Ann Arbor, University of Michi-
gan press, 2005; Matt Andrews, The Limits of Institution-
al Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic 
Solutions, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
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pathway of increasing personalism if not familial rule, 
the de-politicisation of the military through a range 
of ‘coup-proofing’ strategies, and elite capture of large 
segments of the economy. 
Yet as the Syrian example shows, such states are not 
necessarily fragile. They are more appropriately char-
acterised as fierce states, in which the ruling elite 
elevates survival above all else and designs institutions 
to support this aim.28 In fierce states, the consolidation 
of state institutions, and the effectiveness with which 
they contribute to regime survival, is often correlated 
with attributes that directly contradict those associ-
ated with good governance or resilience, including ac-
countability, voice, equity, transparency, and inclusion. 
Instead, governance in fierce states is managed as an 
expression of a zero-sum existential struggle in which 
conflict reinforces the determination of a ruling elite 
to defend existing institutional arrangements by force.
This does not imply that fierce states are indifferent 
to development as it is conventionally understood. 
In this respect, fierce states fall outside Robert Bates’s 
definition of failed states – a category he is careful to 
distinguish from run-of-the-mill, predatory forms of 
authoritarianism.29 Regimes in fierce states understand 
the threat that disaffected populations can pose. They 
understand the benefit of strengthening the depen-
dency of citizens on the regime through the use of re-
distributive social policies.30 They are sensitive to the 
value of popular legitimacy, despite their reliance on 
repression and the use of violence. For instance, in his 
January 2011 interview with the Wall Street Journal, 
Bashar Assad appealed, naively, it turned out, to the 
legitimacy he believed his regime enjoyed as a result 
of its resistance to Israel and the United States to assert 
that Syria would never fall victim to the protests then 
sweeping the region.31 
Moreover, fierce states have constituencies. They 
construct alliances and coalitions, typically on the 
basis of transactional loyalty. They structure incentives 
to reward compliance. They rest on a social base that 
28. The term ‘fierce state’ is not entirely new, but has not 
been widely adopted. It was originally coined by Nazih 
Ayubi in his final book, Overstating the Arab State: Poli-
tics and Society in the Arab World, New York, I.B. Tauris, 
1996.  
29. Robert Bates, “Failed States”, Op. cit., p. 1-12. 
30. Michael Albertus, Sofia Fenner and Dan Slater, Coercive 
Distribution, New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2018.
31. “Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad”, The 
Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011.
can be exploited to generate significant political capital, 
and that offers possibilities for mass mobilisation in the 
event of threats. If threats escalate into armed insur-
gency or mass violence, the organisation of state-soci-
ety relations in fierce states is likely to shape processes 
of social polarisation and militarisation, reflecting 
larger patterns of economic and political inclusion and 
exclusion. As the Syrian example shows, when chal-
lenged by insurgencies or civil war, some fierce states 
may prove more resilient than fragility-based models 
of state weakness and vulnerability tend to assume. 
Not all fierce states survive challenges on the scale 
of those confronted by the Assad regime. Libya and 
Yemen have not, and can now appropriately be cate-
gorised as failed states. Yet even when conflict brings 
about the collapse of such states, the likelihood that 
a post-conflict transition will overcome the legacies 
of pre-war political economies and produce effective, 
accountable, inclusive institutions is low. As the 
Libyan case demonstrates, even in failure, the shadow 
of pre-war and wartime economic orders is likely to 
undermine the efficacy of the standard reconstruction 
treatment. Moreover, those fierce states that survive 
conflicts credit their success to the very institutions, 
norms, and practices that reconstruction orthodoxy 
targets for reform. It is, perhaps, not so surprising 
that dictators who prevail in civil wars tend to have 
exceptionally long tenures in office. Of the twenty-
five longest-serving rulers in the world today, thirteen 
survived civil wars or rose to power after prevailing in 
a civil war, and preside over regimes that are either dic-
tatorships or illiberal democracies.32
This diagnosis has obvious implications for debates 
about what it means to exit a conflict economy. In the 
Syrian case, the hope, however modest, that political 
conditions might someday permit external actors 
to engage in effective, accountable reconstruction 
programming in Syria, or through their interven-
tions influence the course of reconstruction, is deeply 
misguided. Similarly, the argument that the United 
States and the EU must support reconstruction to avoid 
creating a black hole in Syria that will drive radicals 
and refugees into Europe is a form of protection racket 
diplomacy that should be resisted.33
32.  The 13 states are the Republic of the Congo, Cambo-
dia, Uganda, Sudan, Chad, Eritrea, Tajikistan, Rwanda, 
North Korea, Algeria, Russia, Syria, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.
33.  Federica Mogherini, “Federica Mogherini’s remarks at 
the panel on the future of Syria with the UN Special Envoy 
Staffan De Mistura”, (speech, Rome, March 12, 2016).
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Fixing Fierce States? 
Outlines of a Research 
Agenda
Fierce states are largely resistant to the standard re-
construction treatment. Indeed, its use in such cases 
is counter-productive. Supporting post-conflict re-
construction in fierce states will strengthen corrupt, 
exclusionary, predatory regimes. It will not produce 
the intended institutional reforms or changes in gov-
ernance that are needed to address the causes of the 
Syrian conflict and, potentially, reduce the odds of 
future violence.34 In the Syrian case, moreover, inter-
national engagement in reconstruction will contrib-
ute to the legitimation and normalisation of a regime 
that is deeply implicated in war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and violations of international law. 
If Syria highlights the limits of fragility-based models 
of post-conflict reconstruction, however, it also makes 
clear the absence of compelling alternatives. How 
should international actors engage with fierce states, if 
they do so at all? What kind of treatments might yield 
more productive results in ushering fierce states toward 
more effective, inclusive, and accountable models of 
economic governance? The answers to these questions 
have proven elusive. There is a small but growing lit-
erature on the failure of post-conflict interventions 
that offers insights into a wide range of deficiencies 
and shortcomings.35 Yet there has been more attention 
in this literature to diagnosing failures (admittedly, the 
focus of this paper) than to alternative treatments. It 
is possible, as Jeremy Weinstein has argued, that the 
most effective way to achieve post-conflict stability is 
to avoid external interventions and let the combat-
ants sort themselves out, through processes he defines 
as “autonomous recovery.”36 At a minimum, such an 
approach would avoid the pernicious effects of inter-
ventions that may do more to prompt the recurrence 
of conflict than to prevent it.37 Ultimately, however, 
34. See Heydemann, Beyond Fragility, op. cit.
35. See Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., The Dilem-
mas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of 
Postwar Peace Operations, New York, Routledge, 2009.
36. Jeremy Weinstein, “Autonomous Recovery and Interna-
tional Intervention in Comparative Perspective”. Work-
ing Paper No. 57, Washington DC, Center for Global 
Development, 2005.
37. Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil 
Conflict, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
such guidance fails to address the human toll imposed 
by the regimes that dominate fierce states. It also fails 
to respond to two important but counter-intuitive 
facts: first, as recounted above, dictators who survive 
insurgencies tend to have long tenures; second, as 
Barbara Walter points out, “since 2003 every civil war 
that has started has been a continuation of a previous 
civil war.”38 The obvious implication is that conflict 
termination in fierce states is likely to be a temporary 
phenomenon, an interregnum between episodes of 
mass violence. And as MENA’s civil wars have made 
abundantly clear, it is increasingly difficult to view the 
impact of such episodes as limited to the countries 
in which they occur. There is little question that the 
human ‘spillover’ of conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghani-
stan, and Sub-Saharan Africa have contributed to the 
global rise of nativist, illiberal political movements in 
Europe and the U.S.  The incentives to develop alterna-
tives to the standard treatment would thus appear to 
be compelling.
How should such an enterprise proceed? In this paper 
I can do no more than hint at the bare outlines of what 
a research programme might require. We have accu-
mulated a body of knowledge about why various forms 
of post-conflict intervention fail. As a first step, these 
failures need to be mined and aggregated to identify 
where possibilities exist for modifications and ad-
aptations that will address the root causes of failure. 
Second, it will be helpful to revisit fierce states that 
have experienced civil wars that lead to meaningful 
and durable post-conflict processes of institutional 
reform, to identify whether they exhibit generalisable 
features that can inform the development of alternative 
post-conflict treatments. Third, the global institutional 
architecture of post-conflict reconstruction should be 
encouraged to step back from its current reliance on 
fragility-based models to become laboratories for de-
veloping and field-testing alternatives to the standard 
treatment. These suggestions are not in any sense 
radical. They are consistent with what most scholars 
and practitioners would regard as business as usual. 
Yet they point to the importance of moving beyond 
diagnosis and explanation of failures of post-conflict 
intervention, to the demanding but essential work of 
improving both theory and practice. 
38. Barbara F. Walter, “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainabil-
ity of Post-Conflict Peace”. World Development Report 
Background Paper, Washington DC, The World Bank, 
2011.
NO EXIT: CONFLICT, ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE, AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN FIERCE 
STATES - Steven Heydemann
22
Table 1: Largest GDP losses following conflict onset
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Table 2: Human Development Index Rankings, 1990-2017 Libya, Syria, Yemen
Source: UNDP Human Development Reports, “Human Development Data 1990-2017”.
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After eight years of war, there is undoubtedly a peace to 
build in Syria, yet the ‘what,’ ‘how,’ ‘who’ and ‘when’ of 
this endeavour is far from clear. What is clear, however, 
is that building a peace in Syria will not be ‘business 
as usual’ for Western policy-makers because so-called 
‘liberal’ peacebuilding – comprehensive programmes 
aiming to achieve order, prosperity and participatory 
political systems after civil wars – has little prospect 
of traction. This is because policy-makers are facing a 
‘fierce state’ – in which “ruling elites elevate survival 
above all else and design institutions to support this 
aim”2 – or an ‘authoritarian peace’ – in which “regional 
and domestic actors cohere around illiberal, authori-
tarian practice.”3 The challenge of these conditions is 
“the near impossibility of pursuing any form of re-
construction support that will not contribute to the 
regime’s project of authoritarian stabilisation and de-
* Achim Wennmann is Senior Researcher at the Centre 
on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) 
of the Graduate Institute of International and Develop-
ment Studies, and Executive Coordinator of the Ge-
neva Peacebuilding Platform. This paper draws on the 
insights of expert meetings on the Syrian economy con-
vened by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) (March 2018), the National Agenda for the 
Future of Syria (NAFS) Programme of the United Na-
tions Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia 
(ESCWA) (May and September 2018), the European 
Union Institute (November 2018), the London School of 
Economics (December 2018) and the Carnegie Middle 
East Center (December 2018).
2. Steven Heydemann, “Beyond Fragility: Syria and the 
Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States”, Washing-
ton DC, Brookings Institution, 2018, p.2.
3. Samer Nasif Abboud, Syria (Second Edition), London, 
Polity, 2018, p. 216.
mographic change, or avoid channelling funds into 
the pockets of regime cronies and warlords.” Any hope 
that the current period is merely transitory and the in-
ternational community can go back to building liberal 
states and economies in the near future is “deeply 
misguided.”4 
What should Western policy-makers do? Their patients 
no longer respond to the standard treatment and what 
is in the medicine chest no longer seems to work. 
Moreover, the patients look to other doctors that offer 
treatments to keep them alive but cannot cure their 
chronic conditions. 
This chapter places the challenge of reconstruction 
and authoritarianism in Syria in the broader context 
of building peace in the era of the “third wave of au-
tocratisation,” in which the democratic attributes of 
states and societies “erode gradually and under legal 
disguise.”5 The chapter is an exploratory study of how a 
focus on Syria’s reconstruction can help assess the op-
portunities and limits for reinventing peacebuilding 
practice. On the one hand, the chapter speaks to those 
interested in reconstructing Syria by exploring what a 
peacebuilding perspective on reconstruction can look 
like; on the other hand, the chapter speaks to peace-
builders by challenging them to reinvent peacebuild-
ing in the face of ever more autocratic governance in 
many parts of the world. 
The chapter argues that peacebuilding is possible in 
Syria at a time when reconstruction is starting, and it 
is possible under the conditions of a ‘fierce state’ or ‘au-
thoritarian peace.’ However, to recognise the opportu-
nities for peacebuilding, policy-makers need to change 
their mindset from peacebuilding as a ‘comprehensive 
programme’ to peacebuilding as ‘software.’ They need 
to lay to rest the understanding of ‘liberal’ peacebuild-
ing that was part of the post-Cold War era. That era is 
now over, together with the policies that were designed 
for it. They also need to recognise the operational chal-
lenges that accompanied ‘liberal’ peacebuilding, and 
that it has been overtaken by stabilisation and coun-
ter-terror policies, at least since the mid-2000s when 
the ‘War on Terror’ had become a predominant policy 
framework. 
4.  Heydemann, Beyond Fragility, 2.  
5. Anna Lührmann. and Staffan I. Lindberg, “A Third 
Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New About It?” 
Democratization, 2019 March, p.1.
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The chapter emphasises the continuing importance 
of peacebuilding, understood as the use of dialogue, 
trust-building and consensus-seeking processes to 
resolve, transform or manage conflict through non-
violent means. If understood as software – or an 
operating system that makes things work – peacebuild-
ing is versatile and can be uploaded not only to how 
reconstruction packages are negotiated or ultimately 
implemented in Syria but may also be relevant to other 
challenges, such as reforming Syria’s security sector or 
exiting local war economies. Understanding peace-
building as software means going forward in a more 
piecemeal fashion, solving problems where possible 
and through iterative processes. 
The chapter unfolds its analysis in four parts. The 
first part describes the changing global landscape for 
peacebuilding. This is followed by part two, which 
reviews the arguments about why the era of ‘liberal’ 
peacebuilding has ended. The third part charts Syria’s 
political economy of governance and post-conflict re-
construction as a backdrop to reflections in part four 
about reinventing peacebuilding. This part suggests 
that peacebuilding in a new, more multi-polar and au-
tocratic world needs to go back to basics. Policy-mak-
ers need to change their glasses to recognise the agents 
and spaces for this endeavour, and they may also need 
to focus on what they can do in their own countries 
and institutions to help building peace elsewhere. 
The Changing Global 
Landscape for 
Peacebuilding
Over the last three decades, international peacebuild-
ing practice has been dominated by a set of assump-
tions that set countries on the path towards a so-called 
liberal peace. The UN and other international actors 
have concentrated their efforts on ending armed 
conflict through peace agreements, which are to be 
implemented through a cocktail of peacekeeping oper-
ations, state-building and peacebuilding programmes.6 
Such international assistance has become guided by 
the aim of establishing a liberal peace that includes an 
array of functional components such as constitutions, 
elections, institutions and reconciliation mechanisms. 
6. Gowan, R. and S. J. Stedman, “The International Regime 
Treating Civil War, 1988-2017,” Daedalus 147:1, 2018, p. 
171-184.
Many peace agreements have defined the terms for the 
trajectory towards these elements and provided for 
the requisite international support. Over time, an in-
creasingly professionalised set of actors has emerged 
that service different components of the ‘liberal peace’ 
trajectory.7
However, the liberal project to rebuild states and 
societies after armed conflict is becoming increas-
ingly orphaned, cashless and dysfunctional. The US 
supported liberal peacebuilding as a normative global 
policy agenda after the Cold War, and, more broadly, 
used a liberal agenda to construct an international 
order to expand its imperial reach after the Second 
World War. However, in recent years the US has been 
retreating from globalism and from supporting liberal 
values.8 Moreover, major European countries – such 
as Germany, the UK and Sweden – and the European 
Union are or probably will be de-prioritising peace-
building programmes in the face of more proximate 
interests and threats associated with extremism, 
terrorism or unregulated migration.9 
Such developments illustrate that a transforma-
tion towards a multipolar order is well under way, 
heralding a period of turbulence driven by power 
politics and fights for zones of influence.10 In this new 
order, the US, the EU and European countries have 
limited leeway for setting post-conflict agendas, as has 
been illustrated in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Afghani-
stan. After a series of ill-fated military interventions, 
many Western countries may also have lost their le-
gitimacy as credible peacebuilders in the eyes of many 
local actors. 
These political currents are complemented by a 
critique in academic literature pointing to a dys-
functional nature of liberal peacebuilding. For over a 
decade, this literature has exposed massive ambitions 
7. Ladley and Wennmann (forthcoming 2020), “Political 
Economy and Peace Agreements,” in M. Weller, M. Retter 
and A. Varga (eds), International Law and Peacemaking, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
8. Gilford John Ikenberry, “The End of the Liberal Interna-
tional Order,” International Affairs 94:1, 2018, 7-23.
9. Andrew Sherriff, Pauline Veron, Matthias Deneckere 
and Volker Hauck, Supporting Peacebuilding in Times of 
Change: A Synthesis of 4 Case Studies, 2018, Maastricht, 
European Centre for Development Policy Management.
10. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: The Para-
dox of Progress, Washington DC, National Intelligence 
Council, 2018.
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under impossible conditions, and the lack of resources 
and capacity to build peace.11 The academic literature 
also points to a pushback against the type of peace-
building that is directed by external interveners. Many 
states and societal actors in the Middle East, Africa, 
Asia and Latin America are demonstrating increasing 
self-confidence and are willing to challenge the often 
paternalistic approaches of ‘outsiders’ – understood as 
foreign donors, international organisations or interna-
tional non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – at-
tempting to control the peacebuilding dynamics on the 
ground. These observations illustrate a disconnection 
between peacebuilding at the grassroots level and the 
peacebuilding narratives and programmes of interna-
tional organisations and many bilateral donors.12 
Understanding the End of 
Liberal Peacebuilding
The changing global landscape for peacebuilding rep-
resents a new reality for Western policy-makers that 
may not have fully sunk in yet: ‘Liberal peacebuilding’ 
is waning because the historic period which shaped it 
is over. From this perspective, ‘liberal peacebuilding’ 
can be associated with the period between the early 
1990s and the mid-2000s. This timeline began after 
the Cold War, when Western states needed a standard 
treatment to exit civil wars and the United States 
dominated global politics. It ended with the beginning 
of the ‘war on terror,’ which emphasised state-centred 
security and stabilisation doctrines instead of ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’ in the Western policy community. The 
war on terror also became a bridge-builder toward 
non-liberal states to confront common enemies, espe-
cially in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. 
This waning of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ is further il-
lustrated when looking at the changing assumptions 
11. Edward Newman and Roland Paris, and Oliver P. 
Richmond (eds.), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuild-
ing, New York, United Nations University, 2009; David 
Chandler, Peacebuidling: The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1997-
2017, Cham, Springer Nature/Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
12. See, for instance, Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy (eds.), 
Whose Peace is it Anyway: Connecting Somali and Inter-
national Peacemaking, London, Conciliation Resources 
with Interpeace, 2018; M.B. Dayna Brown, Isabella Jean, 
and Mary B. Anderson, Time to Listen: Hearing People 
on the Receiving End of International Aid, Cambridge, 
CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2012.
driving post-conflict exits. The dominant post-Cold 
War consensus involved a theory of change in which a 
functioning state and society produce order, prosper-
ity and political participation all at once. Over the last 
decade, however, this approach has become comple-
mented by an alternative theory of change that pri-
oritises state-centred and -driven order and prosper-
ity, with political participation being phased in later 
in the process (if at all).13 Many Western governments 
and international organisations have also shifted their 
narratives from ‘peacebuilding’ to ‘resilience’ or ‘stabi-
lisation,’ thereby emphasising the need for order and 
control over transformative change in the underlying 
drivers of conflict. 
The prioritisation of stability – and the elite bargains 
necessary to achieve it – has increasingly undermined 
‘liberal peacebuilding.’ Cheng and colleagues 
challenge the assumption that elite bargains will 
necessarily promote stability and economic de-
velopment simultaneously and reveal the trade-
offs that often exist between peace promotion, 
economic growth and equitable development. 
[Their findings] show that stability is often pred-
icated upon rent sharing arrangements that are 
very problematic in terms of providing founda-
tions for other policy goals such as economic 
growth, poverty reduction and good gover-
nance.14
These findings are significant in that they show that the 
progressive normalisation of stabilisation or counter-
terror policies by Western governments has come to 
undermine value-based foreign polices – such as those 
of the European Union – and expose the practical limits 
of narratives about post-conflict economic revival and 
inclusive politics. 
The trend to prioritise stabilisation over transforma-
tive change is also occurring in a global context in 
which ‘autocratisation’ – the decline of democratic at-
13. Haig Patapan and Yi Wang, “The Hidden Ruler: Wang 
Huning and the Making of Contemporary China,” Journal 
of Contemporary China, 27:109, p.47-60, 2018; Jane 
Perlez “Behind the Scenes, Communist Strategist Presses 
China’s Rise”, New York Times, 13 November 2017.  
14. Christine Cheng, Jonathan Goodhand and Pat Meehan, 
Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Con-
flict: Synthesis Report, London: UK Stabilisation Unit, 
2018.
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tributes – is “gaining momentum” in many countries.15 
Lührmann and Lindberg find that 
a ‘third wave of autocratisation’ affecting an 
unprecedentedly high number of democracies 
is under way … This wave unfolds slowly and 
piecemeal, making it hard to evidence. Ruling 
elites shy away from sudden, drastic moves to 
autocracy and instead mimic democratic institu-
tions while gradually eroding their functions.16 
They also find that contemporary autocratisation is 
slower and feebler in comparison to the first wave in 
the 1930s and 1940s and the second wave in the 1960s 
and 1970s, yet their research emphasises that “we 
should heed the call of alarm issued by scholars.”17 A 
key mechanism accelerating this process has been the 
use of states of emergency that provide “an opportuni-
ty for wanna-be dictators to assume more power under 
the veneer of constitutional democracy. Once in place, 
they give leaders … the power to mute dissent and cen-
tralise power.”18
These trends will further reduce the significance of 
liberal peacebuilding in the UN. As a greater part of its 
membership is, or will be, becoming, less democratic, 
there will be fewer and fewer states willing to support 
participatory or inclusive agendas for achieving 
peaceful and inclusive societies. The playing field for 
peacebuilders has changed, and they need to under-
stand that their options are limited in a forum where the 
majority of the membership may want to play another 
game called stabilisation and counterterrorism. Such 
interventions “are being undertaken under a veneer of 
liberal values” that hides a “return to Cold War proxy 
and strong man policies and less pressure for reforms 
that could increase the legitimacy and inclusiveness of 
conflict-affected states.” These trends have resulted in 
“undermining the legitimacy of [the UN] and its work 
in mediation and humanitarian domains, and in par-
15. V-Dem Institute, Democracy for All: V-Dem Annual 
Democracy Report 2018, Gothenburg: University of 
Gothenburg, p.6, 2018.
16. Lührmann and Lindberg. A Third Wave of 
Autocratization Is Here, p.1-2.
17. Ibid.
18.Anna Lührmann and Bryan Rooney, When Democ-
racy has a Fever: States of Emergency as a Symptom and 
Acceleration of Autocratization, Working Paper Series 
2019:85, University of Gothenburg Department of Politi-
cal Science, p.2, 2019.
ticular UN peace operations.”19 Such trends may also 
help explain why the narrative of peaceful, just and 
inclusive societies – as enshrined in Sustainable Devel-
opment Goal 16 – is becoming increasingly sidelined 
by a state-driven security and control agenda. 
These tendencies in the UN are, of course, only part of 
the bigger picture of how war-fighting Western states 
and associated coalitions have shifted their strategy 
from liberal peacebuilding to stabilisation and coun-
terterrorism. This has entailed adapting to a new 
population- and enemy-centric warfare doctrine that 
lowers the ambition “from addressing the root causes 
of violent conflict, such as lack of legitimacy, participa-
tion and inclusion, to focusing instead on the use of 
force to kill or capture enemy targets.”20 In the process, 
the UN’s broader peace agenda may become a casualty, 
as it has been opportunistically used by states as a cover 
for partisan interventions, or as a burden-sharing in-
strument. 
Recognising these tendencies, the scholar John 
Karlsrud observes that “liberal peacebuilding may 
be on its way to the scrapyard of history.”21 This may 
be correct, but it does not mean that peace cannot be 
built. A prominent brand in the peacebuilding market 
may have gone bankrupt, but this does not mean that 
there is no market for products that build peace. From 
this perspective, ‘liberal peacebuilding’ has only been a 
(small) part of a much broader spectrum of practices 
that aim to prevent and reduce violent conflict and 
build peace. This is particularly the case when consid-
ering the many community-based initiatives that build 
peace on a daily basis in many places without calling 
what they do ‘peacebuilding.’22 
However, policy makers may ask ‘what’s next?’ if ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’ – the standard treatment over the last 
three decades – is no longer an option. The following 
sections set out to explore the possibility of reimagin-
ing peacebuilding practice by using Syria as a test case. 
19. John Karlsrud, “From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabili-
zation and Counterterrorism,” International Peacekeep-
ing 26:1, 2019, p. 1-21.
20. Ibid., p.6.
21. Ibid., p.1.
22. Achim Wennmann, “Daring the Unconventional on the 
Pathways for Peace: On the ‘How’ of Sustaining Peace 
in the City,” in A.Wennmann and O. Jütersonke (eds) 
Urban Safety and Peacebuildling: New Perspectives on 
Sustaining Peace in the City, London, Routledge, 2019, 
p.178-194.






Over the last four years, Syria has moved from 
‘stalemate’ to ‘authoritarian peace:’
A structure for the gradual de-escalation of 
violence seems to be in place and a crucial 
regional tripartite agreement is emerging. Both 
bode well for the fate of the Syrian regime, and 
represent a death knell for those who still believe 
in the ideals of the revolution.23
Syria’s political and economic spaces are reconfiguring 
and in the process are consolidating into a new order. 
At the very core of this reconfiguration is the regime’s 
‘authoritarian resilience,’24 which has leveraged state 
infrastructure and networks to ensure survival. 
According to Heydemann, “violence caused the re-
configuration and dissemination of pre-war economic 
norms and practices on all sides of a brutal  conflict. 
Legacies of pre-war economic governance exerted 
substantial influence on how wartime economic 
orders became organised. Continuity, not rupture, has 
been the defining feature of Syria’s wartime political 
economies.”25
However, what is left beyond the security sector or the 
immediate interest of the regime appears to be a shell 
state with little functional ability to deliver services. 
The fracturing of Syria’s political and economic spaces 
has shaped the rise of a new elite that acts at grass-
roots level as gate-keepers for access to local sources 
of wealth and to local populations. Outside actors keep 
their respective levers of influence over this mix of 
constituents at the national and local levels and remain 
engaged in Syria in pursuit of their own agendas. At the 
same time, the Syrian regime seems to be establishing 
23. Abboud, Syria, p.266.
24. Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: The 
Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012.
25. Steven Heydemann, “Reconstructing Authoritarian-
ism: The Politics and Political Economy of Post-conflict 
Reconstruction in Syria”, in Project on Middle East Politi-
cal Science (POMEPS) (ed.) The Politics of Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction, Washington DC, Carnegie Middle East 
Centre, 2018,  p.14-2.
a new balance between core institutions and different 
local ‘gate-keepers’ and constituencies by bartering 
loyalty for the continuation of wealth accumulation. 
Some of these new configurations are shaping ‘facts 
on the ground’ in terms of post-conflict economic 
recovery and reconstruction. Russian and Iranian 
actors are said to aim at securing a foothold in 
economic and reconstruction opportunities in efforts 
also portrayed as ‘pay-back’ for support during the 
war. They benefit from a ‘first-mover’ advantage to 
access some of the most profitable opportunities, ex-
ploiting the weakness of the regime and the limits of 
European and US entities to become more systemati-
cally involved due to the sanctions regime. Such efforts 
take many forms, including the provision of a permis-
sive umbrella for “using market-based incentives tied 
to oil and mining rights to reward private security con-
tractors who secure territory from the extremists.”26 
There has also been much debate about Law No.10 
passed by the Syrian Government on 2 April 2018, 
which is also discussed further below. This law allows 
the creation by decree of redevelopment zones across 
Syria, but its lawfulness has been questioned because 
it would provide the government with a free hand “to 
confiscate and redevelop residents’ property without 
due process or compensation.”27 Heydemann describes 
what is behind these developments in straightforward 
terms: “The Assad regime has operationalised the 
post-conflict rebuilding of Syria’s economy as a process 
of authoritarian reconstruction.”28
These developments are accompanied by an interna-
tional discourse on the cost of war and reconstruction. 
The World Bank estimates that the loss in terms of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) relative to the ‘no war’ 
counterfactual amounts to between USD 200 billion 
and USD 300 billion. It also estimates the cost of war 
damage to six cities over seven sectors at between USD 
33.7 billion and 41.1 billion, including infrastructure 
related to the agriculture, energy, housing, transport, 
water and sanitation, and health and education 
sectors.29 A report by the Syria Centre for Policy 
26. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Deploys a Potent Weapon in 
Syria: The Profit Motive,” New York Times, 5 July, 2017.
27. Human Rights Watch, Q&A: Syria's New Property Law, 
29 March 2018. 
28. Heydemann, Reconstructing Authoritarianism, p. 20.
29  World Bank, The Economic Effects of War and Peace. 
MENA Quarterly Economic Brief, Issue 6 (January), 
Washington DC, World Bank, 2016, p. 12, 22.
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Research estimates this cost higher, at USD 63 billion, 
and concludes that the war has “largely destroyed the 
economic structure, foundations and institutions. This 
destruction has severely depleted tangible and in-
tangible resources and capital, human capital, social 
capital and economic governance.”30 This enumeration 
of costs emphasises that “substantial resources will be 
needed for post-conflict reconstruction.”31
Given the cost of post-conflict reconstruction, neither 
the Government of Syria nor Russia or Iran are said to 
be in a position to provide a tangible prospect and sus-
tainable vision of post-conflict reconstruction beyond 
highly localised efforts in zones in which they have 
privileged access. “The solution that has been tendered 
is that Western states and institutions take on the 
primary responsibility for financing reconstruction.”32 
However, these have made clear – as the EU expresses 
– that “it will be ready to assist in the reconstruction 
of Syria only when a comprehensive, genuine and 
inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian 
parties in the conflict on the basis of UNSCR 2254 
and the Geneva Communique, is firmly under way.”33 
While the EU’s position may be understood as a bar-
gaining chip in the international peace process of the 
Syrian war, it may come under pressure as Western 
support wavers for local state- and capacity-building 
that was hoped to “pave the way for capable account-
able governing processes in a broader hypothesised 
‘transitional governing body’ that would emerge after 
Assad’s fall”.34 This approach is facing a different reality 
‘on the ground’ characterised by increasing control of 
territory by the Syrian regime and the development of 
an ‘authoritarian peace’ and a ‘fierce state.’ In the first 
part of 2019 such efforts have reached north-western 
Syria, especially the city of Idlib, which has remained 
a stronghold of forces opposed to Syria’s government.
Given the current patchwork of ‘pacified’ areas, on the 
30. Syrian Centre for Policy Research (2016), Syria: Con-
fronting Fragmentation!
31. World Bank, The Economic Effects of War and Peace, p. 
12.
32. Joost Hiltermann, Talking about Syrian Post-War Recon-
struction, Op-Ed for the International Crises Group, 12 
February 2018.
33. C.f. Ibid.
34. Brown, F. Z. (2018), “Seeing Like a State-builder: Rep-
lication of Donor Reconstruction Dilemmas in Syria”, in 
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) (ed.) 
The Politics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Washing-
ton DC: Carnegie Middle East Centre, pp.8-13, at p. 8.
one hand, and the zones of active combat, on the other, 
the Government of Syria – and local ‘warlords’ – have 
little incentive to push for and commit to a formal 
political resolution of the war. To start with, the pres-
ervation of power will become more difficult once the 
war is over. This is due to the sheer necessity of de-
livering vital services (such as education, jobs, trans-
portation, etc.) and also to the operational challenge in 
delivering them, including the needs for institutional 
capacity, human resources and budgetary resources. 
What is more, if the war is over, it can no longer be used 
as an excuse for things not working or not happening. 
An end of the war also means that the Syrian popula-
tion will judge the Government and the ‘warlords’ on 
the basis of their ability to deliver and perform, and 
given the fact that they will have great limits to scale 
delivery of many vital services and functions, increased 
domestic political pressure would be likely as a result. 
These considerations suggest that Syria’s reconstruc-
tion in the coming years may take place under a ‘no 
war no peace’ scenario. This scenario offers enough 
flexibility to manage many ‘reconciliation’ realities that 
have their own local logics, interests and particulari-
ties. It also keeps open the possibility for the Govern-
ment to regain control of territory and control access to 
economic spaces and economic flows, especially remit-
tances, aid and investment. As the war status is formally 
upheld, a ‘no-war-no peace’ scenario also opens an op-
portunity to ensure international assistance for recon-
struction under a humanitarian umbrella, including 
that promised at the Third Conference on Supporting 
the Future of Syria and the Region in March 2019, also 
known as ‘Brussels III.’ Such tactical manipulation of 
humanitarian aid expands the international resources 
available for reconstruction and the strengthening of 
state-related entities, while at the same time enabling 
a normalisation of the Government of Syria in the 
coming years. It also allows Western governments to 
save face diplomatically in the short term and continue 
their narrative of value-driven foreign policies while 
they progressively open opportunities for their private 
sectors to enter a prospective reconstruction market. 
In the long term, however, this contradiction may be 
exposed as self-defeating, as humanitarian aid targeted 
at the survival of people during war and humanitari-
an-disguised reconstruction targeted at rebuilding the 
country will strengthen a political system that has little 
to offer in terms of a lasting vision to address Syria’s 
many fault lines of conflict in Syria. 
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Thus, without more systematically integrating a peace-
building logic into humanitarian assistance and recon-
struction, policy-makers are likely to perpetuate a ‘no 
war no peace’ situation, normalise an authoritarian 
state and inadvertently plant the seeds of new violent 
conflict. 
Peacebuilding and 
Reconstruction in Syria 
in Three Steps
In the face of the strategic landscape of reconstruc-
tion in Syria charted above, how can we conceive entry 
points for peacebuilding at a time of post-conflict re-
construction? The following paragraphs offer an ex-
ploratory analysis of this question in three steps: (1) 
Go back to basics, (2) change your glasses, and (3) start 
in your own backyard. 
Step 1: Go back to basics
Many professional peacebuilders share an understand-
ing that peacebuilding involves several key principles. 
These include, for instance, relentless prioritisation of 
the prevention and reduction of violence and conflict, 
engagement by the conflict parties on their partisan 
interests, ensuring vertical linkages within the conflict 
system, working within the de-facto political economy 
and accompaniment by outside actors. Professional 
peacebuilders would also agree that peacebuilding 
has evolved from aligning several strategic building 
blocks. These can include trustworthy data, collab-
orative analysis, progressively expanded coalitions for 
change, targeted interventions that address the most 
acute conflict and violence risk factors and sustained 
institutional support by an honest broker. 35
Within this sequence, the generation of trustworthy 
data is an important entry point for peacebuilding. 
Making sense of the local context and conflict dynamics 
and separating information from dis-information is 
challenging in rumour-rich and information-poor 
environments, yet they are challenges all actors face. 
Generating and communicating trustworthy data is 
peacebuilders’ bread and butter. 
35. Achim Wennmann and Brian Ganson, Responses to 
Conflict That Work, Paper No. 15. Geneva: Geneva 
Peacebuilding Platform, 2016..
Trustworthy data and analysis are also an entry-point 
for the new peacebuilding software for reconstruction 
in Syria. It means generating enough granular data 
to contribute to localised reconstruction and trust-
building processes. Such data generation is especially 
important to keep in check partisan or biased analyses 
emanating from both inside and outside Syria. 
Syria’s housing and land management systems can il-
lustrate this point.36 Overall, there is a legacy of “6 gen-
erations of overlapping and contradictory housing and 
land management policies,” including “massive infor-
mality on the fringes of cities.”37 While much debate 
has focused on Law 10 and the risk of government 
abuse of power in its implementation, Law 10 may be 
only a “minor amendment” as part of the succession of 
“50 new laws [that] were enacted since 2011 changing 
the political economy of land and housing manage-
ment in Syria.”38 The task for independent analysis 
would be to deconstruct such complex issues and 
generate understandings across divided communi-
ties. Key areas relevant for housing and land manage-
ment systems could include, for instance, independent 
research on Syria’s tenure system and inheritance laws, 
the growth of Syrian cities and the impact of the war, 
existing efforts by government-related actors to clear 
heavily bombarded districts and gentrify them, and 
the availability (or lack) of public funds to cover local 
reconstruction costs. In concrete terms, such efforts 
could entail creating an independent capacity for re-
construction-relevant legal and economic analysis. 
From a peacebuilding perspective, independent 
analysis and the generation of trustworthy data on 
Syria’s housing and land management practices are 
important in several ways: 
• Data and analysis can keep in check efforts on all 
sides to inflate topics (like Law 10) for advocacy 
purposes or to deflect attention from more difficult 
36. Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj, Beyond Law 10: Economic and 
Social Challenges of Housing and Land Management in 
Post Conflict-Syria, in Rim Turkmani, Marika Theros 
and Sami Hadaya (eds.) The Political Economy of Gov-
ernance in Syria, London, London School of Economics, 
2019, p. 12-18.
37. Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj, Beyond Law 10: Economic and 
Social Challenges of Housing and Land Management in 
Post Conflict-Syria. Presentation. London, 3 December 
2018.
38. Ibid.
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able to see how people address violence and exclusion 
on a daily basis in their neighbourhoods, often in the 
absence of or despite formal authorities. They need 
to be cognizant of more nuances and have a granular 
understanding of the context to grasp how change can 
happen in even the most difficult places, and through 
problem-driven iterative adaptation. This is “a process 
of experimentation and trial and error; with multiple 
agents playing different leadership roles; producing 
a mixed form of hybrid that is fitted in a particu-
lar context.”40 While international actors discuss and 
ponder the leadership necessary to find solutions, 
many local actors wriggle their way out of destruction 
and dysfunction by solving one problem after another 
in the best possible way. 
The new glasses may help identify the ‘who’ in peace-
building at a time of reconstruction in Syria. Re-
construction is poly-centric at micro levels in many 
different spaces involving limited ‘self-help’ reconstruc-
tion or reconstruction packages, as noted above. Within 
these processes of reconstruction, the key is to identify 
the people managing coexistence and disagreements. 
Such individuals are called different names in different 
constituencies, including ‘insider mediators’ (in peace 
mediation circles), ‘interrupters’ (in violence reduction 
circles) or ‘transpublics’ (in academic circles). What 
these actors have in common is that they are connected 
to, and trusted by, important local constituencies and 
that they can build trust in processes and outcomes 
where the formal authorities or other power holders 
are too weak or illegitimate to do so. They can also talk 
the languages of different constituencies and therefore 
enable understanding and dialogue across divided 
communities or enemy groups.41 Finding and working 
with these actors in politically charged environments is 
not always easy. External support can undermine their 
efforts to play the very important bridge-building, 
mediation or reconditioning roles, or even put their 
security at risk. This is why know-how to advance in-
dependent, neutral or non-partisan support in discreet 
ways is particularly important.
New glasses might also enable a vision of the spatial 
40. Ibid.
41. Paul Dziatkowiec, The Inside Story: The Impact of Insider 
Mediators on Modern Peacemaking, Geneva, Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, 2017; Cure Violence, The Inter-
rupter Model, 2013; Karen Umemoto, The Truce: Lessons 
from the L.A. Gang War, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 2006.
but more important issues such as housing, land 
and property (HLP) rights for women, gentrifica-
tion or dysfunctional governance and justice sys-
tems.
• Independent analysis contributes to evidence gen-
eration about the key grievances of many Syrian 
people who have lost property or titles due to the 
war. Ensuring such evidence is a protection against 
forgetting injustices and a contribution to address-
ing the resulting frustrations many Syrian people 
experience. Ensuring such independent analysis in 
Syria’s highly politicised and securitised environ-
ment means creating political space for sustained 
institutional support by an honest broker. 
• Ensuring granularity and independence of data 
and analysis also means the strengthening of new 
leadership at the international level that stands up 
for these principles. Regarding reconstruction, 
such leadership may come from financial mar-
kets, which could make reconstruction packages 
conditional on such data. In this way, peacebuild-
ing software could become part of reconstruction 
packages, each of which may require its own nego-
tiation to create an investment coalition. 
Overall, the strategic value of independent data and 
analysis lies in asserting checks and balances, generat-
ing common ground and building confidence. 
Step 2: Change your glasses 
Changing glasses means questioning ways of seeing 
and beliefs in how social change happens. With such 
new glasses, policy-makers may identify new agents 
and spaces for peacebuilding. Many policy-makers in 
government and international organisations are accus-
tomed to a top-town government- or society-centric 
world-view and processes of solution- and leader-
driven change. Such processes entail “a disciplined, 
formal project process” in which “solutions are identi-
fied up front and are the focus of change; the reform 
is fully planned; a champion drives the process; and a 
pure-form best practice solution is produced.”39 
Equipped with these glasses, however, they may not be 
39. Matts Andrews, Explaining Positive Deviance in Public 
Sector Reforms in Development. World Development 74: 
197-208, 2018, p.197.
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the IIIM is an example of how to mobilise strong in-
stitutional capacities in countries far away from a 
conflict zone to ensure key accountability issues, the 
full upload of peacebuilding software into such efforts 
would ensure the application of the IIIM mandate to 
all actors and their supporters involved in the war in 
Syria since 2011. 
Another entry point is stronger Western leadership 
to bolster the accountability of UN agencies and pro-
grammes, bilateral donors and businesses involved in 
humanitarian or reconstruction efforts in Syria. As 
a result of key industrial, infrastructure and natural 
resource assets given to its international backers as 
pay-off for their war support, the regime has extended 
its grip on a broader subset of economic activities. 
The clientelistic relationships the government has 
developed over recent years with international and 
local actors operating in its territory allows it to take 
a cut on most activities. This extractive component 
of the ‘fierce state’ is a significant risk for all actors 
engaged in humanitarian, reconstruction or commer-
cial ventures in Syria. This is especially the case of UN 
agencies or other humanitarian actors that may be 
among the biggest captured ‘cash cows’ for the regime. 
By delivering relief they are bolstering Syria’s authori-
tarian elite and are undermining the very legitimacy 
of their humanitarian assistance in the eyes of many 
Syrians. From this perspective, UN-led humanitarian 
engagement could even be in contradiction with the 
United Nations’ value system.
There are two dimensions to this challenge when 
adopting the third step of the peacebuilding software. 
First, Western governments could press for increased 
accountability of the UN’s humanitarian agencies and 
related funds and programmes. Such efforts are diplo-
matically sensitive but are technically and legally not 
impossible. A promising avenue for future work is, for 
instance, to explore the application of block chains to 
increase the transparency of the trajectory of Western 
aid within humanitarian operations. Increasing trans-
parency in how funding is used once it is in the UN’s 
humanitarian system would be a way to account for 
flows that reach the Syrian government directly or in-
directly. 
A similar approach could be applied to business in-
vestment, with a greater emphasis on sharing infor-
mation about the legal and reputational risks for firms 
and banks participating in economic reconstruction 
projects in Syria. Such efforts have already started, 
such as through the Human Rights and Business Unit 
priorities for reconstruction. This spatial optic under-
lines the importance of trusted spaces in which local 
reconstruction processes can be conceived and negoti-
ated and conflict and problems addressed. Such spaces 
frequently stand in between approaches that focus on 
the urban environment through spatial reconfigura-
tion or architectural models – described by the notions 
of ‘safe house’ or ‘safe space’ as physical environments 
for trusted exchanges – and approaches that focus on 
affecting the behaviour of actors within a space through 
negotiation and dialogue – described by the notions 
of ‘political space’ or the idea of ‘political oxygen’ 
that enables discrete work across social, religious or 
political divisions. From this perspective, prioritis-
ing spaces that matter to people’s daily lives – such as 
hospitals, markets or schools – is important, not just to 
deliver services but also because they are the discreet 
spaces for weaving a new social fabric after war. 
Step 3: Start in your own backyard
The third step goes into your own backyard. Western 
policy-makers should increase their efforts to build 
peace in Syria by focusing on efforts in their own ju-
risdictions and in organisations that they can directly 
affect. This means shifting the mindset from contribut-
ing to peace ‘out there’ – through efforts that are taking 
place inside Syria, in its vicinity or in the capitals of 
countries with major interests in the war – to contrib-
uting to peace in Syria ‘right here’ – through efforts in 
the policy-maker’s own country. 
One perspective on this point can be illustrated by the 
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism 
(IIIM) that has been established by the UN General 
Assembly to assist in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of persons responsible for the most serious crimes 
under International Law committed in Syria since 
2011. The IIIM’s mandate is “to collect, consolidate, 
preserve and analyse evidence of violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law and human rights violations 
and abuses and to prepare files in order to facilitate and 
expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings.”42 
Much of the work to prepare the files is done through 
justice institutions outside Syria to ensure crimes are 
accounted for, the necessary evidence exists to be ad-
missible in a future tribunal and the crimes are not 
forgotten. The IIIM may be relevant in Syria’s recon-
struction challenge in relation to data on HLP issues 
relevant to specific reconstruction packages. While 
42. See https://iiim.un.org/mandate/, April 2019.
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makers may be to recognise that a focus on a humani-
tarian assistance framework to manage the war will not 
necessarily build peace in Syria. Other narratives and 
approaches are necessary. The notion of ‘peacebuild-
ing as software’ presented in this chapter may not be a 
‘silver bullet’ in the face of a ‘fierce state’ or ‘authoritar-
ian peace,’ but perhaps one of several avenues out of 
Syria’s quagmire. 
Conclusion
This chapter has offered a proposal to rethink peace-
building in three steps that may offer an entry point for 
peacebuilding and reconstruction under the condition 
of Syria’s ‘fierce state’ and ‘authoritarian peace.’ It has 
argued that Western policy-makers need to update 
their peacebuilding software. The era of ‘liberal peace-
building’ is over but this does not mean that you 
cannot build peace. The update has three steps. First, 
Western policy-makers need to go back to the basics of 
peacebuilding that emphasise the key building blocks 
and principles underlying building peace. With respect 
to reconstruction in Syria, this update underlines the 
importance of trustworthy data and analysis that is 
granular enough to contribute to localised reconstruc-
tion processes. Such analysis is especially important to 
demystify complexity and keep in check biased analysis 
emanating from inside and outside Syria. In the second 
step, Western policy-makers need to get new glasses 
to better identify the actors and spaces that can drive 
reconstruction with peacebuilding software. This new 
perspective emphasises connectors over dividers and 
works with bridge-builders that can constitute a new 
social fabric through local reconstruction projects. 
Such efforts may pave the way for some degree of 
‘normality’ that allows people to go on with their daily 
lives at the local level. The third step is for Western pol-
icy-makers to start building peace from within their 
own countries or to use their influence on internation-
al organisations. By insisting on greater accountability 
by firms, banks and the United Nations they may con-
tribute to limiting a ‘fierce state.’ However, they may 
also need to leverage their influence to acknowledge 
the limits of building peace under a humanitarian 
framework in the context of a ‘fierce state.’
 
of the Syrian Legal Development Programme.43 The 
trend of ‘de-risking’ in the finance sector has already 
made investors much more sensitive to the risks in 
war-affected countries, especially as long as sanctions 
remain in place. 
However, merely monitoring and ensuring the ac-
countability of humanitarian actors in Syria may not 
be enough. A second dimension of the third step in 
the peacebuilding software would be to work on the 
contradictions that are entailed in managing Syria’s 
war with a humanitarian approach. The current state of 
knowledge among experts suggests that humanitarian 
aid is manipulated and will strengthen and normalise 
autocratic governance in Syria, which in turn perpetu-
ates the ‘no war no peace’ situation, or increases the 
risk of renewed violent conflict, as described in part 3. 
The reasons for structuring post-war assistance under 
a humanitarian framework have deeper roots. Peter 
Maurer, the President of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, has highlighted that over the last 
decade there has been a 
lack of political will to engage on conflict prevention 
[and a tendency] to continually make out of every 
political question a humanitarian issue … this is what 
has hampered and has confused a lot of spirits … The 
UN system [is] at the core a political system which 
needs to think and work towards peace, preventing 
conflict and respecting Human Rights [yet] because 
this … was difficult to achieve, the [UN] system has 
moved into delivering humanitarian assistance and 
pretending it is neutral, impartial and independent 
while it is a state-driven system.”44 
In the context of the political landscapes of a multi-
polar world in which some states aim to expand their 
zones of influence, the manipulation of humanitar-
ian aid to Syria may only be part of a larger story of 
political manipulation to further a narrow set of 
interests of individual states and associated coalitions. 
This tendency requires a peacebuilding response that 
reclaims the space for neutral, impartial and indepen-
dent efforts that aim to reduce, resolve, transform or 
manage conflict through non-violent means. With 
respect to Syria, a starting point for Western policy 
43. See https://www.hrbu.syrianldp.com, April 2019.
44. Peter Maurer, War in Cities: What is at stake? Speech at 
the Graduate Institute of International and Development 
Studies, 4 April 2017. Video available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=SiddTxyQdB4, citation at 53:57 
– 55:04.
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In mid-2018 the cost of reconstruction was estimated 
at around $400 billion,4 which created an appetite 
among national and foreign actors even though the 
war had not finished. Reconstruction is one of the main 
projects by means of which the regime and crony capi-
talists linked to it will consolidate their political and 
economic power while providing foreign allies with a 
share of the market to reward them for their assistance. 
However, Damascus faces several challenges at 
different levels regarding reconstruction. First, the 
regime and its allies lack the economic resources to 
fund the reconstruction process, which would damage 
the whole political economy of the country. Another 
issue is connected to the capacity of the regime to 
provide stability in the regions under its control and 
a business-friendly environment favourable to invest-
ments. This is endangered by various actors such as 
loyalist militias, jihadist organisations and crony capi-
talists. 
Reconstruction and 
the Reconstitution of 
Political and Economic 
Authority 
The regime and its institutions have made use of a 
whole system of laws and decrees to expropriate prop-
erties from individuals and therefore to frame and 
benefit from the reconstruction. One of these was 
Decree 66,5 which entered into force in September 
2012 and allowed the government to “redesign unau-
thorised or illegal housing areas” and replace them with 
“modern” real estate projects with quality services.6 In 
July 2015, the government approved a law that allowed 
the establishment of private sector holding companies 
by city councils and other local administrative units 
to manage public assets and services. This opened 
the way for regime cronies to generate business from 
public assets.
4. Agnus McDowall,  “Long reach of U.S. sanctions hits 
Syria reconstruction,” Reuters, 2 September 2018.
5. Cham Press 2012, “Marsoum 66”.
6. Ajib Nadi, “Mashrû’ tanzîm 66 khalf al-râzî tajruba 







After more than eight years of a popular uprising which 
transformed into a murderous war with major regional 
and international actors intervening in the country, 
the situation in Syria is catastrophic at all levels, es-
pecially in terms of human loss. In 2015 an estimated 
2.3 million people, approximately 11.5 percent of the 
Syrian population, were killed, injured or maimed 
as a result of the armed conflict.1 By the end of 2015, 
85.2 percent of Syrian people lived in poverty.2 More 
than half of the population was displaced internally or 
outside the country, or forced to leave their homes as 
a result of the war. Of the 5.5 million Syrian refugees 
worldwide, with the majority remaining in neighbour-
ing countries, a very limited number have returned to 
Syria, the majority in living conditions characterised 
by poverty, exploitation and discriminatory policies.3 
1. Syrian Centre for Policy Research (2015), “Alienation 
and Violence, Impact of Syria Crisis Report 2014,” 
UNRWA, 51.
2. Syrian Centre for Policy Research (2016), “Confronting 
Fragmentation! Syria, Impact of Syrian Crisis Report,” 
UNRWA, 37.
3. Syria’s neighbours have welcomed most of the refugees. 
There are 3.3 million registered refugees in Turkey, one 
million in Lebanon and 650,000 in Jordan. In the Euro-
pean Union (EU), close to 1 million Syrian refugees have 
requested asylum in different countries, with Germany 
being the primary destination.
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Decree 66 allowed the Damascus governorate to expel 
the populations from two large areas in Damascus,7 
including Basateen al-Razi in the district of Mazzeh, 
in order to develop the high-end real estate project 
of Marota City (Marota in the Syriac language means 
‘sovereignty and motherland’). The inhabitants of 
these areas were mostly working and lower-middle 
class people. Decree 66 was inspired by some aspects 
of a 2007 Damascus Master Plan that had not been 
implemented because of the beginning of the uprising 
in 2011. This area was and still is considered an 
immensely lucrative real estate opportunity: undevel-
oped farmland and informal housing in some places 
within walking distance of the centre of Damascus.8
The reconstruction programmes involve building 
12,000 housing units for about 60,000 people, mainly 
targeting high-income households.9 The programmes 
include schools and restaurants, places of worship 
and even a multi-storey car park and shopping centre. 
According to the Syrian authorities, 110,000 job op-
portunities and 27,000 permanent jobs will be created 
by these projects.10 
Under Decree 66, residents who are entitled to new 
housing built in an unspecified location will receive 
the equivalent of the annual rent from a special fund 
created by the Damascus governorate until the new 
housing is completed. Those who are not eligible will 
receive the equivalent of two years’ rent, which will be 
paid no later than one month after the eviction notice. 
The decree does not specify the conditions for inhabit-
ants to be considered eligible for a new home or not. 
In fact, throughout the years of reconstruction many 
of the inhabitants of the areas have complained of the 
absence of any alternative housing and that other areas 
lacked any housing and/or are too expensive to live in, 
including on regime-controlled or pro-regime televi-
sion stations,11 while others, who became refugees and 
live outside the country, have not received anything.  
7. Two areas in the southern suburbs of Damascus are 
concerned. The first, which has already started, includes 
Mazzeh, a residential area near the presidential palace, 
and Kafr Soussa. The area of the second zone includes 
Mazzeh, Kafr Sousseh, Qanawat, Basateen, Daraya and 
Qadam.
8. Tom Rollins, “Decree 66: The blueprint for al-Assad’s 
reconstruction of Syria?” IRIN News, 20 April 2017.
9. Prices per square meter range from 300,000 to 500,000 
SYP according to the Executive Director of Damas-
cus Sham Holding Company, Nasouh Nabulsi. See 
http://damaspost.com/article/19972-يسلبانلا_
.ىلعألا_نوكتس_‘‘يتیس_اتورام’’_ققش
10. Nadi, 2017; See also https://sana.sy/en/?p=12155.
11. SyriaTVChannels1, 19 August 2015, Youtube Video,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhOENhG7CZc. 
In July 2018 following the total recapture of the 
Damascus countryside by regime forces, the recon-
struction plan for Basilia City (Basilia means ‘paradise’ 
in the Syriac language) in southern Damascus was 
announced by the Damascus governorate. The  Basilia 
City area  is nine million square meters and around 
4,000 units are planned. Just as with the Marota City 
project, evictions of local residents have already started 
in some areas involved in the Basilia City plan and the 
residents have faced similar problems regarding alter-
native housing.12
A Nationwide Expansion 
of Expropriation 
Measures: Decree No. 10
In April 2018, the Assad regime issued a new law, 
Decree No. 10, which expanded Decree 66 to the 
national level. It stipulated that property owners (and 
relatives by procuration or an attorney) will have to 
submit their title deeds to the relevant authorities, all 
of which are local administrative units, within one year 
of an announcement of reconstruction plans for their 
locality.13 If they fail to do so, they will not be compen-
sated and ownership of their property will revert to the 
province, town or city where it is located. Those who 
succeed in proving ownership of their property will get 
shares in the zone.
As Human Rights Watch explains, those who have suc-
cessfully proven their title to their property can: 
“1) register the sector in their names and receive a share 
of the profits from re-development; or 2) sell their 
shares in a public auction; or 3) create a company 
to invest in and develop the division. All the share-
holders in a sector must agree to one option.”14 
Under Decree 10, the inhabitants in these zones must 
move out but it is not clear from the law who will qualify 
for alternative housing or how this will be determined.15 
The main purpose of the law, however, remains to seize 
real estate properties abandoned by civilians forced 
12. Enab Baladi, “Damascus Governorate announces the 
plan of "Basilia City”, 30 July 2018.
13.The time allocated for owners to claim in-kind rights 
that were not recorded in the real estate registry were, 
for example, extended from one month previously to 
one year following some criticisms on the international 
political scene. 
14. Human Rights Watch, “Syria’s New Property Law”, 29  
May 2018.
15. Ibid.
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to leave the country, especially in former opposition-
held areas.16 As a result, the decree can make new 
land registrations and exclude from these registers a 
plethora of real estate owners. Through the reorgan-
isation of the administrative structure, the property 
of civilians forced to flee will de facto be seized. Law 
No 10 therefore extends Decree 66 to the whole of the 
country in the sense that it permits all local admin-
istrative units (LAUs) throughout Syria, such as cities 
and governorates, to create real estate development 
zones within their administrative areas and, based on 
that, to expropriate the properties and rebuild them.17 
Under Law No. 10, in September 2018 the Damascus 
Governorate Committee issued a report announcing 
the demolishment and reconstruction of Tadamon 
district in Damascus, which includes a mixture of sup-
porters and opponents of the regime. Other areas of 
Damascus such as Jobar, Barzeh and Qaboun were 
also scheduled to be studied for reconstruction in early 
2019.18 
By allowing the demolishment and expropriation of 
large areas of property, Decree 66 of 2012 and Decree 
10 of 2018 have been used as instruments to efficiently 
create large rapid development projects that will benefit 
regime cronies and attract possible foreign funding, 
while at the same time operating as punishments 
against populations known for their opposition to the 
regime. The vast majority of the people concerned are 
from Sunni Muslim backgrounds in impoverished 
rural areas and medium-sized towns, and also from 
the suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo. This does not 
16. For example, the regime enacted Decree No. 66, which 
entered into force in September 2012, allowing the 
government to “redesign unauthorised or illegal hous-
ing areas” and replace them with “modern” real estate 
projects with quality services. This decree, according 
to the Syrian authorities, aimed to improve the living 
conditions of the inhabitants by eliminating informally 
built properties and replacing them with comfortable 
modern ones. However, the decree selected two areas 
that supported the opposition, while the areas inhabited 
by supporters of the regime, where life conditions were 
no better, were left intact.
17. The Syria Report, “Basatin Al-Razi Project Highlights 
Again Emergence of New Business Figure”, 9 January 
2018.




mean that the regime is opposed to Sunni popula-
tions generally or a particular Sunni identity per se, 
but to hostile constituencies. They will most probably 
be replaced by members of higher social classes and 
the new war elite, who are generally less inclined to 
rise up against the regime. In the case of the Marota 
City project, for example, the prices per square meter 
range from SYP 300,000 to SYP 500,000 according 
to the executive director of Damascus Sham Holding 
Company, Nasouh Nabulsi, who added that he believed 
the prices of real estate in Marota City would be the 
highest in Syria in the long term.19 20 The creation of 
Marota City will also probably lead to rent increases 
in adjacent areas due to their proximity to a luxury 
neighbourhood. The development of possible residen-
tial projects in these areas will actually be carried out 
by holding companies owned by governorates or mu-
nicipalities, but the construction and management of 
the projects is likely to be contracted to private-sector 
companies owned by well-connected investors affili-
ated to the regime. 
More generally, the reconstruction is a key element 
in the process of deepening neo-liberal policies. In 
January 2016, a Public Private Partnership (PPP) law 
was passed authorising the private sector to manage 
and develop state assets in all sectors of the economy 
except oil.21 This law was cited as a reference for the 
‘new economic strategy’ of the National Partnership 
launched by the government a month later in February, 
which replaced the social-market economic model 
developed before the uprising. Within this framework, 
in September 2018 during a meeting with representa-
tives of companies and businessmen participating in the 
Damascus International Fair, Prime Minister Khamis 
announced that the government would probably open 
50 infrastructure projects in the country to private 
investors under the public private partnership.22 In the 
future, this new economic strategy and the PPP law 
will most probably increase the capture of public assets 
19. Please see http://damaspost.com/article/19972-
ىلعألا_نوكتس_‘‘يتیس_اتورام’’_ققش_يسلبانلا
20. At the end of 2018, an article in a regime econom-
ics newspaper was entitled “Skyscrapers in Damascus 
overlooking the ruins of war… And apartments at 400,000 
dollars!”.
21. Syrian Arab News Agency, “Higher Judicial Committee 
for Elections announces results of People’s Assembly elec-
tions”, 16 April 2016.
22. Ibid., “Khamis: Large infrastructure projects offered for 
partnership”, 10 September 2018.
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by crony capitalists and powerful elite networks on 
conditions widely favourable to them at the expense of 
the larger interests of the state and its citizens. 
Marota City, an 
Instrument for Capital 
Accumulation by Crony 
Capitalists and a New 
Economic Elite
Some businessmen linked to the regime have also 
started to appear and rise to more prominence. They 
are usually individuals who were outside both the 
crony capitalist circles and the dependent business elite 
networks built up in recent decades, but they are people 
who had accumulated some level of wealth before the 
uprising. This has been particularly observed in the 
reconstruction process. The most important of these 
figures is Samer Foz, who during the war became one 
of the country’s most powerful businessmen. Before 
the uprising in 2011 he owned the Aman Group, a 
contractor for real estate development and food com-
modities.23 In the course of the war, Mr Foz’s business 
interests massively expanded to include aviation, the 
cable industry, steel, sugar, car assembly and distri-
bution, hotel management, real estate development, 
pharmaceuticals and the banking sector. 
In August 2017 his company Aman Group also 
announced that it would participate in partnership 
with the Damascus Governorate and Damascus Cham 
Private Joint Stock Company in the reconstruction 
of the Basateen al-Razi area in the Mazzeh district of 
Damascus. Aman Damascus, the company established 
by Aman group for this project, announced it had 
USD 18.9 million in capital.24 In November, Damascus 
Cham Holding granted the Aman Group the right to 
develop real estate properties worth around USD 312 
million as part of the Basateen al-Razi project.25 
Other business personalities and companies have also 
23. See http://www.amangroupco.com/en/pages/6/Over-
view/1.
24.“The signing of an additional contract between Damascus 
Cham Holding Company, Aman Holding Company and 
Damascus Aman Company Private Shareholding Com-
pany”, 27 September 2017.
25. The Syria Report, “Samer Foz Acquires Rights over Hun-
dreds of Millions of Dollars in Basatin Al-Razi Project”, 21 
November 2017.
benefited from lucrative contracts with Damascus 
Cham Holding as part of the reconstruction of 
Basateen al-Razi:
• Zubaidi and Qalei LLC, owned by Khaled Al-
Zubaidi and Nader Qalei;
• Kuwait-based businessman Mazen Tarazi, who is 
active in a variety of economic sectors26 ;
• Talas Group,27 which is owned by businessman 
Anas Talas; 
• Exceed Development and Investment, owned 
by private investors Hayan Muhammad Nazem 
Qaddour and Maen Rizk Allah Haykal;
• Rawafed Damascus Private joint venture, owned by 
Rami Makhlouf and close associates and composed 
of Ramak for Development and Humanitarian 
Projects LLC and four other companies;
• Bunyan Damascus, which is a partnership with 
two companies, Apex Development and Projects 
LLC and Tamayoz LLC.
These members of the new business elite, the great 
majority of whom were unknown before the war, 
have been able to capitalise, both economically and in 
terms of political influence, on opportunities created 
by the departure of dependent business elite networks. 
Some of these individuals, such as Samer Fawz, have 
also benefited from important economic opportuni-
ties by acting as middlemen in trade deals between the 
regime and various actors, while others have acted as 
frontmen or close associates with regime cronies hit by 
sanctions.
National Funding and 
Foreign Investments
These large real estate projects are expected to attract 
foreign capital, which is crucial for reconstruction in 
Syria. The investments by public and private actors are, 
however, insufficient to rebuild the country, while, as 
mentioned previously, the state is seriously indebted. 
The reconstruction tax (called the National Contribu-
26. In early January 2018, the Syrian Civil Aviation Author-
ity granted a license to an airline established by Mazen 
Tarazi. Mr. Tarazi held 85 percent of the shares in the 
company, with his two sons, Khaled and Ali, holding 
the rest. Mr. Tarazi has demonstrated his support for the 
regime on a number of occasions. 
27. The company is mainly active in the production and 
distribution of food products from its base in the UAE. 
The company has developed its own food brand, Tolido. 
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tion for Reconstruction), which was introduced in 2013 
and was initially supposed to be applied on various 
taxes and fees for only three years,28 was doubled in 
December 2017 from five to ten percent but this did 
not solve the problem. This tax did not generate much 
revenue, bringing the equivalent of SYP 13 billion, a 
mere USD 31 million, into the 2017 budget.29 The gov-
ernment has also become increasingly dependent on 
early disbursements by the Central Bank, in addition to 
foreign aid, which increased during the war because of 
the very limited tax revenue. In 2015, at least a third of 
public spending was financed by long-term borrowing 
from the Central Bank of Syria.30 
The national budget for 2017 was SYP 2.6 trillion (USD 
5 billion). In 2018 this increased to SYP 3.1 trillion31 
and again in 2019 to SYP 3.882 trillion.32 The govern-
ment’s Reconstruction Committee was established in 
2012 and it is affiliated with the Ministry of Local Ad-
ministration and Environment. The combined value 
of its reconstruction project in the 2018 budget was 
only SYP 50 billion and it is SYP 34.8 billion (USD 75.2 
million) in 2019. The money allocated is mostly spent 
on the repair of destroyed equipment and buildings, 
although some of the listed projects were not neces-
sarily damaged during the war, such as the Bassel 
Al-Assad Airport in Lattakia, the Jableh Hospital and 
the Sharqiyeh phosphate mines, which are currently 
being developed by a Russian company.33 The 2019 
budget allocated for reconstruction was no more than 
SYP 50 billion, equivalent to USD 115 million.34
Moreover, the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
schemes had funding problems as they relied on 
28. Taxes on business profits, on exit fees, car license plate 
fees and real estate license fees were among the many 
on which the tax was imposed. The income tax on wage 
earners was, however, exempted.
29. The Syrian Report, “Syrian Parliament Approves Dou-
bling of Reconstruction Tax Rate”, 12 December 2017.
30. Paul Cochrane, “Après la guerre, qui financera la recon-
struction de la Syrie?”, 2 December 2017.
31. Syrian Observer, “Cabinet Approves 3 Trillion Syrian 
Pounds for 2018 General Budget”, 25 October 2017.
32. Syrian Arab News Agency, "Cabinet approves state bud-
get bill for 2019 at SYP 3882 billion", 21 October 2018.
33. The Syria Report, "Reconstruction Committee Lists 2018 
Projects", 23 October 2018.
34. Wajeeha Haddad, "The Syrian budget of 2019: recon-
struction allocated 115 million dollars", 9 September 
2018.
finance from banks, which was clearly unavailable as 
the total assets of the 14 private-sector commercial 
banks operating in the country were SYP 1.7 trillion at 
the end of 2016, equivalent at the time to only around 
USD 3.5 billion. In 2010 the figure had reached USD 
13.8 billion. In terms of assets, some of the six state-
owned banks are actually larger than their private 
sector counterparts, in particular the Commercial 
Bank of Syria. However, these banks have large bad 
debt portfolios.35 Therefore, the reconstruction needed 
foreign funding, which will benefit the countries that 
most support the Assad regime, particularly Iran and 
Russia. 
Following the recapture of eastern Aleppo in December 
2016, Aleppo governor Hossein Diyab stressed that 
Iran was going to “play an important role in reconstruc-
tion efforts in Syria, especially Aleppo.” In March 2017 
the Iranian Reconstruction Authority announced that 
it planned to renovate 55 schools in Aleppo province.36 
In mid-September 2017, Iranian officials declared that 
they would repair and reconstruct the electricity infra-
structure in Damascus and Deir Zor, and an Iranian 
company was awarded a contract to supply electric-
ity to Aleppo. These deals were worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars if finalised.37 38
In September 2018, a Memorandum of Understand-
ing on cooperation in the electricity sector was signed 
between Syria and Iran and it included the provision 
by Teheran of new power generation stations in 
Lattakia and Banias and the repair or improvement of 
others in Aleppo, Deir Zor and Homs.39 A month later, 
Iran struck a new deal with Damascus to build a €400 
million power plant in Latakia. In August 2018, the 
Syrian Ministry of Public Works and Housing agreed 
35.The Syria Report, "Syrian Banks Unable to Finance Re-
construction", 21 July 2017.
36. Tobias Schneider, "Aleppo's Warlords and Post-War 
Reconstruction", 13 June 2017.
37.Al Jazeera, "Iran signs deal to repair Syria's power grid", 
12 September 2017.
38. Bassam Darwish, head of the electricity ministry’s 
planning unit in the Syrian government, estimated that 
direct damage in the power sector during the war corre-




39. Syrian Arab News Agency, "Syria, Iran sign MoU on 
electricity cooperation", 12 September 2017.
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with Iranian private companies to build 30,000 resi-
dential units as part of the General Organisation for 
Housing’s projects in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs.40 
A few months later in February 2019, Iraj Rahbar, the 
deputy head of the Mass Construction Society of Iran, 
announced that his company was planning to build 
200,000 housing units in Syria, mostly around the 
capital, as a result of a memorandum of understand-
ing that was signed a few weeks before in a meeting 
in Damascus of the Joint Syrian-Iranian Higher 
Committee. The agreement, he explained, would be 
implemented within three months and be funded 
through a new USD 2 billion Iranian credit line.41 
As for Moscow, already in October 2015 a Russian del-
egation visited Damascus and announced that Russian 
companies would lead Syria’s post-war reconstruction. 
Deals worth at least €850m emerged from these nego-
tiations. A further Russian parliamentary visit to Syria 
in November 2016 resulted in Syrian Foreign Minister 
Walid Muallem reportedly offering Russian firms 
priority in rebuilding Syria.42 In mid-December 2017, 
a Russian delegation made up of the heads of major 
Russian companies led by Russian Deputy Prime 
Minister Dmitry Rogozin was again in Damascus for 
talks with Bashar al-Assad on investment and recon-
struction in the country, referring to “major economic 
projects,” including the “oil, gas, phosphate, electricity 
and petrochemical industries” and also transport and 
trade.43 
In February 2018, Syria and Russia signed an 
agreement on cooperation in the electrical power field 
in the “framework of developing the electrical system 
through reconstructing and repairing the Aleppo 
thermal plant and installing a Deir Zor power plant, 
in addition to expanding the capacity of the Mharda 
and Tishreen plants.”44 In March 2019, Russian private 
companies announced their readiness to transfer and 
introduce their construction techniques and skills to 
Syria for the reconstruction process in collaboration 
with the Syrian Ministry of Public Work and Housing.45 
40. The Syrian Observer, "Iran Commits to Residential Proj-
ects in Syria", 16 August 2018.
41. Economy 2 Day, "Construction of a city and 200 thou-
sand housing units", 25 July 2018.
42. Neil Hauer, "To the victors, the ruins: the challenges of 
Russia’s reconstruction in Syria", 18 August 2017.
43. Le Figaro, "Syrie: «de grands projets économiques» évo-
qués", 18 December 2017.
44. Syrian Arab News Agency, "Syria, Russia ink agreement 
for cooperation in energy field", 1 February 2018.
45. Emmar Syria, 2 March 2019.
However, there are serious doubts about the imple-
mentation of some of these projects, especially the 
massive reconstruction scheme and memoranda of 
understanding mentioned above concluded between 
the Syrian allies Teheran and Moscow with Damascus, 
just like numerous other previous investment projects 
and economic agreements announced in the past few 
years.46 For example, the Syrian government failed to 
secure the necessary funds for its contribution in the 
deals with Iran and Russia in the electricity sector and 
for the construction or repair of power plants and as a 
result they pulled out.47
In August 2017, the Chinese government hosted its 
“First Trade Fair on Syrian Reconstruction Projects,” 
during which a Chinese-Arab business group 
announced a $2 billion commitment by the govern-
ment for the construction of industrial parks in Syria.48 
In December 2017, Qin Yong, the vice president of the 
China-Arab Exchange Association, estimated  invest-
ments in Syria of a similar value and explained that 
the companies he had accompanied to Damascus, 
Homs and Tartus – including the China National 
Heavy Duty Truck Company – planned to build roads, 
bridges, airports and hospitals and to restore electricity 
supplies and communications.49 China was, however, 
still reluctant to engage massively in such an unstable 
country. For Beijing, investments in emerging countries 
are often, as in Africa, conditioned on privileged access 
to natural resources. However, Syria is quite weak in 
raw materials and it has promised Moscow and Tehran 
that they will have priority. The projects could also 
be awarded to India and Brazil as rewards for their 
positions rather than to Damascus. 
On the Arab political scene, a few countries expressed 
their willingness to take part in the Syrian recon-
struction process, such as Egypt, Oman, Jordan and 
Lebanon. Moreover, some Gulf monarchies led by 
the UAE are changing their positions regarding Syria 
and an increasing process of normalisation towards 
Damascus is taking place on the Arab political scene. 
Already in August 2018, UAE citizen Abdul Jalil 
Al-Blooki visited the premises of Damascus Cham 
46. The Syria Report, "Iran Says it Plans to Build Large 
Housing Project Around Damascus", 6 March 2019.
47. Sinan Hatahet, “Russia and Iran: Economic Influence in 
Syria,” Chatham House, 2019, p.14.
48. Steven Heydemann, “Syria Reconstruction and the Illu-
sion of Leverage,” Atlantic Council, 2019.
49. Ting Shi, Henry Meyer, Donna Abu-Nasr and Ilya 
Arkhipov, "China Eyes Role Rebuilding Syria While Putin 
Spars With West", 21 December 2017.
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Holding and attended one of its meetings.50 Among 
other positions, Al-Blooki is the deputy chairman of 
Aafaq Islamic Finance, a Sharia-compliant financial 
services firm, and head of the Syrian company Emirates 
Private Development and Investment Company LLC, 
which was established in 2013 to invest in the real 
estate sector. This visit confirmed the efforts by the 
UAE to normalise its relations with Damascus. 
In December 2018, the situation accelerated once 
more towards a re-legitimisation and rehabilitation of 
the Assad regime among its Arab counterparts. First, 
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, a close ally of 
Saudi Arabia, visited Syria in mid-December, becoming 
the first Arab League leader to visit the country since 
the beginning of the uprising in March 2011, and on 
27 December the UAE re-opened its embassy in Syria 
after seven years. A day later, Bahrain followed suit. 
Both states justified their decisions with the need to 
reactivate an Arab presence and role in Syria, and also 
to counter the deepening influence of Turkey and Iran 
in the country.51 
At the end of December 2018, a delegation from the 
UAE company Damac Properties headed by its Senior 
Vice President for International Development, Wael 
Al-Lawati, visited Damascus. Damac is a real estate 
developer and one of the largest companies in the 
UAE and Arab world with assets of more than USD 7 
billion and an annual revenue above USD 2 billion. At 
the Four Seasons Hotel Mr Lawati met representatives 
from two Syrian companies, Telsa Group and Al-Diyar 
Al-Dimashqiah.52 53 Towards the end of January 2019, 
a visit to the UAE by a delegation from Damascus 
Cham Holding to encourage investment in Syria was 
announced. It was represented by its Chief Executive 
50. Please see: https://www.facebook.com/Marota.city/
posts/272057506858282
51. Ali Bakeer, “Why did the UAE and Bahrain re-open their 
embassies in Syria?”, 8 January 2019.
52. Both companies were established relatively recently, 
Tesla in 2015 and Diar Al-Diyar Al-Dimashqiah in Sep-
tember 2018. Maher Al-Imam is the general manager of 
the former, while Muhammad Ghazi Al-Jalali, a former 
minister for communications and a board member of 
Syriatel, and who is under EU sanctions, is a founder of 
Diar. 
53. Emmar Syria, "DAMAC Properties is looking into ways 
to implement real estate development projects in Damas-
cus", 20 December 2018; The Syria Report, "UAE Com-
panies Showing Growing Interest in Syria", 24 December 
2018.
Nassouh Nabulsi and accompanied by Syrian business-
men and industrialists led by Muhammad Hamsho. 
The delegation met a number of UAE chambers of 
commerce and industry, in addition to UAE business-
men.54
However, at the time of writing the level of recon-
struction funding by foreign capital remains unclear 
but insufficient, particularly as Russia and Iran are 
having increasing difficulty in maintaining their levels 
of financial and material support for the regime. The 
participation by other foreign actors in the recon-
struction of Syria is linked to the development of 
other regional and international issues and negotia-
tions, notably regarding Iran, in addition to the issue 
of sanctions imposed by the USA55 and the European 
Union56 on Syria, which constitute an obstacle that 
may scare off foreign companies. Threats of falling 
under US sanctions are also putting off most inter-
national and Chinese multinational companies, such 
as Huawei, which recently announced its withdrawal 
from Syria and Iran.57 In November 2018, the US 
actually increased its pressure on Syria by announc-
ing that it will seek to impose sanctions against any 
party (including shipping companies, insurers, vessel 
owners, managers and operators) involved in shipping 
oil to Syria.58 In addition to this, US pressure has put 
the brakes on further rapprochement between some 
Arab regimes and Syria. The momentum to get Syria 
back in the Arab League has ebbed, for example.
54. Please see: https://www.emmarsyria.com/
post/128?fbclid=IwAR13JpmO-QFqqNuD1nCkZZnyz-
5dlqFL9qRN42yLgP4SpPEJKHlLRSy8ZpxA
55. They notably ban exports, sales or the supply of ser-
vices, along with any new investments, into Syria by 
any US individual. They also forbid any dealings by US 
individuals in Syrian oil and hydrocarbon products, and 
importing them into the United States.
56. EU Sanctions include asset freezes, travel bans, trade 
restrictions, financial sanctions and an arms embargo. 
The European sanctions also target Syria’s electricity 
network, banning EU companies from building power 
plants, supplying turbines or financing such projects. 
The latest European sanctions in January 2019 target all 
the investors in the Marota urban master plan.
57. Sinan Hatahet, “Russia and Iran: Economic Influence in 
Syria,” Chatham House, 2019, p.9.
58. World Maritime News, "US Treasury Warns Against Pe-
troleum Shipments to Syrian Ports", 21 November 2018.
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The European Union and the USA59 have repeatedly 
declared that their support for the reconstruction 
of Syria and an end to sanctions would depend on a 
credible political process leading to a real political 
transition. In this framework, in January 2019 the 
European Union imposed new sanctions on eleven 
prominent businessmen, including Samer Foz, and 
five entities  on the list of those subject to restrictive 
measures against the Syrian regime and its support-
ers because of their involvement in luxury real estate 
development, such as the Marota City reconstruction 
scheme, and/or their acting as middlemen on behalf of 
the regime in various trade deals.60
The issue of reconstruction is also connected to the 
capacity of the regime to provide stability in the regions 
under its control and a business-friendly environment 
favourable to investment. This has been endangered by 
other elements such as: 
• The capacity of the regime to stabilise the situation 
in the areas it controls and put an end to or at least 
control the various loyalist militias, whose griev-
ances against it have increasingly become public 
and outspoken, is an important challenge at the 
time of writing. Pro-regime militias in different 
regions have been involved in various criminal ac-
tivities such as robbery, looting, murder, infighting 
and especially checkpoint extortion, resulting in 
higher prices and further humanitarian suffering, 
as well as creating apprehension about recreating a 
favourable business environment. 
• Jihadist organisations’ gradual loss of control 
over a large area of territory does not mean an end 
to their capacity to strike regime-dominated areas 
with terrorist attacks. 
• The crony capitalists empowered in the war could 
also impede the possibility of enabling the return 
of sections of the bourgeoisie to re-invest in the 
59. In addition to the sanctions imposed in 2011, in 
December 2017 the US Congressional Foreign Affairs 
Committee unveiled the No Assistance for Assad Act, 
which prevented the Donald Trump administration 
from using non-humanitarian US aid funds for the 
reconstruction of Syria in areas held by the Assad regime 
or associated forces (USA Congress 2017).
60. The Council of the European Union (2019). ‘Council 
Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2013/255/CFSP concern-
ing restrictive measures against Syria,’ Official Journal of 
the European Union.
country61 and therefore of their willingness to 
dominate the economy and investment opportu-
nities to create a business environment favourable 
for reconstruction.
The risks of a failure of the reconstruction plans and 
more generally of economic development, especially 
in productive sectors of the economy such as manu-
facturing and agriculture, will make it much more 
difficult to end the “illegal and violent activities” that 
considerably increased throughout the war, attracting 
around 17 percent of the active population inside Syria 
in 201462 and which could continue under other forms 
in the future. 
Conclusion
The resilience of the regime in its war against any kind 
of dissent has come at a very high cost, above all in 
terms of human lives and destruction, but also po-
litically. In addition to the growing dependence on 
foreign states and actors, some features of the patrimo-
nial regime have been strengthened and its authority 
has been diminished. Crony capitalists and militias 
have considerably increased their power, while the 
clientelist sectarian tribal features of the regime have 
been reinforced. The war also allowed the rise of new 
businessmen linked to the regime. At the same time, in 
this situation the vast majority of the Syrian business-
men in the diaspora are not yet ready to come back to 
the country or to invest.   
In this framework, the reconstruction process will 
most probably consolidate and strengthen the pat-
rimonial and despotic character of the regime, while 
being used as a means to punish or discipline former 
rebellious populations. 
61. In February 2017, the Minister of Finance, Maamoun 
Hamdan, visited Egypt to meet with the ‘Syrian Busi-
nessmen Group – Egypt,’ (Tajammu’ Rijal Al-A’mal As-
Suri Bi-Masr) and offered them many incentives, such as 
a reduction in customs duties on production inputs, an 
exemption of all duties on machinery and on sales tax, 
in addition to a rescheduling of any debt owed to state 
banks. A few days later, the newspaper owned by Rami 
Makhlouf, al-Watan, published an article entitled “The 
Egyptian Industrialists,” strongly condemning Syrian 
businessmen in Egypt for their alleged arrogance, the 
fact that they conditioned their return to Syria on incen-
tives provided by the government, and the fact that they 
returned “only after the liberation of Aleppo.”
62. Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) (2016), “Con-
fronting Fragmentation! Syria, Impact of Syrian Crisis 
Report,” UNRWA, 2016, 37.
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More generally, the Assad regime has emerged from 
the war as an even more brutal, narrowly sectarian, 
patrimonial and militarised version of its former self. 
The popular uprising turned into a war that has forced 
Damascus to reconfigure its popular basis, to narrow 
its dependency on global authoritarian networks, 
adjust its modes of economic governance and reorga-
nise its military and security apparatus.63 Repression 
continues, including of former opposition fighters and 
civilians who participated in the so-called ‘reconcilia-
tion agreements,’ and no dissent is accepted. 
The survival of the regime has not prevented Damascus 
facing a series of contradictions and challenges, on 
the one hand satisfying the interests of crony capital-
ists and heads of militias, and on the other accumu-
lating capital through economic and political stability 
while granting its foreign allies the major shares in the 
reconstruction business. These objectives are rarely 
overlapping at the time of writing and some contra-
dictions and rivalries are already appearing. Mounting 
criticisms are increasingly levied by civilians in re-
gime-held areas against the criminal practices of the 
pro-regime militias. This is without forgetting the high 
potential for destabilisation of jihadist forces turning 
increasingly to terrorist actions particularly targeting 
urban populated areas after the loss of the territories 
they held. 
However, it will be difficult for these internal contra-
dictions to transform into political opportunities for 
opposition forces to capitalise on and transform them 
into connected struggles at a national level because of 
the absence of an inclusive and structured political op-
position on the ground appealing to all popular classes, 
and of social actors, such as independent trade unions 
or peasant associations. This is in addition to a general 
and important fatigue among large sectors of society 
just seeking to come back to a form of stability in the 
country. 
These dynamics have a number of implications which 
should be considered by the international community 
in designing its policies towards Syria and its recon-
struction:
• The deepening of wide and general sanctions 
against Syria should probably be re-thought and 
re-modelled because they will most probably 
continue to harm large sectors of the population 
and society, in particular the popular classes. At the 
same time, regime cronies and elite networks will in 
all likelihood maintain or increase their influence 
63.  Steven Heydemann, “Syria and the Future of Authori-
tarianism,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 24, No. 4, Octo-
ber, 2016, p. 59-73.
in developing the black market and smuggling 
even more, strengthening their domination of the 
economy. Sanctions against regime individuals are 
an appropriate mechanism to prevent them from 
benefiting, for example, from the reconstruction 
process. In this perspective, the latest European 
sanctions at the end of January against business-
men profiting from economic agreements with the 
regime are welcome. However, sanctions affecting 
the general society are mostly likely not a solution 
that will advance the interests of the Syrian people. 
• Today, international funding from Western 
countries is lacking, but this could change in the 
future. Therefore, a framework for international 
funding should be suggested. This would respect 
a number of conditionalities such as the inclusion 
and participation of local populations (refugees, 
IDPs and those who remained) in reconstruction 
plans (with owners and tenants being provided with 
new housing), guarantees of their rights, transpar-
ency of budgets, enforcement of and respects for 
workers’ rights64 etc. Conditions should be made 
to prevent or limit the regime and businessmen 
linked to it from using these funds to advance their 
own (political, security and financial) interests.
• Learning from past and foreign experiences, the 
privatisation of reconstruction very often benefits 
particular strata of society and/or particularly 
individuals close to the regime. This could be 
monitored and may be challenged by providing 
and proposing solutions encouraging monitoring 
by the local population and the participation of 
public institutions in reconstruction plans could 
be envisioned. Although it is clear that the public 
institutions are under the authority of the regime, 
it would limit the possibilities for crony capitalists 
allied to the regime to empower themselves and 
would offer citizens more possibility of demanding 
more transparency.  As has been argued, privati-
sation of reconstruction will expand even more 
the regime’s predatory activities from controlling 
‘rents derived from the state’ to a position that 
permits it to dominate ‘private rents’ without even 
a modicum of transparency. This new income will 
enable the ruling elite to establish a network of as-
sociates linked directly to itself.
64. The experiences of founding independent trade unions 
in Egypt, for example, can be used as models to inspire 
suggestions and possible solutions that challenge the role 
of the official general trade union supported by the state 
and encourage the self-organisation of workers, their 
rights and working conditions. 
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• The reproduction of previous social, economic 
and regional inequalities present before the war 
should be an element to tackle in reconstruc-
tions plans. The most important component of the 
Syrian popular movement consisted of economi-
cally marginalised Sunni rural workers, along with 
urban employees and self-employed workers who 
have borne the brunt of neoliberal policies, par-
ticularly since Bashar al-Assad came to power in 
2000. The geography of the revolts in Idlib, Dar’a 
and in other medium-sized towns and rural areas 
exhibits a pattern, namely that they were all his-
torical strongholds of the Ba’th Party and benefited 
from agricultural reforms in the 1960s. 
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THE CASE OF IRAQ
Anne Hagood
Introduction
The successive crises that Iraq has faced since 2003 are 
intrinsically linked to the nature of the identity politics 
that permeates its institutions and feeds the informal 
economy. Extensive ethno-sectarian patronage diverts 
state resources to maintain a balance among commu-
nities. The post-ISIS political and economic environ-
ments perpetuate this system, with the winners of the 
conflict being not the state but militias. These have 
developed parallel governance and economic struc-
tures, filling the vacuum left by the state institutions 
yet operating through a complex web of state mecha-
nisms. As long as identity politics and its underpinning 
patronage continue to characterise the Iraqi political 
landscape, there is little room for national stabilisation 
and reconstruction. 
On the basis of identity-driven patronage, political 
and economic powers are mainly benefiting particular 
communities depending on who represents them and 
the resources available. As a result, this dynamic fosters 
political, social and economic cleavages that translate 
into competition for scarce resources and institutional 
and political representation.1 Such competition is also 
what drives competing visions of nationalism2 and the 
formulation and role of the state, and therefore the pri-
orities for reconstruction and whom reconstruction 
1. Nancy Ezzeddine and Erwin van Veen, “Power in Per-
spective: Four Key Insights into Iraq’s Hashd Al Sha’abi,” 
Clingendael, Policy Brief, June 2018.
2. For more, see Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: An-
tagonistic Visions of Unity, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2011.
should benefit.3
However, a comprehensive reconstruction and stabili-
sation approach based on a long-term vision is essential 
for Iraq to move forward and to prevent a new cycle of 
conflict. The legacy of the various conflicts since 2003 is 
indicative of the root factors that need to be addressed 
in moving forward, such as corruption, sectarian-
ism and the incapacity of the state to reform. These 
elements are intertwined and fit into a war economy 
mindset adopted by the political parties for political 
survival and to maintain control over resources, thus 
supporting the extensive patronage network they have 
built up over the years.
To better situate the argument, an overview of the 
dynamics of the war economy in Iraq since 2003 with 
a focus on the latest conflict against ISIS between June 
2014 and December 2017 is necessary. This will inves-
tigate the identity-based patronage system that led to 
the demise of Iraq in 2014. In doing so, it will demon-
strate how the key drivers of conflict in Iraq are inter-
woven and remain present to this day. These drivers 
are intrinsically linked to resources and the structure 
of the economy, and consequently account for the 
lack of reform, the deep-seated corruption, inequali-
ties and the ethno-sectarian sharing of resources, with 
the emergence of semi-formal state actors that operate 
through state mechanisms to establish a new form of 
governance.4 The various conflicts since 2003 (the civil 
war, the war against ISIS) and the lingering instabil-
ity have affected Iraq’s capacity to rebuild itself after 
3. According to interviews with Hashd leaders in Iraq 
conducted by the author, a number of groups have 
developed their own procurement and contracting 
systems obtaining contracts via political parties affiliated 
to the Hashd group, thus by-passing the local admin-
istration and the state in reconstruction projects. This 
enables them to develop their own localised economy 
and develop a mode of local governance by taking over 
local state institutions. For example, in Salahadin the 
customs posts are controlled by Asaib Al Haq (AAH), 
whereas in Diyala they are shared between AAH and the 
Badr Organisation. Likewise, in the oilfield in Sa’adiya 
in Diyala is shared between these two groups as well. 
For more, see also Beaumont, R. and Quesnay, A. (2018) 
“The Return of the State and Inter-Militia Competition 
in Northern Iraq,” Noria, online at: https://www.noria-
research.com/the-return-of-the-state-and-inter-militia-
competition-in-northern-iraq/
4. Given the restricted scope of this essay, I will not discuss 
the KRG, which would require a much more extensive 
analysis.
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the fall of Saddam Hussein and have further plunged 
the country into economic deadlock. Dependent on 
oil, Iraq’s government has failed to invest in its youth, 
who for the most part have not completed primary 
education. With 60%5 of its population under the 
age of 25, without proper investment and a reformed 
economy and without opportunities, Iraq’s youth bulge 
is likely to become a youth problem. 
1. Cycles of Conflicts 
after 2003
Establishing an Identity-Based 
Patronage System
In July 2003, the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) 
established what it thought was a representative 
governing structure based on an ethno-sectarian de-
mographic map of Iraq and appointed a 25-member 
Iraqi Governing Council. Not only did this formalise 
sectarianism and ethnicity as the organising principles 
of Iraqi politics6, but its members consisted of a mix of 
religious leaders and expatriates who held little sway 
or legitimacy among Iraqis. They therefore mobilised 
their constituencies around identity politics through 
patronage.7 Politicians started to use state resources, 
rent and employment opportunities as patronage to 
sustain a strong base of support in a society where 
they had none previously.8 Nouri al-Maliki filled 
vacant positions in the military and the administra-
tion with his loyalists and considerably augmented 
his powers to the point where his powerful patronage 
5. United Nations, “In Iraq, UN Youth Envoy says young 
people are ‘most valuable force we have to shape a better 
future,” UN online 12 August 2017.
6. For more on the topic, see International Crisis Group, 
‘The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict’, 
Crisis Group, Middle East Report, No. 52, 2006.
7. Iraqis not only chose identity as a basis for representa-
tion given the elite in power, but it also became a factor 
in political and economic connections, often leading to 
a position or recruitment. See Toby Dodge, Understand-
ing the drivers of violence in Iraq, Adelphi Series, 2012, 
52:434-435, 31-52. 
8. Toby Dodge, Zeynep Kaya, Jessica Watkins and Renad 
Mansour, Understanding the Drivers of Conflict, 2018, 
London School of Economics: Conflict Research Pro-
gramme.
almost led to the creation of a shadow state. Negotia-
tions after each of the elections since 2003 focused on 
which party would control which ministry, given that 
control of particular ministries became a major source 
of patronage and corruption and therefore of vital 
interest to the political parties.9 
The political landscape was dominated by a Shi’a-
Kurdish alliance, which consisted of various fragment-
ed groups. The Sunnis, who were short of political rep-
resentation and linked to the former regime, turned 
to insurgency as they saw the new elite as illegitimate 
and threatening. A series of targeted attacks, particu-
larly the explosion of the Dome in Samarra and the 
ensuing response by Shi’a militias, led to a violent civil 
war in 2006 and 2007. The informal power-sharing 
system (muhasasa) that has permeated Iraqi politics 
since 2003 is also the main reason for the continua-
tion of clientelism in Iraq through control of minis-
tries and institutions, which is inextricably linked to 
sectarian quotas.10 Power-sharing became a gateway 
for employment, leading to an over-inflated and inef-
ficient public sector. An MP on the Integrity Commis-
sion, who asked to remain anonymous, went as far as 
to state that “political parties hand out positions, from 
the cleaners to the post of ministers,”11 thus pointing to 
the complete dominance of patronage. 
The ethno-sectarian consociational system that has 
emerged over the years through exclusive elite alliances 
relies on three sources of rent: 1) the dominant parties 
secure government payrolls for themselves and income 
to reward political loyalty and extend patronage 
networks; 2) they use government contracts to co-opt 
private sector and business people close to them; and 
3) they take part of the ministerial budgets for their 
9. Key ministries with important budgets and contracts are 
first distributed among the dominant political parties or 
those who are taking part in the national unity govern-
ment. The parties then appoint their followers, which 
enables them to get jobs in the ministries they control. 
Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The 
Occupation and its Legacy, London, Hurst & Company, 
2006.
10.This is not to say that clientelism did not exist prior to 
2003, but I would argue that it was not driven by iden-
tity.
11. Sarwar Abdullah, Tim Gray and Emily Clough, Clien-
telism: factionalism in the allocation of public resources 
in Iraq after 2003, Middle Eastern Studies , 2018, 54:4, 
665-682.
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own personal or party gain.12 
Over the years, most of these groups have developed 
their own armed militias and have engaged in conflicts 
with one another over control of territory and 
resources and to assert “exclusivist ethnic and religious 
identities.”13  While I would contend that ethnic ma-
nipulation is nothing new and often the by-product 
of identity reconfiguration, the struggle and violence 
that accompany this reconfiguration become part of 
a process of state-building, with the state’s boundaries 
and institutions reflecting the characteristics and aspi-
rations of the dominant parties. 
The political and economic structures of muhasasa 
enabled a majority of Shi’a Islamists, who felt vindi-
cated by their perception of their victimisation, to lead 
the country, together with nationalist Kurdish factions. 
As ethno-sectarian identity became a new frame of 
national identities, the elite sustained their power over 
time by relying on ethnic or sectarian nationalist dis-
courses14 tapping into grievances.
After Iraq re-emerged from ethno-sectarian politics in 
2010, with the secular blocs winning the majority of 
votes, the subsequent sectarian politics of PM Maliki 
were responsible for uprisings and sit-ins that took 
place throughout the Sunni provinces in the following 
years. Most of the demands centred on accusations of 
corruption, unemployment, poor public services and 
poor salaries,es epically by the Sahwa. In a country 
where the political system is guided by an elite pact 
based on ethno-sectarian apportionment, with identity 
becoming the main justification for access to state 
resources (employment, services etc.), the Sunnis were 
excluded from the economic and political systems. A 
narrative of communal victimhood has progressively 
come to dominate the Sunnis’ perception of Iraq.15 
This drove them into a series of protests between 2012 
and 2013, with sectarian clashes escalating in Hawija 
12.  Dodge et al., Understanding Conflict, op-cit.
13. Ibid.
14. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization 
and the Danger of War,” International Security , Vol. 20, 
1995, No. 1, 5-38.
15.The trigger was the arrest of Rafi Al Essawi and his ten 
bodyguards on charges of corruption.
in 2013.16 A violent response to the demonstrations 
by Maliki ultimately provided fertile ground for ISIS 
to recruit among Sunnis. The first stages of the ISIS 
takeover in Mosul were characterised by the resto-
ration of electricity, the provision of salaries and the 
removal of checkpoints, which were formerly main-
tained by police forces largely seen as illegitimate by 
the local population.
2014 Onwards: The Collapse of Iraq
The fight against ISIS became the theatre for a revival 
of identity politics with a mobilisation of thousands of 
volunteers outside direct government control under 
the umbrella of the Popular Mobilisation Forces 
(PMF). The PMF have gained significant economic, 
social and political ground in Iraq since 2014. Many of 
the groups under the PMF enjoy genuine support from 
the local population and have worked to institution-
alise this relationship by setting up local committees 
or by appointing a person from the local population 
as their representative in public institutions.17  Given 
the dominance of Shi’a politicians and militia leaders 
among the PMF cadre and leadership, it has proven 
more challenging to recruit and garner legitimacy in 
Sunni areas. Therefore, Sunni representatives from 
Baghdad, nicknamed the Green Zone Sunnis18 are 
appointed by the PMF to recruit and ‘sub-contract’ 
security at the local level, but they often do so through 
criminal networks.
Importantly, the PMF are not a homogenous entity 
either, and they have become part of a growing in-
tra-Shi’a contest for state resources and legitimacy. 
16. On Friday 19 April 2013, confrontations took place 
between protesters and the army at a checkpoint in 
Hawija resulting in the death of one civilian and one of-
ficer. As the residents refused to hand over the suspects, 
the city was put under siege, sparking support for the 
Sunni Naqshbandi Army insurgent group and within a 
few days leading to violent clashes resulting in the death 
of 300 people. Other attacks took place in Salahdin and 
then Ninewah.
17. Robin Beaumont and Arthur Quesnay, "The Return of 
the State and Inter-Militia Competition in Northern Iraq", 
14 June 2018.
18. A term that is often used by Sunnis from provinces 
such as Salahadin, Ninewah and Anbar to refer to Sunni 
politicians or representatives who have no clout or 
legitimacy among the populations of these provinces but 
claim to represent them. 
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Among the PMF, there are roughly three groups.19 The 
first group emerged early in Iraq’s post-2003 security 
vacuum and gained a fresh impulse from the ISIS 
takeover of Mosul in June 2014, when Prime Minister 
Maliki and his allies established the Hashd commis-
sion.20 The second reflects Ayatollah Sistani’s priority 
for the Hashd – the protection of Shi’a shrines. The 
groups that pledge allegiance to him are named after 
imams or their burial places in Iraq. The third group 
pledges allegiance to Muqtada al-Sadr and is called 
Sarayat al-Salam (Peace Brigades), a reincarnation 
of the Mahdi Army. The competition for power and 
resources among these groups was most evident during 
the 2018 election.
If anything, the PMF demonstrate that sect-codification 
is not just an elite-driven process and in fact calls for 
different groups or constituencies to buy in and actively 
participate. The elite are not confined to being sectarian 
entrepreneurs acting as puppeteers over masses devoid 
of agency; they are also driven by local demand.21 
Economic opportunities weighed in considerably more 
than ideological or political motives during and after 
the conflict in a number of cases, which was evidenced 
by the young people that mobilised. Most of those in-
terviewed stated that their primary hope in joining 
the PMF structure was to eventually obtain a position 
within a government structure.22 This was especially 
so for those who adhered to the first category cited 
above, the Badr Brigade, to which funds and access to 
state resources were more readily available. Most were 
mainly seeking employment, and communities rallied 
around opportunities that would spring from joining 
19. It should be noted that these three groups have been 
oversimplified for the sake of this article. The PMF is a to 
be seen as a grouping of what is estimated to be between 
140,000 and 160,000 fighters and over 40 military units, 
whose relationship with political actors, Iran and each 
other vary according to interests, patronage, social an-
choring and political and economic interests and vision. 
For more, see Haddad, F. (2018), Understanding Iraq’s 
Hashd Al Sha’abi: State and Power in Post-2014 Iraq. 
March 5, The Century Foundation.
20. With Badr taking a prominent role, along with a more 
silent group that was still dominated by Hezbollah.
21. Fanar Haddad, "Shia-Centric State Building and Sunni 
Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq", Carnegie Endowement, 1 
July 2016.
22. Interview conducted by the author with PMF soldiers in 
Amerli and Baghdad.
the war in the form of contracts for reconstruction.23 In 
an approach more instrumentalist than primordialist,24 
individual economic strategies for survival in social 
and political networks25 are constructed and invested 
with political and economic power balancing indi-
vidual needs with collective identity. The distribution 
of power and resources translates into ethno-sectarian 
patronage networks and exclusivist policies that priori-
tise economic survival at the expense of other groups. 
The policies they formulate and the approaches they 
develop are more sect-centric than sect-driven. In 
other words, the sectarian codification shapes the 
political and social community targeted.
After the fight against ISIS, several groups from the PMF 
coalesced to form a political alliance under the name of 
‘Fateh,’ which was led by the Badr Commander Hadi 
Al Ameri. This competed against other Shi’a factions 
and won 48 seats. Sunni politicians were less critical 
and aligned themselves with Shi’a political leaders in 
the May 2018 election. However, while this may be in-
terpreted as a sign that Iraqi politics are stepping away 
from identity politics and may opt for stability, I would 
caution against such a judgment. The deep-seated re-
sentment is still present. However, the ‘Green Zone’ 
Sunnis are now aligning themselves with stronger 
figures as the economic outlook seems grim and op-
portunistic behaviour is taking precedence, further 
driving a wedge between Sunni populations and their 
political representatives. 
A number of Sunni internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
have been largely prevented from returning to their 
areas of origin26 by PMF groups. The latter deliberately 
target them and hence contribute to ‘homogenising’ 
23. According to several interviews with young people 
mobilised into the PMF by various factions, the mon-
etary incentive was the primary factor. Furthermore, to 
maintain legitimacy and popularity, various PMF groups 
set up a system of pensions for widows, families and oth-
ers of ‘fallen combatants.’ This was later codified into law 
under the current PM. 
24. While primordialists consider that individuals are de-
fined by their identity and ethnicity as a social phenom-
enon has an independent existence that is not rooted 
in any particular social context (Van den Berghe 1994), 
instrumentalists perceive identity as an instrument to 
achieve a political or economic goal (Wimmer 2005, 
Davis 2008, Horrowitz 2009). 
25. These can be tribal, ethnic, religious, etc.
26. Some of the more documented areas are Jafr Al Sarar 
outside Baghdad, Yathrib in Salahdin and Suleiman Beg 
(which was destroyed).
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the demography in order to bolster their legitimacy 
and political and economic grounding. Not only is 
this becoming a breeding ground for radicalism, but it 
will exacerbate political instability as longer-term dis-
placement exposes those concerned to economic loss, 
in addition to the longer social stigmatisation that will 
affect these communities. A consequence of this is a 
considerable impact on the agricultural sector, which 
is being progressively replaced by a de facto public sec-
tor-based employment economy controlled by militias 
and their institutions.27 Furthermore, the state and the 
PMF have engaged in revenge campaigns, systemati-
cally casting out or killing anyone perceived to have the 
slightest relationship to ISIS.28 
At the government level, the state’s priorities were clear 
from the beginning. At the expense of reconstruction 
or stabilisation, among the first four cabinet decisions 
on the budget allocation for 2019, two granted higher 
salaries and an increased budget to the PMF. This was 
despite the ending of the war. Priority for employment 
and jobs was to be given to the relatives of the PMF 
members who died fighting against ISIS. Henceforth, 
competition for resources among the Shi’a groups and 
parties, and the structures established by the PMF that 
are semi-parallel to the state institutions that finance 
non-accountable state actors, will pose a challenge.29 
To date, despite the victory against ISIS and increas-
ing demands by Iraqis for issue-based campaigns and 
parties rather than just identity-based ones, the capture 
of state resources and institutions by the political elite 
and their control over the patronage networks upon 
which they rely still dominate the social, political and 
economic landscapes. This not only underscores a 
pattern that has emerged and intensified since 2003, 
but it also means that the prospects for reconstruction 
are grim. 
27. This was particularly evidenced in areas surrounding 
Kirkuk, in Yathrib, in mixed areas of Ninewah, in Hawi-
jah and in several places in Diyala.
28. In many cases the author witnessed, the victim was 
simply the wife or relative of an alleged fighter. For more, 
see Ben Taub, “Iraq’s Post-ISIS Campaign of Revenge,” 
The New Yorker, 17 December 2018. 
29. Erwin van Ven, Nick Grinstead and Floor El Kamouni-
Janssen, “A House Divided: Political Relations and 
Coalition-Building between Iraq’s Shi’a,” 2017, CRU 
Report. As the authors point out, Shi’a political parties 
unite temporarily in the face of an external threat, espe-
cially if called upon by their religious leadership, but this 
tends to be short-lived and does not reduce opportunis-
tic political behaviour.
2. Competing for 
Resources
While the defeat of ISIS marked a positive step, Iraq 
still faces major impediments to reconstruction that 
are more structural than situational. With its current 
political structure and modes of governance, patronage 
continues to weaken state institutions and enables 
a number of actors to perpetuate the war economy, 
hindering post-conflict recovery. First, the collapse 
of oil prices in 2014 revealed the vulnerability of the 
Iraqi economy and made the rentier state model more 
unsustainable if it is to embark on reconstruction. 
Second, the state’s dire need for private investment 
to provide goods and services, rebuild the economy 
and reconstruct is key to stability. The necessity of 
overhauling the economy and passing legislation that 
would support a non-oil economy and promote job 
creation, particularly in the construction and agri-
culture sectors, calls for a set of political, institutional 
and legal changes that Iraq has yet to introduce but 
are, nonetheless, essential to its development, if not its 
stability. A continuation of the rentier state model and 
patronage-driven economy will accentuate identity-
based cleavages and inequalities and increase the gap 
between citizens and their institutions.30
On 9 December 2017, the Government of Iraq declared 
victory against ISIS after more than three years of 
intense fighting, 67,000 civilian deaths and 2.3 million 
IDPs as a result of conflict, with the cost of recovery 
estimated at USD 88.2 billion.31 Petrodollars account 
for about 90 per cent of government revenue, and crude 
production has tripled since the 2003 US-led invasion. 
To date there has been little progress in diversifying 
the economy and much of the government spending 
is focused on salaries.32 This is not only for political 
30. In 2018, despite a resounding victory against ISIS, 
the turnout was the lowest since 2003, with only 




31. Iraq Economic Monitor: From War to reconstruction 
and Economic Recovery: A Special Focus on Subsidy 
Reform, World Bank, 2018.
32. The public sector wage bill rose by 2.5 times between 
2006 and 2016 and accounts for more than 12% of GDP, 
according to the IMF – available at https://www.imf.
org/~/media/Files/Publications/DP/2018/45535-mcddp-
public-wage-bills.ashx
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of reforms and their lack of implementation indicate 
that subsidies in the energy sector will represent a con-
siderable proportion of federal spending in the fore-
seeable future.36 In fact, the 2019 budget re-ignited 
the ire of a number of governorates as it amounts to 
nearly USD 107 bn, with a USD 19 bn deficit and with 
oil revenue covering up to 88% of the budget (with oil 
prices estimated at USD 56 a barrel). The budget is a far 
cry from the austerity measures previously adopted by 
former PM Haider Al Abadi. 
Although the conflict is over, defence expenditure is 
prioritised in the budget, with the most significant rise 
allocated to recruitment and maintaining the PMF, to 
IQD 1.693 trillion in operational expenditure from 
IQD 1.3888 trillion in 2018, and to IQD 404,560 bn in 
capital expenditure from IQD 294.5 bn in 2018. 
The budget indicates that Iraq will remain fairly central-
ised despite small increases in revenue allocated to some 
governorates through the decentralisation process, 
such as the one in Basra after the protests and political 
infighting.37 The budget law also tries to mitigate the 
risk of uncoordinated or politically oriented provincial 
spending. Cementing central control, however, points 
to additional funds being allocated as expenses on 
projects submitted by governors,38 with priority being 
granted to projects with districts most impacted by 
oil and gas operations and environmental protection 
projects. 
The reliance on oil revenue at the expense of other 
sectors has paved the way for the formation of a neo-
liberal rentier system vulnerable to external shocks, 
rent-seeking and corruption. As explained earlier, 
Iraq has suffered setbacks due to growing personalis-
tic and clientelistic relationships between the private 
36. According to some estimates, it will amount to four 
times the federal expenditure on health, education, 
trade, industry and higher education combined. The 
electricity sector is heavily financed by the government 
at 12% of the total 2019 budget, while bill collection 
rates were at 28% in 2017.
37. In Basra, the oil companies, which are supposed to train 
and hire a workforce drawn from the local population 
and invest back in development projects, are forced to 
hire people with connections to powerful tribal sheikhs 
and the Islamist parties.
38. With the approval of provincial councils, governors 
can utilise up to 50% of the petrodollar funds for: (1) 
electricity imports, (2) services and cleaning, (3) send-
ing patients outside Iraq, (4) provincial current account 
expenses.
reasons to maintain the constituencies committed to, 
but the budget allocation is also detrimental to service 
provision as there is a lack of oversight and high levels 
of subsidies represent a large portion of GDP.33 The 
rentier system on which Iraq’s economy hinges and 
depending on oil for the primary income mean that 
oil revenue has primarily served short-term strategies 
financing a neo-patrimonial distribution of resources 
across identity and party-based relationships. This 
has been made evident by oil revenue being poured 
into public expenditure through the public sector to 
enhance control of the state and its institutions, with 
rife competition among the parties. The system is thus 
serving a political agenda rather than focusing on the 
state’s investment capacity. The rise in oil prices should 
have resulted in a boom for Iraq, but instead it made 
the government reconsider its expenditure. The 2019 
budget, however, shows that public spending will reach 
an all-time high, and while the defence budget needs to 
go down, it is unlikely to do so.
The Budget
Moving forward and despite positive oil price forecasts, 
Iraq’s expenditure should remain focused on reducing 
subsidies, improving service delivery, fighting corrup-
tion and promoting investment reforms. While funds 
were raised to fight corruption in the Board of Supreme 
Audit and the Integrity Commission, the low rates of 
investigation compared to that of conviction point to a 
lack of political will to tackle the problem.34 
The number of public sector employees is expected to 
rise from 2.88 million to 2.93. Adding those of state-
owned companies, they will officially increase by half 
a million. However, according to some estimates they 
may be double that as they include a considerable 
number of contractors and part-time employees.35 
Contractors and part-time employees are likely to be 
appointed through political connections, and particu-
larly with the PMF, which have been heavily involved in 
reconstruction at the local level.  Likewise, the low level 
33. Energy subsidies alone were estimated at 13% of GDP 
in 2015. IMF: Iraq: Selected issues. Country report 15/236. 
34. Robert Tollast, Yasser Al Maleki and Harry Istepanian, 
Iraq’s 2019 Draft Budget Law: A Turning Point in Recon-
struction, Iraq Energy Institute, 29 October 2018.
35. Ali Al-Mawlawi, “Iraq’s State-owned enterprises: A case 
study for public spending reform,” LSE Middle East Cen-
tre, 10 October 2018.
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which suffered heavy destruction.42 In effect, the PMF 
are setting up an array of institutions in parallel with 
the state. As the country recovers and money comes in 
to rebuild areas destroyed in the fighting, the PMF are 
positioning themselves as key intermediaries through 
their reconstruction companies and as brokers in con-
tracting. Being middlemen allows them to both profit 
financially and to employ their demobilised fighters. As 
a PMF leader put it, “having the PMF on your résumé 
makes finding a job very simple these days.”43
The PMF have already moved beyond the reconstruc-
tion of areas destroyed in the fight against ISIS, and they 
proudly advertise their role in providing services and 
building critical infrastructure elsewhere in Iraq. Their 
website displays trucks bearing their logo that have 
begun repaving roads in Basra.44 Beyond the formal 
economy, the PMF are active in informal markets and 
smuggling. In much of Iraq, and particularly in areas 
retaken from ISIS, they man checkpoints, decorate 
the metal posts with portraits of their ‘martyrs’ and 
leaders, and levy fees on travellers. Some have taken 
control of parts of the oil and gas trade in areas once 
ruled by ISIS, imposing tariffs on traders who, since 
the 1990s – when Iraq laboured under comprehensive 
international sanctions – have learned to smuggle oil 
and gas out of the country.45 
This is important given that a stabilisation of Iraq and 
its emergence from the war economy model would 
be based above all on job creation. According to a 
January 2018 World Bank report, 2.5 million Iraqis 
urgently needed jobs, with young people46 being most 
affected. The youth unemployment rate reached 36% 
and demand for jobs was projected to span from 100 
to 180% over the next 13 years. While reform of the 
private sector and business climate is urgent for jobs 
to be created, the elements mentioned above coupled 
42. While it makes good sense to employ demobilised 
fighters in reconstruction, it makes no sense to allow the 
PMF to seize control of this economic sector without 
effective state oversight.
43. International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: 





46. Nearly 50 percent of Iraqis are younger than 19, and 60 
percent are below 25. The population of young people is 
projected to increase from seven to ten million between 
2015 and 2030.
and public sectors based on family, ethno-sectarian 
or political affiliations.39 These relationships between 
the formal and informal economies are now even 
closer with the involvement of the PMF, to the extent 
that programmes that are implemented by interna-
tional agencies or organisations in order to develop 
the private sector end up being heavily influenced by 
political sponsors, including local leaders and grant 
officers.40 There are few signs of this situation changing. 
The PMF and the state
With the rise of the PMF as political actors and by ex-
ploiting grey legal areas, they have been able to expand 
their reach in the security, political and economic 
spheres. Their initial willingness to integrate the min-
istries of the interior and defence was only a means to 
legitimise their leadership and provide access to state 
funding. Abadi’s Executive Order 91 granted them 
legal status while preserving their autonomy, which 
was confirmed by the November 2016 PMF Law.41 It 
is precisely this unique status that allows them to shift 
between the formal and informal sectors and further 
undermine the state and its institutions. The PMF have 
achieved a profile in the economic sphere which on 
occasion directly competes with the state to provide 
reconstruction and services to citizens. They have done 
this particularly in areas retaken from ISIS, many of 
39. See Irene Costantini, “A Neoliberal Rentier System: New 
Challenges and Past Economic Trajectories in Iraq,” The 
International Spectator, 2017, 52:1, 61-75.
40. Ibid.
41.As Renad Mansour explains, the PMF law recognises 
them as “an independent military formation as part of 
the Iraqi armed forces and linked to the Commander-
in-Chief.” The PMF are therefore now legally recognised 
as a legitimate armed entity under the National Security 
Council (NSC) rather than being in a subservient posi-
tion under one of the security ministries. The com-
mand structure does not always go up to the PM and 
the groups compete with the state forces at checkpoints. 
Likewise, in the political arena PMF leaders, and also 
Fatah members, use their political positions to argue 
for greater pay and pension allocations in the budget. 
As Mansour aptly remarks, “Baghdad has allowed the 
militias to institutionalise their role as part of the state, 
while maintaining autonomy as an independent secu-
rity, political and economic actor. The PMF retains the 
image and prominence of a state actor but the auton-
omy of a non-state actor,” See https://warontherocks.
com/2018/04/more-than-militias-iraqs-popular-mobili-
zation-forces-are-here-to-stay/.
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man checkpoints, especially in Sunni areas, point to a 
return of the security and social factors that fuelled the 
rise of ISIL. 
The PMF, rising key actors, are unlikely to reduce or 
stop their expansion through formal institutions and 
will move on to control ministries and institutions that 
offer lucrative rewards from contracting and access to 
resources. The fine line between the private and public 
sectors also hinders necessary reforms and weaning 
Iraq off its oil dependency. The PMF are also moving 
into controlling parts of the private sector, particularly 
in reconstruction, by taking over state-owned con-
struction companies through the Ministry of Housing 
and Construction.
The high level of unemployment, particularly among 
the young, will not merely broaden the gap between 
the state and its citizens but will also foster risks of 
reviving radicalisation and hence impede recovery. 
Importantly, the need to match skill sets to the current 
economic needs of the market is also dire. The conflicts 
and instability that have affected Iraq since 2003 mean 
that today around 35% of Iraqis aged 15-24 have not 
completed primary education. It is essential for both 
stability and poverty reduction to facilitate their access 
to jobs and give them reasonable prospects of advance-
ment. The scale of the employment challenge requires 
significant political will to overcome it. So far, despite 
the urgency this seems lacking. 
The Iraqi government operates through coalitions 
made up of enemies and rivals, a recipe that makes 
progress notoriously slow. A recent accident in Mosul 
in which a boat capsized, which led to the removal of 
the Ninewah Governor Nawfal Hammadi, sparked 
demonstrations and protests that attest to the real 
problem: a need to combat corruption and address the 
lack of service delivery and reconstruction.50 The state 
and its institutions continue to be absent from citizens’ 
lives, leaving a vacuum for informal or semi-formal 
state actors to fill. 
Iraq still has all the makings of being susceptible to 
relapsing into conflict, and rather than turn a new 
page it could find itself in another civil war. Beyond 
political and social polarisation, the government needs 
to address corruption and identity-based nepotism in 
50. Alissa J. Rubin and Falih Hassan, Iraq Ferry Accident 
Sets Off Political Upheaval in Mosul. New York Times, 24 
March 2019.
with the PMF preventing the return of IDPs to their 
areas of origin and their dominance of the reconstruc-
tion sector at the local level means that the economy 
will continue to be shaped by rapidly shifting security, 
social and political conditions and a governance 
deficit. Likewise in agriculture and agribusiness, job 
creation and food security are key to stabilising the 
country, particularly in the liberated areas. Since the 
end of ISIL, Iraq has lost 40% of its agricultural pro-
duction47 due to barriers against the return of IDPs, 
changes made to the local economy by the victors in 
the conflict, deteriorating soil as a result of increasing 
salinity, and a lack of both skills and capital-intensive 
production.48 
Despite an increase in capital spending in the 2019 
budget, the provision of vital services in the south 
and reconstruction in areas destroyed by the war 
are secondary to operational expenditures. Political 
competition among provinces and parties continues 
to hamper service delivery and reconstruction, not 
to mention poor implementation of the budget. The 
revenue generated by the oil sector benefits political 
parties and the elite, while transparency and account-
ability are still lacking.  This translates into a lack of 
connection among ministries, with resources seldom 
being allocated to reconstruction in the governorates 
most affected by the war, especially in Sunni areas.49 
3. Conclusion: What next?
Can Iraq emerge from its war economy model and 
address its woes by diversifying its economic portfolio 
to reduce its dependency on oil and increase its resil-
ience? Can it really efficiently combat corruption and 
overcome ethno-sectarian resource-sharing? There are 
no clear answers to these questions. The lack of political 
will, clientelism and control of state resources being in 
the hands of a few elite members remain serious im-
pediments to moving forward. This is exacerbated by 
the rise of the PMF as political and economic actors, 
which will hamper much-needed changes and reforms. 
Furthermore, the PMF’s militias and organised 
criminal networks, combined with the fact that they 
47. Reach and Big Heart, 2016, Agricultural Market Assess-
ment. FAO (2017), Near East and North Africa Regional 
Overview of Food Insecurity 2016.
48. According to the World Bank, a 10 percent increase in 
primary production may generate revenue for farmers 
and farm workers equivalent to 126,000 jobs, in addition 
to jobs in services and manufacturing. 
49. Ben van Heuvelen, “Q & A with Haider Al Abadi, For-
mer Prime Minister of Iraq,” Iraq Oil Report, 19 March 
2019.
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the public sector and service provision.51 The current 
divided government has stopped most of the former 
PM’s unpopular yet necessary reforms, mainly due 
to political pressure and competing priorities. The 
coming year’s government spending exhibits all the 
traits of disposing of state resources to finance neo-
patrimonial networks, with increased spending on the 
public sector. Meanwhile, the private sector continues 
to contribute to political settlements as it remains 
closely affiliated with the political establishment. 
Iraq needs to diversify its economy through a reform 
of the private sector by means of laws and regulations, 
and also by removing the interests of political figures 
in private companies, which too often obtain contracts 
regarding education and reconstruction of infrastruc-
ture through political connections. Priority must be 
given to the war-affected areas in order to stabilise 
the situation politically and socially. However, more 
broadly speaking, Iraq’s public infrastructure at large 
is in shambles and needs to be rebuilt, starting with the 
energy sector.
51. Nearly half of the budget – $52 billion – will go on 
public sector salaries, pensions and social security for 
government employees, a 15 percent spike from 2018. In 
other words, operational spending (salaries) will eat up 
the largest part: about 75 percent compared to under 25 
percent for investment.
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Analysis of the Iranian organisation, Construction 
Jihad (Jihad-i Sazandigi, hereafter JS), informs on how 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has instrumental-
ised reconstruction and development to consolidate 
power at home and project influence abroad. Of-
ficially established on 16 June 1979, several months 
after the departure of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi 
on 16 January and the return of the exiled Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini on 1 February, JS helped the 
nascent IRI gain popular support by undertaking an 
ambitious development campaign and by spreading 
revolutionary and religious values throughout the 
countryside, where over half the population resided. 
To this end, the organisation built roads, bridges, 
schools, libraries, clinics and baths; delivered elec-
tricity, water, medication and vaccinations; provided 
inputs, credit, guidance and assistance to farmers, 
herders and artisans; disseminated books and films 
with revolutionary and religious content; distributed 
Qur’ans and other Islamic texts; and organised clerical 
sermons, prayer groups and study sessions.
In addition to winning rural hearts and minds, JS 
helped a fledgling and vulnerable IRI demobilise and 
marginalise myriad domestic and foreign opponents, 
1. A modified version of this chapter was originally and 
previously published as Erib Lob, ‘Construction Jihad: 
State-building and development in Iran and Lebanon’s 
Shi'i Territories,’ Third World Quarterly, 2018, 39:11, p. 
2103-25.  
including Shah loyalists and royalists, communists 
and Marxists, Sunni and ethnic separatists, tradi-
tional elites and other counter-revolutionaries, and 
Iraqi forces and their collaborators in four ways. First, 
JS monitored these opponents and reported on their 
presence, personnel and activities in the countryside 
to the political and security establishment.2 Second, in 
a clientelistic fashion, JS persuaded the beneficiaries of 
its projects and services to participate in public dem-
onstrations in support of Khomeini and his political 
allies, and to vote for them in local and national elec-
tions.3 Third, JS integrated its members, partners and 
supporters – who ostensibly supported Khomeini and 
his allies and participated in the Iranian revolution 
and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) – into thousands of 
Islamic councils, land-distribution committees and 
rural cooperatives, and away from the traditional elite, 
Marxists and other opponents.4 Fourth, during the war, 
JS formed a corps of combat engineers, who logistically 
supported Iranian troops on the front and contributed 
to wartime and post-war reconstruction by repairing 
and rebuilding damaged and destroyed infrastructure.5 
After helping the IRI consolidate power in 1983, JS 
became a ministry and helped the state export the 
revolution and project influence to other parts of the 
Muslim and developing world, including Lebanon. 
There, JS helped Hizbullah (The Party of God) establish 
a similar reconstruction and development organisa-
tion called Jihad al-Binaʾ (JB), the Arabic equivalent of 
‘Construction Jihad.’ Based on extensive fieldwork in 
Iran and Lebanon, this chapter examines the wartime 
and post-war reconstruction and development ac-
tivities of JB. These activities shed light on Hizbul-
lah’s strategic efforts to attract recruits, supporters and 
voters as a military organisation and a political party. 
Toward this end, Hizbullah advantaged Lebanese 
Shi‘a economically, in part through JB’s projects and 
services, including infrastructure, housing, hospitals, 
medical centres, dispensaries, schools, electricity, 
water, vocational training and agricultural assistance. 
As an unintended consequence, these projects and 
2. Former deputy minister of JS, interview with the author, 
Tehran, 15 March 2011.
3. Former JS member and Iranian parliamentarian, inter-
view with the author, Tehran, 1 June 2011.
4. Iranian sociologist, interview with the author, Princeton, 
NJ, 25 January 2011. 
5. Former JS members and war veterans, interviews with 
the author, Tehran, 8 March, 15 March, 6 April, 17 April 
and 23 April 2011.
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Even in Lebanon’s Shi‘i territories, popular support for 
Hizbullah was not always a given due to the convoluted 
landscape of political allies and rivals, foreign powers, 
kinship networks and multiple confessions. For 
instance, during the 1998 municipal election in Hiz-
bullah’s birthplace, the northern Bekaa, the party un-
expectedly lost to its Syrian-backed Shi‘i predecessor 
and rival, Amal. The latter had successfully formed an 
opposing coalition of different parties, families, clans 
and confessions, not to mention followers of Hizbullah’s 
disgruntled former secretary general, Subhi al-Tufayli 
(1983-84). During the next election in 2004, Hizbullah 
decidedly won, not just by effectively forging local 
alliances and outmanoeuvring its opponents, but also 
by recognising the necessity and urgency of mobilising 
Shi‘i voters through social welfare and other means.7 
This scenario probably changed after Hizbullah and 
Amal entered into the 8 March Alliance following the 
Syrian military’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005.
Alongside other Hizbullah-affiliated NGOs and 
service providers, JB represented a conduit through 
which the party established and expanded its patron-
client networks before municipal and parliamentary 
elections – a common practice in Lebanese politics. 
In a clientelistic and rentieristic fashion, and backed 
by international institutions and foreign partners and 
donors, local political parties and religious groups 
owned and operated their own reconstruction and 
development organisations. These groups did this to 
compensate for the weakness of the Lebanese state, fill 
the vacuum in public goods and social services in their 
respective communities and maintain legitimacy and 
support from them.8 Unlike these organisations, JB and 
other Hizbullah-affiliated NGOs initially and inten-
tionally remained more autonomous from government 
departments and less dependent on public funds that 
were tied to a state widely perceived as sectarian, inef-
ficient and corrupt.9 Compared to Hizbullah, JB and 
other affiliates, Amal and its service providers, such 
7. Aurélie Daher, ‘Le Hezbollah face aux clans et aux 
grandes familles de la Békaa-nord: les élections munici-
pales de 2004 dans la ville de Baalbeck,’ in Mermier, F. 
and Mervin, S., Leaders et partisans au Liban, Institut 
Français du Proche-Orient/Karthala, Beirut and Paris, 
2012, p. 422-27, 429.
8. Myriam Catusse, and Joseph Alagha, ‘Les Services 
Sociaux du Hezbollah. Effort de guerre, ethos religieux et 
ressources politiques,’ in Mervin, S., Le Hezbollah. État 
des lieux (Sinbad/Actes Sud: Arles, 2008, p. 129-31.
9. Ibid, p. 127-31. 
services subjected Hizbullah and JB to rising expecta-
tions from constituents, who increasingly valued per-
formance and accountability alongside resistance and 
religion. JB also offers insight into Hizbullah’s politi-
cised, faith-based and distributive reconstruction and 
development model. Ideationally, JB helped Hizbullah 
spread political and religious values and demarcate its 
territorial boundaries by erecting and expanding the 
structures of the resistance society and the Islamic 
sphere. JB instilled cohesiveness and commitment in 
some of its personnel and beneficiaries. At the same 
time, JB dismissed the needs and aspirations of others 
and lacked inclusivity and sustainability.
Clientelism and 
Favouritism
Since its official establishment in 1988, JB has delivered 
diverse projects and services to Lebanon’s Shi‘i territo-
ries, including southern Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and 
south Lebanon. As JS had done during the Iran-Iraq 
War, JB renovated and reconstructed infrastructure, 
housing and businesses that rival Lebanese militias 
and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had damaged 
and destroyed during and after Lebanon’s fifteen-year 
civil war and Hizbullah’s repeated confrontations with 
Israel. In addition to wartime and post-war recon-
struction, according to JB’s director general, Engineer 
Muhammad al-Hajj, the organisation delivered 
drinking water, established agricultural cooperatives, 
offered vocational training, organised farmers and 
handicraft markets and promoted environmental pro-
tection.6 
Strategically, JB delivered these projects and services 
to help Hizbullah advance its military and political 
interests, which changed with its organisational 
evolution. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a 
fledgling Hizbullah used JB and other NGOs and 
service providers to alleviate the suffering of impov-
erished and insecure Shi‘a, gain popular legitimacy 
and political support (the lifeblood of any guerrilla 
organisation), attract recruits and compensate fighters, 
martyrs and their families. During and after 1992, 
when Hizbullah participated in Lebanon’s first parlia-
mentary election since the civil war, the party also used 
JB and other NGOs and service providers to appeal to 
constituents and secure electoral votes. 
6. Youtube Video, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ayLChMjm2rs, no longer available.
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separate itself from the party or the state. Rather than 
simply or exclusively commanding the political loyalty 
and religious commitment of some Lebanese Shi‘a, the 
distribution of projects and services by Hizbullah, JB 
and other affiliates comprised a symbiotic or bi-direc-
tional process that generated and intensified public 
pressure for the continued provision and improved 
quality of these projects and services. For Hizbullah, JB 
and other affiliates, one crisis among others exacerbat-
ed this scenario: the post-war reconstruction between 
2006 and 2012.
After the month-long war between Israel and Hizbullah 
in July 2006 decimated Lebanon’s Shi‘i territories, the 
party was obligated to fulfil the promise of its secretary 
general, Hassan Nasrallah, to make these territories 
more beautiful and better than before. As had been the 
case with previous conflicts with Israel, JB was techni-
cally in charge of the reconstruction. During its early 
stages, JB removed rubble and cooperated with Hiz-
bullah’s think tank, the Consultative Centre for Studies 
and Documentation, to conduct surveys, produce 
maps and collect data that assessed the damage. On 
24 May 2007, Hizbullah established a non-profit and 
private planning agency called Wa‘ad (the Promise) 
– which was named after Nasrallah’s promise – to 
supervise and coordinate the reconstruction of demol-
ished apartment buildings in southern Beirut and to 
undertake rebuilding operations in the areas of south 
Lebanon that were under Hizbullah’s political control.
Hizbullah established Wa‘ad to complement and bolster 
JB’s resources and capabilities during this sizeable re-
construction. The party probably also did this in an 
attempt to circumvent the terrorist designations and 
economic sanctions that the United States had imposed 
on JB during the first year of the reconstruction on 20 
February 2007 – even though Wa‘ad was subjected to 
the same designation and sanctions nearly two years 
later during the reconstruction on 6 January 2009.13 
Nonetheless, JB and Wa‘ad seemingly performed an 
impressive feat of engineering by reconstructing and 
renovating 270 buildings, 941 apartments and 1,771 
stores, warehouses and commercial spaces in the Haret 
Hreik municipality of southern Beirut between 2006 
and 2012.14 
One resident of Haret Hreik – who had his apartment 
reconstructed and renovated by JB and Wa‘ad – heaped 
unadulterated praise on them while showing off his 
13 . See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Programs/Documents/terror.txt.
14. Scarlett Haddad, “Promesse tenue : 270 immeubles à 
Haret Hreik entièrement reconstruits à l’initiative de 
Waad ", 11 May 2012.   
as the Council of the South, were less robust, efficient 
and legitimate because they were further entrenched 
in the state. However, since at least 2005, this distinc-
tion has waned after Hizbullah relinquished its status 
as an opposition party with its entry into the cabinet 
and expanded presence inside the government.10 This 
transformation probably explains JB’s growing coop-
eration with different ministries and agencies, particu-
larly those that fell under Hizbullah’s purview.
According to JB’s former president, Qasim‘Ulayq, its 
most important goals were to: 
Keep the people in their land, increase people’s 
morale while they were in their land, prevent 
displacement and prevent the Israeli enemies 
from stopping the objectives of the resistance, 
which [the Israelis] attempted to weaken and 
end its work, to prevent Israel from achieving 
any social goal from its defeats in each battle, 
and bring people back [after these battles] and 
make their homes better than before.11 
Strategically, these objectives could be construed as an 
effort by JB to help Hizbullah maintain a critical mass 
of constituents within its territories and maximise 
recruits, supporters and voters. Ideationally, these 
goals could be interpreted as a mandate to undertake 
wartime and post-war reconstruction and develop-
ment as a moral and symbolic victory and also as 
acts of defiance and survival against the IDF and rival 
Lebanese movements, militias and parties – some of 
which were suspected of collaborating with Israel.
As Hizbullah increasingly integrated into the state 
and distributed public goods and social services, the 
party subjected itself and its affiliates to rising expecta-
tions. Hizbullah probably maintained the non-govern-
mental status of JB and other service providers in an 
attempt to shield them from popular demands, to help 
these organisations attract local, regional and foreign 
funding and support and to keep a certain distance 
from Lebanese politics in general.12 However, as an 
affiliate of Hizbullah – with its parliamentary represen-
tatives and cabinet ministers – JB could not completely 
10. Mona Harb, ‘Faith-Based Organisations as Effective 
Development Partners? Hezbollah and Post-War Recon-
struction in Lebanon,’ in Clarke, G. and Jennings, M., 
Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organisa-
tions: Bridging the Sacred and Secular, Palgrave Macmil-
lan, Basingstok, 2008, p. 216.
11.Youtube Video, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7l5EziJIQVo , no longer available.
12. See http://www.jihadbinaa.org.lb/.  
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Residents at first were worried and sceptical, 
then enthusiastic, and in the end insistent, 
demanding that [we] change the décor of the 
kitchens, the tiles in the bathrooms, etc… [One 
of our biggest challenges was] obtaining the 
approval of residents, who often changed their 
minds and with whom it was necessary to con-
stantly negotiate.16 
Even after Hizbullah declared the official end of the 
reconstruction in May 2012, the popular dissatisfac-
tion did not subside. One resident of Haret Hreik com-
plained about “low-quality housing, un-cleared debris, 
insufficient parking, and the lack of greenery and 
public space, notwithstanding mosques.”17 In response, 
the municipality – which was affiliated with Hizbullah, 
but, as previously mentioned, had been sidelined by it 
during the reconstruction – launched a programme 
in which young volunteers planted trees around the 
area.18 While visiting Haret Hreik on 14 July, the author 
witnessed groups of young volunteers planting trees. 
Although these activities may have partially resulted 
from grassroots pressure for more greenery, they may 
have also been inspired by and implemented in coop-
eration with JB’s environmental protection campaign. 
In addition to generating complaints about implemen-
tation, the reconstruction created perceptions of fa-
vouritism. Coinciding with Hizbullah’s ceremony and 
rally announcing and commemorating the end of the 
reconstruction, residents of southern Lebanon criti-
cised Hizbullah for having dedicated more resources 
to the reconstruction of the party’s headquarters in 
Haret Hreik – a policy that corresponded to the gov-
ernment’s compensation scheme.19 One resident 
of Haret Hreik insisted that “Wa‘ad has exclusively 
serviced the owners of apartments and excluded their 
renters”20 Another resident alleged that JB and Wa‘ad 
had mainly serviced individuals and families who 
joined and supported Hizbullah – a common trend 
among its NGOs and service providers, not to mention 
16. Haddad, op-cit.
17. Resident, interview with the author, Haret Hreik, 26 
July 2012. 
18. Municipality official, interview with the author, Haret 
Hreik, 14 July 2012.
19. Ya Libnan, “South Lebanon residents criticize Hezbollah 
over reconstruction efforts”, 11 May 2012.
20. Resident, interview with the author, Haret Hreik, 26 
July 2012.
new residence, which, as Nasrallah had promised, was 
allegedly more beautiful and better than before.15 In 
reality, JB and Wa‘ad had reinstated the pre-war status 
quo for approximately 200 private property owners 
(including the abovementioned resident) – who osten-
sibly were members and supporters of Hizbullah – in 
an attempt to advance its political and social priorities. 
These included controlling and taking credit for the re-
construction, preserving population density or outside 
resettlement, reaffirming its mediator or interlocutor 
status between the community and the state, renewing 
legitimacy among the community and maintaining 
service provider credibility, reasserting dominance 
and exercising political sovereignty over the territory 
and constituency, and achieving spatial hegemony and 
further reducing the spaces of contestation.
During the reconstruction, Hizbullah, JB and Wa‘ad 
sidelined municipal officials and public authorities 
(even those who were affiliated with the party), ar-
chitects, academics, the public (e.g. tenants, visitors, 
shoppers, mosque-goers and churchgoers) and other 
stakeholders in prioritisation, planning and decision-
making. In the process, Hizbullah, JB and Wa‘ad dis-
regarded the priorities and preferences of these stake-
holders regarding improved liveability, including less 
population density and traffic congestion and more 
public space (e.g. sidewalks, playgrounds and parks), 
pedestrian circulation, natural lighting, ventilation and 
privacy. In the end, the reconstruction was marked by 
a noticeable dearth or even absence of public debate, 
deliberation, participation, inclusiveness, consultation, 
consensus, transparency and accountability, with the 
exception of a few minor superficialities, such as the 
selection of building finishes, tiles and colours.
Ultimately, the reconstruction constituted a top-down 
and exclusionary process that triggered local discon-
tent among the above-mentioned stakeholders and 
other residents. Despite Hizbullah’s attempts to protect 
JB and Wa‘ad through their NGO status, they were 
exposed to heightened expectations and created a 
buffer for the party during the reconstruction. The fact 
that input and feedback on the reconstruction were 
primarily relegated to property owners and minor su-
perficialities narrowed the scope of this process and 
also raised the stakes and rendered it contentious, as 
was revealed by Wa‘ad’s director general, Hassan Jechi: 
15. Resident, interview with the author, Haret Hreik, 15 
July 2012.
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JB and other Hizbullah-affiliated NGOs attempted to 
become more self-sufficient and diversify their funding 
to local, regional and foreign sources other than the 
IRI. As a registered NGO and like other Hizbullah-
affiliated service providers, JB solicited and received 
financial assistance and other support from indigenous 
and diaspora Lebanese Shi‘a, Lebanese governmental 
and non-governmental organisations, and foreign gov-
ernments and international institutions, including the 
Italian government, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Interna-
tional Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas 
(ICARDA).26 Following the 2006 July War between 
Israel and Hizbullah, renewed terrorist designations 
and intensified economic sanctions against the party 
purportedly caused JB’s funds, especially those from 
USAID and other American institutions, to substan-
tially diminish and dry up – even though the European 
Union designations and sanctions targeted Hizbullah’s 
military wing and excluded its NGOs and service pro-
viders.27
The fact that Hizbullah and JB depended to varying 
extents and degrees on external rents from the IRI 
and the international community, and distributed 
these rents to constituents in the form of jobs, goods 
and services, made the party a distributive or rentier 
state within a state. This categorisation also applied 
to Hizbullah’s patron, Iran, and to Lebanon and other 
countries in the region that relied on revenues from 
oil exports, foreign aid and/or diaspora remittances. 
However, rather than simply or exclusively creating 
economic dependency and commanding political 
loyalty among constituents, the rentier-based and dis-
tributive reconstruction and development of Hizbullah 
and JB generated popular pressure in the form of 
heighted expectations and demands for the continued 
provision of increased and improved public goods and 
social services.





those of other political and religious groups.21 This ac-
cusation contradicted Jechi’s claim that Hizbullah had 
not interfered in the reconstruction except to assist 
with zoning and traffic.22 However, in reality, Jechi and 
Wa‘ad’s board reported directly to Hizbullah’s political 
authority or bureau without going through the agency. 
Furthermore, Hizbullah members and party cadres 
directed JB, and its employees were affiliated with 
the party, even if its Central Unit of Social Services 
attempted to present the NGO as autonomous. 
Apart from the criticism of the implementation of the 
reconstruction and favouritism, perceptions existed 
among Lebanese Shi‘a regarding corruption and em-
bourgeoisement of the party during this period. Jechi 
himself expressed concerns about the large sum of 
money totalling approximately $400 million that had 
been allocated for the reconstruction.23 The financial 
cooperation that tenuously existed and opaquely trans-
pired during the reconstruction between the Lebanese 
government and Hizbullah further blurred the dis-
tinction between the two – especially since the party 
sat on the government’s reconstruction committee for 
southern Beirut. Hizbullah claimed that it had distrib-
uted the largest portion of the reconstruction costs to 
the amount of $280 million and relied on only $120 
million from the state.24 However, the fact remained 
that Hizbullah and Wa‘ad had accepted and depended 
on post-war funds, indemnities and compensation 
from the state to partially finance the reconstruc-
tion. This undeclared partnership made it difficult for 
Hizbullah to disassociate itself from a government that 
was negatively perceived. 
In the spirit of rentierism and with an annual operating 
budget of $5 million in 2002,25 JB depended on funding 
from the IRI, particularly from institutions that fell 
under the purview of the supreme leader. Nevertheless, 
21. Ibid.     
22. Haddad, op-cit.   
23. Ibid.    
24. Mona Fawaz, ‘The Politics of Property in Planning: 
Hezbollah’s Reconstruction of Haret Hreik (Beirut, Leba-
non) as Case Study,’ International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 2014, 38:3, p. 929. 
25. Lamia El-Moubayed Bissat, ‘The Role of Civil Society in 
Rural Community Development: Two Case Studies from 
Lebanon,’ paper presented at the Joint ESCWA-World 
Bank Capacity Building Workshop on Rural Develop-
ment in the Middle East, UN-House, Beirut, 3-6 June 
2002, p. 7.
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during and after military conflict (the smaller jihad) 
remained contingent on their individual struggles to 
better themselves (the larger jihad). In return, JB’s 
employees and volunteers were told that they would 
earn heavenly rewards, a concept that Khomeini had 
used to encourage and persuade Iranians to join JS.31   
 Strategically and ideationally, JB served an important 
function for Hizbullah by constructing the physical 
landscape of the Islamic sphere. To this end and as 
JS had done in Iran, JB prioritised structures and in-
stitutions that were related to religion, culture and 
education. Between 1988 and 2008, JB constructed 
and renovated 139 mosques, 95 congregation halls 
for ʿAshura and other Shi‘i commemorations, three 
shrines and seminaries, 81 schools and nine institutes, 
in addition to six hospitals, 21 medical centres and 28 
dispensaries (see table 1). JB’s structures and institu-
tions enabled Hizbullah to appropriate public space 
and demarcate territory or turf from other religious 
sects and political groups. With the transition from 
violent conflict to renewed electoral competition 
following the civil war, such appropriation and demar-
cation remained salient, as the flags, emblems, posters 
and signs of religious and political leaders and parties 
were conspicuously exhibited in their respective neigh-
bourhoods and communities. 
 Despite the high levels of cohesiveness and commit-
ment that it inspired, JB’s resistance and faith-based 
reconstruction and development model encountered 
two limitations. First, it bred exclusivity. Like JS in 
Iran and in the spirit of clientelism, JB did not employ 
and service individuals and families who were neces-
sarily the most qualified or needy but those who were 
deemed to be the most politically loyal and religiously 
committed. As indicated above, JB and other Hizbul-
lah-affiliated NGOs primarily employed and serviced 
Lebanese Shi‘a who joined and supported the party, 
even as it criticised its competitors and the state for 
the same discriminatory and clientelistic practices. 
At the same time, Wa‘ad and other Hizbullah-affili-
ated service providers sought to present an image of 
religious inclusiveness and open-mindedness by hiring 
architects and workers of different confessions, even 
while the party ultimately made the actual decisions 
31. See  http://www.jihadbinaa.org.lb/. On heavenly re-
wards, see Momen, M. (1985), An Introduction to Shi'i 
Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, p. 233-34. 
Exclusivity and 
Sustainability
In helping Hizbullah consolidate a territorial and social 
base in Lebanon’s Shi‘i territories, JB contributed to 
the party’s efforts to build and strengthen the political 
and religious identity of its members and constituents. 
These individuals primarily consisted of thousands of 
low- and middle-income Shi‘a, who supported Hizbul-
lah’s mission and subscribed to its ideology, norms, 
and values, albeit in a critical and reflective manner. As 
JS and other revolutionary organisations had done in 
Iran, JB and other Hizbullah-affiliated NGOs attempted 
to construct and reinforce the political and religious 
identity of employees, volunteers and beneficiaries. 
Politically, JB sought to instil its personnel with unity, 
meaning and purpose by reiterating that its efforts not 
only contributed to wartime and post-war reconstruc-
tion and development but also to the resistance and 
the resistance society – expressions that JB’s website 
and ‘Ulayq used to describe its mission.28 To this end, 
JB adopted JS’s slogan “all together toward construc-
tion,” but with a more militaristic bent: “Together we 
resist and together we build.” While delivering projects 
and services, JB’s employees and volunteers wore caps, 
jackets and vests that were green and yellow (Hizbul-
lah’s colours) and contained the organisation’s slogan 
and logo of a sickle and stalk – a replica of JS’s logo.
Religiously, and as had been the case with JS, the term 
‘jihad’ in JB’s name constituted a powerful recruit-
ment and mobilisation tool because it implied that 
employees and volunteers were fulfilling a sacred, 
collective and individual duty to improve society 
and themselves. A Hizbullah member revealed that 
Lebanese Shi‘a, like other Muslims, distinguished 
between the ‘smaller jihad,’ which included becoming 
a fighter and dying as a martyr in battle, and the ‘larger 
jihad,’ which comprised “building the self, for example, 
by reciting the Qur’an and helping the poor.”29 While 
JB’s employees and volunteers perceived their work as 
contributing to the resistance,30 their non-violent and 
collective efforts to reconstruct and develop society 
28. See http://www.jihadbinaa.org.lb/; https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=7l5EziJIQVo (videos no longer 
available). 
29. Hizbullah member, interview with the author, Bekaa 
Valley, 10 July 2012.
30. Youtube Video,  https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7l5EziJIQVo, no longer available.
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about the modalities of reconstruction and develop-
ment. According to one resident of southern Beirut, 
depending on the political circumstances, JB and other 
Hizbullah-affiliated NGOs attempted to portray them-
selves as non-sectarian by occasionally servicing other 
confessions outside of Shi‘ism.32   
Apart from exclusivity, and like JS, a second shortcom-
ing of JB’s reconstruction and development model was 
its distributive approach or disproportionate focus 
on physical distribution instead of economic sustain-
ability, even though the organisation and its affiliates 
recognised the need to promote and achieve it.33 As JS 
had done in Iran and despite Hizbullah and JB’s rhe-
torical emphasis on sustainable development, popular 
participation and self-sufficiency, the organisation 
focused primarily on delivering services and projects, 
particularly faith-based ones, rather than improving 
economic conditions by creating jobs and support-
ing industry. Compared to construction projects 
and social services, JB dedicated less attention and 
resources to self-sufficiency and income-generation 
projects such as factories, cooperatives, markets and 
vocational training, which the organisation launched 
in 2000, the same year as the Israeli withdrawal from 
southern Lebanon (see table 1). In the Bekaa Valley 
and south Lebanon, JB established a tomato process-
ing and canning plant and sixteen cooperatives: one 
for pickle production, one for honeybee keeping, one 
for machinery servicing and thirteen in agriculture.34 
Instead of adequately promoting sustainability, JB’s 
distributive reconstruction and development model 
caused beneficiaries to become dependent on the or-
ganisation and the party for survival and prosperity. 
A working class resident of southern Beirut confessed 
that “while a number of people like myself do not par-
ticularly care for either Hizbullah or Amal and feel 
trapped between them, being affiliated with one or the 
other increases the likelihood of receiving an education 
and earning a living.”35 According to the director of an 
international NGO that specialises in microfinance in 
the Bekaa, “rather than encourage and train residents 
32. Resident, interview with the author, southern Beirut, 15 
July 2012.     
33. See http://www.jihadbinaa.org.lb/; and https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=7l5EziJIQVo (video no longer 
available). 
34. Bissat, op-cit.
35. Resident, discussion with the author, southern Beirut, 
27 July 2012.
to develop entrepreneurial ideas, write business plans, 
secure private loans and start businesses through 
personal initiative, competence, skill and merit, 
Hizbullah and its affiliates make locals dependent on 
their employment and services, and condition them 
to continue seeking hand-outs by maintaining the 
proper connections and working the system to their 
advantage.”36 This critique of Hizbullah ignored the 
fact that it had distributed microcredit through JB and 
other NGOs, including the Good Loan Foundation 
and the Relief Committee, since 1982.
As had been the case with JS, JB’s real and perceived 
inability to sufficiently promote sustainability was 
not just the by-product of a distributive reconstruc-
tion and development model, but also of a top-down 
one. Despite the fact that JB’s employees and volun-
teers enjoyed autonomy and were embedded in local 
communities to assess their needs, the organisation 
remained more centralised than participatory with 
respect to its beneficiaries. Like JS and other Hizbul-
lah-affiliated NGOs, JB engaged in cost-sharing with 
beneficiaries to grant them ownership of projects, 
such as the digging of wells and the building of clinics, 
and increase their chances of success, not to mention 
expanding and diversifying the organisation’s funding 
sources. 
Cost-sharing aside, and like JS, JB refrained from so-
liciting meaningful participation from its beneficiaries 
in the decision-making, prioritisation and planning of 
projects and services – a practice that, as noted above, 
applied to the organisation’s post-war reconstruction 
of Lebanon’s Shi‘i territories between 2006 and 2012. In 
her ESCWA-World Bank report on JB’s rural develop-
ment activities, Bissat (2002) stated that the organisa-
tion built “strong ties with its target beneficiaries” and 
gained “the respect and trust of the people,” while also 
concluding the following:
Beneficiaries, mainly poor villagers and small farmers, 
are not actively involved in the definition of needs and 
prioritisation of projects and activities. [JB] has a pre-
defined plan. The field engineers of [JB] identify pri-
orities themselves, on the basis of needs they perceive 
during their site visits and upon interaction with the 
population.37
In a top-down fashion, JB imposed projects that did 
36. International NGO director, interview with the author, 
Bekaa Valley, 11 July 2012.  
37. Bissat, ‘Role,’ p. 8.
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not always correspond to the priorities or preferenc-
es of its beneficiaries, especially those who were not 
Hizbullah members or supporters. When it came to 
project selection, JB’s beneficiaries had limited, if any, 
say. Although they may have required and desired more 
cooperatives, factories, markets and training to boost 
self-sufficiency and income-generation, JB continued 
to concentrate more on social services and construc-
tion projects, especially in the areas of religion, culture 
and education. While likely to improve literacy rates 
and education levels, these activities did not necessar-
ily generate greater employment opportunities or pro-
fessional skills – which explains why JB launched its 
vocational training programme in 2000.
Conclusion
One explanation of JB’s top-down reconstruction and 
development model and its disproportionate focus 
on physical distribution over economic sustainability 
is that Hizbullah’s military and political priorities su-
perseded its socioeconomic and developmental goals. 
Hizbullah’s primary existence and raison d’être as a 
military organisation and a political party – the self-
proclaimed Islamic Resistance in Lebanon – meant 
that its socioeconomic and developmental objectives 
were subservient to its military and political ones. Hiz-
bullah’s war with Israel in 2006 and the party’s battles 
against Syrian rebels and Sunni extremists since 2011 
have subjected Lebanese Shi‘a and other citizens to 
continual and intensified conflict and instability.38
So long as this remains the case, JB is likely to continue 
dedicating its finite resources to the immediate and 
pressing needs of wartime and post-war reconstruc-
tion and service provision rather than economic 
sustainability. Moreover, as Hizbullah continues its 
military operations and becomes increasingly integrat-
ed into the state, the party will probably continue using 
JB’s projects and services to advance the strategic and 
ideational goals of attracting and socialising constitu-
ents, spreading political and religious values and main-
taining a territorial and social base. For JB, inclusivity 
and sustainability have remained secondary to Hizbul-
lah’s social and political aims of servicing disadvan-
taged groups, improving their livelihoods, reducing 
migration from target villages, building solidarity and 
strengthening support for the Islamic resistance and its 
community.
38. See https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database.
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Appendix
Table 1. JB’s Developmental Activities (1988-2008).39
Number of Projects Completed by JB (1988-2008)
Type of Project Construction Renovation
Houses of Families of Martyrs and the Needy 59 147
Hospitals 2 4
Medical Centres 6 15
Dispensaries 13 15
Mosques 66 73
Congregation Halls 20 75
Shrines and Seminaries 3 0
Schools 13 68
Institutes 4 5
Professional Training Provided by JB (2000-2008)  
Profession/Domain Number of Sessions Number of 
Participants




Iron Workers 3 15
Cement Workers 2 30
Painters 4 23
Reconstruction, Compensation and Assistance Provided by JB  
(1988-August 2007) 
Type Number of Relevant 
Cases
Amount (USD)
Lodging 28,300 133.5 million
Repair of Damaged Houses 0 190.7 million
Economic and Commercial Institutions 12,500 30 million
Direct Damage (Agricultural) 1,300 2 million
Direct Damage (Livestock) 2,000 3 million
Public Transport 2,300 4 million
Support to Damaged Villages (The Most Affected) 3 million
Support to Fishermen 3,500 700,000
Wa‘ad Project 0 14 million*
Total Expenditure 380.9 million
*The amount is that accrued by 14 August 2007. It therefore does not correspond to the total amount invested in the project.
Source: JB’s Website, 27 August 2009, www.jbf-lb.org.
39. Aurelie Daher, Le Hezbollah: Mobilisation et pouvoir, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2014, p. 159 (translated by 
the author).
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Free Trade Zones (FTZs) reflect collaboration between 
governments, local businesses, multinational firms, in-
ternational investors and development banks. In theory, 
FTZs should serve as spheres in which international 
and local actors can cooperate to help end conflicts, 
achieve stabilisation and contribute to reconstruction 
efforts. This cooperation can entail both managing a 
variety of stakeholder expectations within a particular 
conflict and garnering global capital flows. In reality, 
geopolitics and domestic issues often play a crucial 
role in the timing, location and objectives of FTZ de-
velopment across the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. Determining the likelihood that FTZs 
may replace international political commitments to 
assist in stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in the 
MENA region therefore requires identifying not only 
areas in which the theoretical and practical applica-
tions of FTZs overlap but also theatres in which public 
and private-sector actors possess a mutual interest in 
reconstruction and reconciliation. This paper seeks 
to determine whether FTZs in countries that border 
conflict areas can be utilised as vehicles to accomplish 
post-conflict objectives.
The FTZ system in Saudi Arabia offers a useful case 
study for addressing the paper’s primary research 
question. First, the country borders two conflict-rid-
den states: Yemen and Iraq. Saudi Arabia is particularly 
concerned about the political, economic and security 
dynamics in the post-conflict futures of these neigh-
bouring countries. Second, the Saudi government has 
exhibited an increased inclination to develop FTZs that 
utilise the border regions and other non-contiguous 
territories of Yemen, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt as a means 
of navigating the new economic realities in the region. 
These nascent projects offer a comparative view of how 
Saudi FTZ development takes place alongside MENA 
territories in various stages of conflict. Third, the early 
developmental phases of Saudi FTZ projects present a 
window of opportunity for policymakers to better in-
corporate reconstruction and reconciliation objectives 
into these dynamic long-term initiatives.
This paper will first present a simplified political 
economy of FTZs in Gulf Arab states and highlight 
key insights from the available literature concern-
ing the cross-border consequences of FTZ develop-
ment. The paper then traces Saudi Arabia’s plans for 
FTZs with countries outside of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). The paper concludes with an assess-
ment of how the country’s economic and geopolitical 
interests in FTZ development may affect the likelihood 
of projects contributing to reconciliation and inclusion 
efforts, specifically those pertaining to Yemen and Iraq. 
The methodology combines analycentric and meta-
policy approaches by analysing the economic and 
technical feasibility of FTZ projects and contextualis-
ing these projects to better determine their likely struc-
tural impacts. The paper draws on interview material 
and data collected during the author’s DPhil research 





In global case studies traditional FTZs are recognised 
as means of increasing foreign direct investment (FDI), 
generating employment, boosting exports in strategic 
sectors and transferring skills to local workforces.1 
Other observers view FTZs as producing a “catalyst 
effect” for local exporters or functioning as second-
best initiatives that encourage broader trade reform.2 
1. Akinci Gokhan and James Crittle, ‘Special Economic 
Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications 
for Zone Development,’ The World Bank Group, Wash-
ington DC, 2008.
2. Johansson, H. and Lars, N. (1997), ‘Export Processing 
Zones as Catalysts,’ World Development 25.12: 2115-
2116.
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FTZs in the GCC broadly resemble demarcated geo-
graphical areas contained within a territory’s national 
boundaries where full foreign ownership is permitted 
and other rules of business are different to those that 
prevail in the national territory.3 More specifically, 
Gulf FTZs differ from onshore commercial hubs in 
three crucial areas: they permit full foreign ownership 
of commercial entities, they offer reduced workforce 
nationalisation requirements and they provide duty 
and tax exemptions. 
FTZs emerged earlier and more often in the GCC ter-
ritories lacking substantial oil and gas resources. Dubai 
launched the Jebel Ali Free Zone in 1985, and many 
of the northern emirates developed FTZs in the late 
1980s. The coincidence of this early FTZ develop-
ment with the oil glut of the 1980s linked FTZs with 
economic diversification efforts. Resource-abundant 
territories – such as Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Kuwait – 
also engaged in FTZ development, but these territories 
built their first FTZs in the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
FTZs in these territories have focused, with varying 
degrees of success, on attracting high-profile multina-
tional firms to boost their commercial reputations. 
By the end of 2016, there existed 51 FTZs operating 
across the GCC region. This FTZ system provides 
multiple market entry points for foreign companies 
seeking to enter Gulf Arab markets, and therefore local 
governments hail FTZ initiatives as state-led efforts 
to encourage private sector development. However, 
the overwhelming majority of GCC FTZs are govern-
ment-owned and susceptible to exploitation by polit-
ically-connected firms and actors. Some authors, for 
example, posit that development initiatives associated 
with FTZs mask a fundamental goal of capital accu-
mulation.4
The structural characteristics and policies of FTZs in 
the GCC, however, have often hampered or actively 
undermined objectives traditionally associated with 
FTZs. According to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), FTZs complicated the collection of non-oil tax 
revenue across the GCC,5 and the region’s FDI has not 
3. Thomas Farole, Special Economic Zones in Africa: Com-
paring Performance and Learning from Global Experi-
ences, The World Bank: Washington D.C., 23.
4. Frank Cugurullo, ‘How to Build a Sandcastle: An Analysis 
of the Genesis and Development of Masdar City,’ Journal 
of Urban Technology 20.1: 34.
5.  International Monetary Fund. (2016), Diversifying Gov-
ernment Revenue in the GCC: Next Steps. Riyadh: IMF, p. 
5.
improved the quality and sophistication of exports.6 
Policy divergence within the GCC’s FTZ system also 
sends mixed signals regarding the centrality of local 
employment generation as an objective behind FTZ 
creation. FTZ policies in Oman and Bahrain require 
clients to meet workforce nationalisation targets, 
whereas FTZs in the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar openly 
advertise unrestricted access to expatriate labour. 
These objectives challenge traditional notions of FTZ 
development, which focus primarily upon economic 
calculi yet neatly align with the concept that all 
economic institutions are political because they must 
have a political end to survive.7
There is a dearth of literature specifically addressing 
FTZ development in the GCC region.  In one of the 
few political economy works focusing on FTZs in the 
GCC region, Arang Keshavarzian compares Dubai’s 
Jebel Ali Free Zone with Iran’s Kish Free Trade Zone 
to demonstrate that FTZs project territorial sover-
eignty in turbulent geostrategic settings and direct 
rents to domestic and international members of elite 
coalitions.8 Key works on the political economy of Gulf 
Arab states sporadically discuss FTZs but do not treat 
the concept as a central analytical category.9 A small 
number of academic works have explored the relation-
ship between cross-country reconciliation efforts and 
FTZs, such as industrial zones in Israeli, Egyptian, 
Jordanian and Palestinian businesses10 and the “ex-
perimental form of territoriality”11 in the Kaesong 
Industrial Zone between North Korea and South 
6.  Tim Callen. et al., Economic Diversification in the GCC: 
Past, Present, and Future, Washington: IMF Staff Discus-
sion Note, p. 21.
7. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. 
Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual 
Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, 
New York, Cambridge University Press. 
8. Arang Keshavarzian, ‘Geopolitics and the Genealogy of 
Free Trade Zones in the Persian Gulf,’ Geopolitics, 2010, 
15.2: 263-89.
9. Adam Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab 
States, New York, Palgrave MacMillan; Young, K. (2014), 
Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the 
UAE: Between the Majilis and the Market, London: Pal-
grave MacMillan; Davidson, C. (2005), The United Arab 
Emirates: A Study in Survival, Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2005.
10. Congressional Research Service, "Qualifying Industrial 
Zones (QIZs) in Jordan and Egypt: Background and Issues 
for Congress", 23 August 2013.
11. Jamie Doucette and Seung-Ook Lee, ‘Experimental ter-
ritoriality: Assembling the Kaesong Industrial Complex in 
North Korea,’ Political Geography, 2015, 47: 53-63.
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along the border with Yemen in the southwest part 
of the country – to promote development in margin-
alised areas outside of Saudi Arabia’s traditional urban 
centres. The proposed FTZ project in the al-Wadee-
ah area of Najran reflected a collaboration between 
the Saudi government, private sector actors in both 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the Islamic Develop-
ment Bank. However, the initiative ultimately stalled 
following the regional protests of 2011 and the ensuing 
conflict, which increased the risks for the project 
stakeholders. The postponement demonstrated that, 
rather than political unrest providing an impetus for 
economic development through FTZ creation, political 
conflicts instead disrupted processes of FTZ creation. 
Shaykh Abdulmohsin Abdulaziz Al Hokair, founder 
of the Al Hokair Group and a prominent Saudi busi-
nessman, likewise proposed launching an FTZ on the 
Jizan-Yemeni border. Al Hokair suggested that Yemen’s 
abundant labour resources would pair neatly with 
Saudi capital and commercial expertise and stimulate 
trade in Yemen.12 However, the Jizan project never ma-
terialised. 
The Saudi government reopened discussions concern-
ing FTZs on its southern border in early 2017 through 
a government-issued press release:
It is expected that projects and programs of re-
construction of Yemen after the war ends and 
restoration of legitimacy will contribute to the 
revival of the project of free trade zones between 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.13
The nature of the conflict in Yemen had evolved sub-
stantially since 2011, and Saudi Arabia formally entered 
the unfolding civil war in 2015. It is noteworthy that 
government communications specifically mention “re-
construction” and the “restoration of legitimacy” as 
objectives behind the reinvigorated FTZ initiative. The 
press release also suggests that FTZs could facilitate the 
movement of “millions of tons of cement, rebar, wood 
and other infrastructure materials”14 into post-war 
Yemen, thus positioning Saudi Arabian commercial 
entities as facilitators of post-conflict reconstruction. 
The former chief of the Saudi-Yemeni Business 
12. National Yemen, "Free Trade Zone Between Yemen and 




Korea. However, these works examine how economic 
initiatives enhance linkages amidst poor diplomatic 
relations rather than how FTZs specifically contribute 
to building socioeconomic foundations in conflict and 
post-conflict states. In order to build on the available 
literature, this paper examines the potential for FTZs in 
Saudi Arabia to shape conflict resolution, reconstruc-
tion and reconciliation efforts in the broader region. 
FTZs in Saudi Arabia
The early stages of FTZ development in Saudi Arabia 
included: i) the creation of two bonded re-export zones 
in Dammam and Jeddah during the late 1990s; and ii) 
the emergence of economic cities in the early 2000s 
under the direction of the Saudi Arabia General In-
vestment Authority. Saudi economic cities are hybrid 
entities containing elements from both offshore FTZs 
and onshore industrial parks and cities. As a result, 
such entities are often referred to as dual zones. The 
publicly-stated objectives behind the economic cities 
involved promoting growth outside the traditional 
urban centres in Saudi Arabia. While bonded and 
re-export zones and economic cities depended on 
international trading partners and foreign direct in-
vestment inflows, these entities marshalled resources 
primarily to accomplish domestic objectives and did 
not engage in bilateral or multilateral cooperation with 
neighbouring states. 
Prior to 2015, the FTZ system in Saudi Arabia was 
mainly domestic in orientation and so had little to bear 
on the role of these entities in promoting conflict reso-
lution and stabilisation efforts. A third stage of FTZ de-
velopment began following a re-alignment of political 
institutions following the death of King Abdullah bin 
Abdulaziz in January 2015 and the succession of King 
Salman bin Abdulaziz and Crown Prince Mohammed 
bin Salman. During this stage, the Saudi state has dem-
onstrated an increasing propensity to establish inter-
nationally-oriented economic initiatives that are inex-
tricably linked to markets in neighbouring countries. It 
is to these initiatives that this paper now turns.
The Saudi-Yemeni Border 
Nearly a decade ago, the Saudi government and pri-
vate-sector actors explored the prospect of develop-
ing FTZs in Najran and Jizan – two provinces located 
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mately facilitate the outflow of investment rather than 
working to stabilise economic institutions. 
The ongoing conflict in Yemen caused an outflow of 
investment through the country’s only non-Saudi land 
border. In May 2016, FTZ authorities reported that 75 
multinational companies had signed free zone agree-
ments, and a further 25 applications remained under 
review.20 A director at the Public Establishment for 
Industrial Estates, the government entity that oversees 
Al Mazunah Free Zone, confirmed the war’s effect on 
the FTZ: “Mazunah has witnessed a flurry of activity 
because all other borders are blocked. There are no 
commercial access points to Yemen other than its ports, 
but these have real security concerns. All of this [free 
zone activity] is because of the war.”21 He estimated 
that 95 percent of the available commercial space in 
Al Mazunah Free Zone had been allocated within a 
one-year period ending in June 2016. By March 2018, 
around 160 companies had signed contracts to operate 
in Al Mazunah Free Zone.22 The Omani zone focuses 
specifically on trade in and storage of vehicles, auto-
motive parts, fruit and vegetables, livestock, fresh and 
frozen meat, machinery and equipment and other 
merchandise.
The Saudi-Iraqi Border 
A deterioration in Saudi-Iraqi diplomatic relations 
and persistent security issues in Iraq prevented the 
emergence of FTZs along the border between the two 
countries during the late 1990s and early 2000s – a 
period of substantial FTZ proliferation across the Gulf 
region. The Saudi government cut formal ties with Iraq 
in 1990 after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. 
Relations deteriorated further following the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent security 
consequences resulting from military strife in the 
country. Although troubled diplomatic relations and 
instability owing to conflict complicated the emergence 
of an FTZ on the Saudi-Iraqi border, Iraq nevertheless 
attempted to develop a FTZ system within the country. 
In 1998, the Iraqi Ministry of Finance codified a Free 
Zones Commission Law resulting in the creation of 
20.Times of Oman, "Oman's Al Mazunah Free Zone signs 21 
investment agreements", 21 may 2016.
21. Personal interview, a director at the Public Establish-
ment for Industrial Estates, Knowledge Oasis Muscat, 
Oman, June 12, 2016.
22. Free Zone Watch, "Al Mazunah makes its mark".
Council, Dr. Abdullah Marei Mahfouz, noted that the 
proposed FTZ would stimulate private-sector activity 
not only in Saudi Arabia’s southern provinces but also 
in the Yemeni governorates of Hadramout, Al-Jawf 
and Saada. The Saudi business leader also mentioned 
increased Yemeni exports – namely fish, fruit and veg-
etables – and the generation of “thousands of jobs for 
the youth of Saudi Arabia and Yemen” as potential 
outcomes of FTZ development.15 He estimated that the 
project would require SR250 million ($66.7 million) in 
initial investments and that the value of trade would 
reach SR500 million ($133.3 million) in the first year.16
Increased trade flows in and out of Yemen and more 
employment opportunities would be welcome in a 
country where exports dropped from $9.18 billion in 
2013 to $899 million in 2016 and imports decreased 
from $13 billion to $6.7 billion in 2016.17 Since the esca-
lation of violence after March 2015, Yemen’s economy 
has contracted at a cumulative rate of 50 percent.18 
However, the growth trajectory of another FTZ on the 
Yemeni-Omani border – the Al Mazunah Free Zone in 
the Dhofar governorate of Oman – offers a critical view 
of the capital flows associated with the new economic 
realities in Yemen. 
The Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen and the 
consequent escalation of the conflict in 2015 has been 
a boon for business in the Al Mazunah Free Zone on 
the Yemeni-Omani border. Very little activity occurred 
at Al Mazunah between its opening in 1999 and 2010. 
Security issues in Yemen prevented a smooth flow 
of workers over the border, and the Omani govern-
ment found it difficult to differentiate between serious 
Yemeni investors and those with other motives. “Many 
rich Yemenis want to go to the free zone to escape the 
war and invest in a safer environment,”19 said a source 
closely associated with the Al Mazunah Free Zone. 
The investment trends in the Al Mazunah Free Zone 
illustrate a worrying scenario for FTZ development 
alongside theatres of conflict: that FTZs may ulti-
15. Arab News, "Saudi-Yemeni free-trade zone would benefit 
both countries, says business leader", 22 February 2017.
16. Saudi Gazette, "Yemenis await revival of free trade zone 





19. Personal interview, senior industrial estate and free 
zone manager, Salalah, Oman, June 9, 2016.
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the Khor Al-Zubair Free Zone near Basra, the Felafal 
Free Zone near Ninevah, the Qayem Free Zone near 
al-Anbar and the Sulaymaniya Free Zone23 in the 
north of the country.24 All of these FTZs targeted trade 
with Iraq’s northern neighbours, while the country’s 
southern border with Saudi Arabia received substan-
tially less attention from economic policymakers. 
Economic embargoes, armed conflict and damaged in-
frastructure negatively influenced commercial opera-
tions in these zones.25
The poor progress of Iraqi FTZs and reinvigorated dip-
lomatic ties presented an opportunity for Saudi Arabia 
to consider FTZ development in the north. Saudi Arabia 
signalled an intention to create FTZs on its border with 
Iraq following a broader warming of relations between 
the two countries in 2017.26 The Saudi government 
reopened diplomatic offices in Iraq after 25 years, and 
several high-profile Saudi government officials subse-
quently visited the country.27 In August 2017, Saudi 
Arabia created a Saudi-Iraqi coordination council and 
planned to reopen the Arar border crossing with Iraq 
for the first time since 1990 – a necessary condition 
for facilitating cross-border trade and rebuilding the 
economic institutions required for the FTZ develop-
ment. 
The Iraqi government insisted that $88 billion was 
needed for the reconstruction of areas decimated by 
ISIS-related violence,28 and Saudi Arabian officials 
pledged $1.5 billion for reconstruction efforts in neigh-
bouring Iraq. The Saudi Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Trade at the Ministry of Commerce and Investment, 
Abdulrahman Al Harbi, suggested that increased trade 
and investments could further contribute to post-
conflict initiatives in the country. Saudi Arabia set a 
target of SAR25 billion ($6.13 billion) in trade flows 
23. The Sulaymaniya Free Zone is managed by the Kurdis-





26. Asharq Al Awsat, "Iraq Oil Minister: Establishment of 
Iraqi-Saudi Coordination Council a Significant Step", 16 
August 2017.
27. Christopher Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and 
U.S. Relations, Washington, D.C, Congressional Re-
search Service, 2017.
28. Lulwa Shalhoub, "Saudi Arabia to allocate $1.5 billion 
for Iraq reconstruction, trade", 14 February 2018.
over the next decade, and the minister stated that “the 
increase in volume of trade and investment will posi-
tively impact the economy of the country [Iraq], which 
will lead to its development and stabilisation.”29 While 
a FTZ may indeed help facilitate trade and investment 
flows from Saudi Arabia into Iraq, there remain addi-
tional factors beyond stabilisation and reconstruction 
efforts that have influenced FTZ development consid-
erations on the Saudi-Iraqi border. 
Geopolitical rivalries, regional competition from 
within the GCC and border politics remain important 
factors behind Saudi plans for FTZ development on its 
northern border. First, the increasing Iranian presence 
in Iraq’s political, economic and security structures 
represents a threat to Riyadh’s foreign policy objectives 
in the region. On the economic front, Iran opened an 
FTZ along the Shalamcheh border crossing near Basra, 
and Iran lifted visa requirements for Iraqis shopping for 
Iranian goods over the border.30 In this context, Saudi 
efforts to create commercial hubs on its border with 
Iraq can be viewed as a means of countering Iranian 
economic influence in Iraqi markets. Earmarking 
funds for FTZs along the border would also augment 
Saudi Arabia’s security-monitoring capabilities. 
Iran, however, is not the only regional actor interest-
ed in exploiting post-conflict northern Gulf markets. 
Driven by its New Kuwait Vision 2035, Kuwait has 
sought to position itself as the premier financial hub in 
the northern Gulf and the commercial gateway to it. As 
part of this strategy, Kuwait has reinvigorated plans for 
its Silk City megaproject and an integrated economic 
zone on five of its northern islands – both of these ini-
tiatives contain FTZ characteristics that target Iraqi, 
and to a lesser degree Iranian, markets. Saudi Arabia 
also combines a substantial border with Iraq with a 
pressing need to diversify its economy by promoting 
non-oil trade and investment. Therefore, Saudi Arabia 
is unlikely to surrender the title of premier gateway 
into northern Gulf markets to Kuwait.
FTZs located along borders remain vulnerable to 
political conflicts, and tensions over Saudi Arabia’s 
border with Qatar demonstrate this point well. Qatar’s 
state-owned developer of economic zones, Manateq, 
planned to build a special economic zone, Al Karaana, 
on the Saudi-Qatari border. However, the diplomatic 
29. The National, "Saudi-Iraqi trade to reach 23 billion Saudi 
Riyals within 10 years", 20 February 2018.
30. The Economist, "Saudi Arabia’s use of soft power in Iraq 
is making Iran nervous", 8 March 2018.
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to the elite.35 Neom also accomplishes elements of 
Mohammed bin Salman’s broader social and economic 
reform agenda: a main theme of Saudi Vision 2030 
involves promoting a vibrant society with strong roots, 
fulfilling lives and strong foundations. In this context, 
Neom promises its inhabitants “an idyllic living envi-
ronment and rich quality of life” and “world-standard 
social norms in culture, arts and education.”36 Saudi 
vision 2030 also aims to reduce the country’s depen-
dence on oil revenues and diversify its economy.
The ambitious nature and scale of the project, however, 
has created funding obstacles that highlight the 
continued role of hydrocarbon revenue in the kingdom’s 
economy. After Mohammed bin Salman’s plan to 
raise $100 billion in funding through an initial public 
offering of Saudi Aramco was delayed, the government 
facilitated a $69.1 billion share purchase agreement in 
which Saudi Aramco would purchase 70 percent of the 
stock of Saudi Basic Industries Company. The Public 
Investment Fund will use this funding to push ahead 
with the first phases of high-profile projects like Neom. 
That the primary source of funding originates from the 
country’s national petroleum and natural gas company 
underscores the inherent difficulties involved in tran-
sitioning away from oil and gas income and toward 
revenue from strategic non-oil sectors.      
The overlapping spatial elements of this initiative – 
while not including states embroiled in conflicts to 
the degree witnessed in Yemen and Iraq – neverthe-
less offer an insightful window into the motivations 
of Saudi policymakers as they embark on FTZ devel-
opment within the country. Saudi Arabia announced 
plans to build a Saudi-Egypt causeway and construct 
an FTZ in the Sinai Peninsula in April 2017.37 However, 
the conceptual launch of Neom in October 2017 repre-
sented an evolution of the earlier Sinai FTZ proposal. 
Egypt pledged 1,000 square kilometres of land in the 
Sinai in return for a stake in the project’s $10 billion 
35. Michael E. Porter, ‘Competitiveness and Economic 
Development of Gulf and Middle Eastern Countries,’ 
Presentation to Middle East Petrotech, 2003, Bahrain in 
Micahel Ewers, and Edward Malecki, ‘Leapfrogging into 
the Knowledge Economy: Assessing the Economic Devel-
opment Strategies of the Arab Gulf States,’ Royal Dutch 




dispute with the Saudi-led bloc of GCC members 
and the consequent economic embargo beginning 
in the summer of 2017 resulted in the closure of the 
Saudi-Qatari border. This political decision essential-
ly destroyed the commercial feasibility of the Qatari 
special economic zone, which required unfettered 
overland access through Saudi Arabia to access Middle 
Eastern markets. 
Egyptian and Jordanian territories  
In October 2017, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, 
Mohammed bin Salman, unveiled plans to build a $500 
billion megacity-cum-FTZ in the north-western Tabuk 
region of the country. The ambitious initiative – known 
as Neom31 – promises to create “the world’s first inde-
pendent special zone stretching over three countries” 
by incorporating Egyptian and Jordanian territories as 
part of its 26,500 square kilometres.32 Of Saudi Arabia’s 
three border-focused FTZ initiatives discussed in 
this paper, Neom’s pace and scale of development far 
exceed the other economic initiatives on the Yemeni 
and Iraqi borders. The Saudi government has started 
geological surveys and construction of hotels and an 
airport in the area, and Saudi policymakers expect that 
the total capital investment in the project may reach 
$500 billion dollars. 
The rapid pace and massive scale of the Neom project 
can be viewed in part as an effort to consolidate state 
power and state institutions under the authority of 
the Saudi regime and, in particular, the crown prince. 
Mohammed bin Salman chairs both the special 
authority and state sovereign wealth fund33 respon-
sible for the development of Neom, and the project’s 
first commercial contracts involved the construction of 
several royal palaces.34 Resource-abundant economies 
often focus on real estate ventures rather than clusters 
of productive industries because the former initia-
tives offer a convenient method of distributing rents 
31. The name combines the term ‘neo’ with the transliter-




33 . The Public Investment Fund is one of Saudi Arabia’s 
sovereign wealth funds and managed approximately 
$230 billion as of June 2018. 
34. Middle East Online, "Saudi awards contracts to build 
palaces in huge new business zone", 8 February 2018.
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to contribute $100 billion to the country’s GDP.42 The 
parameters of private-sector partnerships involved 
in prospective FTZs can also change as a result of 
exogenous factors and shocks. For example, the anti-
corruption campaign of 2017 and global news coverage 
of the murdered Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi 
have affected investor confidence in the country and 
led some international business leaders to delay or 
cancel their participation in the Neom advisory board. 
Conclusions 
The specific development trajectories of FTZs on 
Saudi Arabia’s borders, as indicated by the case studies, 
suggests that these initiatives are unlikely vehicles 
for garnering private-sector participation in post-
conflict stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. Since 
the Saudi government announced each of the three 
FTZ initiatives in 2017, the respective development 
progress of each project reveals a greater prioritisa-
tion of initiatives in areas with lower levels of conflict. 
With Yemen embroiled in military conflict and hu-
manitarian crises, the Saudi-Yemeni FTZ remains 
merely a verbal commitment by the Saudi govern-
ment. The Saudi-Iraqi FTZ is in the conceptual design 
stage and part of the portfolio of an economic coor-
dination council arranged by the two governments. 
In contrast, Neom represents the most advanced of 
the initiatives examined. The Saudi government has 
appointed an advisory committee, awarded commer-
cial contracts and launched construction on the site. 
Moreover, the scale of and the expected capital invest-
ment in the Neom initiative far exceeds that of the 
other case studies. The other country partners in the 
Neom project, Egypt and Jordan, confront economic 
and political challenges. However, these challenges do 
not equate to the level of state collapse and military 
strife witnessed in Yemen and Iraq. Thus, the degree 
of conflict in neighbouring territories appears to exert 
a negative impact on the speed and scale of Saudi 
Arabia’s FTZ development. 
Exogenous factors and shocks to regional and domestic 
institutions can disrupt FTZ development and associ-
ated activities – thus complicating the ability of these 
initiatives to meet long-term post-conflict targets. 
Initial attempts to construct an FTZ along the Saudi-
Yemeni border stalled as a result of the so-called ‘Arab 
42. See https://www.neom.com/content/pdfs/NEOM-Faqs-
en.pdf
development fund.38 The proposed territory for Neom 
includes the controversial islands of Tiran and Sanafir, 
which the Egyptian president ceded to King Salman in 
a June 2017 agreement that was ratified by Egypt’s par-
liament and upheld by the Egyptian Supreme Court. 
The collaboration between Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
over Neom followed the latter country’s support for the 
Saudi-led diplomatic and economic embargo on Qatar 
that began in June 2017. Following the announcement 
of the project, Jordan’s Minister of State for Media 
Affairs briefly commented that the project would posi-
tively influence development rates, while the Chief 
Commissioner of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone 
Authority expected that Neom would boost commer-
cial activity in Aqaba.39 
Viewing Saudi FTZ development along the borders of 
Egypt and Jordan against that of Yemen and Iraq il-
lustrates how transnational FTZ development varies 
according to the nature of the project’s partnerships. 
For example, the stated objectives for Neom involve 
attracting foreign investment and redirecting local 
capital into the domestic economy.40 Both of these ob-
jectives demonstrate the regime’s intention to partially 
shift distributive responsibilities to private-sector 
actors through FTZ development processes. Japan’s 
SoftBank, which secured $45 billion in planned invest-
ment from the crown prince in 2016, indicated that it 
would reinvest $15 billion in Neom and an additional 
$10 billion in other Saudi projects, reflecting a recycling 
of Saudi investment into the domestic economy.41 
In addition, Saudi government officials are actively 
courting market-leading firms like Amazon and 
Lockheed Martin in the hope that investments by these 
firms will establish credibility and attract ancillary 
investments. Neom aims to capture approximately 
$70 billion in outward investments – described as 
“economic leakage” – resulting from foreign imports, 
international investment and overseas spending and 
38. Independent, "Saudi Arabia and Egypt pledge $10bn to 






41. Dinesh Nair , Ruth David , and Matthew Martin, "Soft-
Bank Plans Up to $25 Billion in Saudi Investments", 15 
November 2017.
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prioritising development initiatives near the borders 
with conflict-ridden countries, economic policymak-
ers in Saudi Arabia may be able to influence private-
sector investment flows and other economic activities. 
This will not be an easy task. The governments in Gulf 
Arab states are careful to limit the economic autonomy 
afforded to their private sectors, while private-sector 
actors in the region will view reconstruction efforts 
through a profit-maximising lens. 
Saudi Arabia’s regional allies operate FTZ models from 
which to extract institutional knowledge, replicate 
useful frameworks and develop beneficial partner-
ships. For example, Shaykh Mohammed bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai, established International 
Humanitarian City – the region’s first humanitarian-
focused free zone – in 2003. International Humanitar-
ian City possesses 63 humanitarian organisations and 
18 commercial companies. By leveraging its member-
ship base, the FTZ facilitates and coordinates efficient 
emergency responses to crises around the world. 
The Dubai-based FTZ also provides free airlifts to 
transport aid and evacuate staff members from danger 
zones. The Saudi government could seek to establish a 
strategic partnership or memorandum of understand-
ing with International Humanitarian City to strength-
en the government’s capacity to integrate conflict-re-
lated objectives into its evolving FTZ system. Indeed, 
a deeper understanding of the dynamics behind FTZ 
development in Saudi Arabia and in the broader region 
is the first step toward determining the most effective 
manner in which these commercial entities can con-
tribute to regional reconciliation and reconstruction in 
the future.   
Spring’ protest of 2011, revealing that instability ulti-
mately disrupts FTZ development instead of serving as 
a justification of it. The ongoing GCC crisis between 
a Saudi-led coalition and Qatar illustrates that any 
border-dependent initiative, such as the Al Karaana 
special economic zone, is vulnerable to regional 
shocks. Competing FTZ projects from regional allies, 
like Kuwait, or opponents, such as Iran, can alter the 
underlying commercial dynamics behind FTZ initia-
tives. Other system-wide shocks – whether in the form 
of anti-corruption campaigns targeting prominent 
Saudi businessmen or negative global news coverage of 
the country – can abruptly impact investor confidence 
and reduce the demand for government-sponsored 
economic initiatives. 
The predominantly public-sector nature of FTZs in 
Saudi Arabia – and indeed in the Gulf region more 
broadly – incentivises the government to employ 
FTZs to accomplish domestic and foreign policy ob-
jectives that do not necessarily align with reconcilia-
tion and reconstruction efforts. Official statements 
from the Saudi government indicate an intention to 
leverage FTZs to reinforce the legitimacy of the Saudi-
backed government in Yemen. Meanwhile, the Saudi-
Iraqi FTZ appears to be an element of Saudi Arabia’s 
strategy to counter Iranian economic influence in Iraq. 
Moreover, the economic scope of these FTZs reveals 
their expected contribution to job creation, trade 
and investment flows, and GDP within Saudi Arabia; 
very few details exist on the projects’ expected con-
tribution to the economies of partnering countries. 
In this regard, the scope of these projects conforms 
with North’s argument that all economic institutions 
are political because they must have a political end to 
survive.43
FTZs in Saudi Arabia do not currently function as 
viable vehicles to address post-conflict reconstruction 
in neighbouring states because these entities either 
reflect multipurpose initiatives or possess a decidedly 
domestic orientation. The fact that the initial group of 
FTZs lacked a strong strategic thrust nevertheless offers 
the Saudi government an opportunity to adapt the 
scope of zone development to include these new goals. 
By incorporating stabilisation and reconstruction ob-
jectives as part of FTZ development strategies and 
43. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Wein-
gas, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework 
for Interpreting Recorded Human History, 2009, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how China 
sees and communicates its actual and potential role 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It sets 
the background context of why China criticises the 
Western approach of democracy promotion as the 
cause of disorder in MENA and is responding to this 
crisis with its own ‘peace with development’ solution 
to restore regional order. The chapter provides an 
overview of China’s interests in MENA, how it is imple-
menting its narrative via the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) and examines the regional perception of China’s 
policy. It compares the West’s state-centric approach 
with China’s regional approach to peacebuilding and 
tries to identify possible convergences and venues of 
cooperation with the West to promote stability.
China is rising as an extra-regional power in the 
MENA.  In a way, it provides a unique opportunity 
for the countries in the region to project their aspira-
tions for a different type of great-power relationship. 
Unlike the West, it has no colonial history in the region 
and its non-interference principle does not moralise 
for others to conform to the superiority of China’s 
ideology or culture. After decades of Western-backed 
democracy promotion and violent regime change that 
have precipitated failed states, rising terrorism and 
regional disorder, Beijing is stepping in and offering 
an alternative narrative of ‘peace with development’ 
as a more sustainable security concept. By promoting 
connectivity and economic integration and creating 
*  Christina Lin is a Research Fellow at the Centre for 
Global Peace and Conflict Studies at UC Irvine special-
ising in China-Middle East relations. She is a former 
Senior Transatlantic Academy Fellow at the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States and Visiting Fellow 
at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Dr Lin 
has extensive US government experience working on 
China security issues, including policy planning at the 
Department of Defence, the National Security Council 
and the Department of State. 
economic value from the bottom up, rather than a 
top-down approach of mandating democratic gover-
nance systems, China’s economic involvement via the 
BRI has the potential to transform MENA trade and in-
frastructure, boost regional relations and provide new 
security and stability. In the face of ongoing regional 
security problems with terrorism, economic woes and 
a need for immediate infrastructure investment and 
trade, the BRI, which taps into China’s financial where-
withal, could potentially provide much-needed quick 
economic relief. 
Moreover, while the US is seen as pro-Israel, the EU 
as pro-Palestinian and Russia as pro-Iran and Syria, 
the Middle Kingdom has good relations with all 
parties – whether in the Syrian crisis, the Israel-Pal-
estinian conflict or Saudi-Iran rivalry. Given China’s 
‘cleaner’ scorecard than those of other members of 
the UN Security Council, it may be more successful 
in promoting economic-based regional cooperation. 
Beijing’s increasing role in MENA thus presents an op-
portunity for regional actors to leverage the BRI as a 
catalyst and help pave the way towards post-conflict 
peace and stabilisation. While it is not a substitute 
for political solutions, the BRI could perhaps create a 
friendlier environment and conditions to facilitate the 
arrival of these solutions in the region. 
The Chinese Perspective 
on the Causes and Cure 
of MENA disorder
Cause of Disease: Democracy-promo-
tion and Regime change
From China’s vantage point, when asked what the 
main cause of disorder in MENA is, it usually points 
to the Western narrative that sees a lack of democracy 
as the cause of conflict and disorder. This is rooted 
in the Democratic Peace Theory,2 which asserts that 
democracies are less likely to go to war with each 
other than autocratic regimes. Democratisation and 
2. A leading proponent of Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) 
is Rudolph Rummel, who in 1999 asserted “democracy 
is a general cure for political or collective violence of 
any kind.” According to DPT, democratic leaders are 
restrained by the resistance of their people to bearing 
the costs of war deaths, and democracies are therefore 
less likely to go to war against each other than autocratic 
regimes.
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governance have been part of US foreign assistance 
for many decades, and since 1990 almost every US 
presidential National Security Strategy has linked the 
promotion of democracy to US security.3 Anchored 
in the Democratic Peace Theory, the 2010 National 
Security Strategy stated “The United States supports 
the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad 
because governments that respect these values are 
more just, peaceful and legitimate” and more likely to 
support US interests.”4 Thus, by delineating democracy 
as a legitimate form of governance that is more likely to 
serve US interests, and autocratic countries as illegiti-
mate, Washington purports to shape MENA according 
to this narrative, which has provided legitimate cover 
for a string of interventions.
Ironically, China sees the Western approach of 
exporting democracy and sponsoring ‘regime change’ 
as the disease and cause of regional disorder, not order, 
after a string of targeted countries such as Iraq, Libya, 
Syria and Yemen descended into chaos and created 
ungoverned space for rising Islamic extremism and 
terrorism. In witnessing the MENA chaos and refugee 
crisis that is spilling into the EU and is also affecting 
Chinese interests, Beijing has been very critical of the 
Western narrative and its regime-change policy as the 
cause of the current disorder.5 The Middle Kingdom is 
therefore stepping in and offering a new narrative of 
‘peace with development’ to restore order in MENA.
Chinese Medicine: Peace with 
Development
Beijing has long promoted the idea that economic de-
velopment is vital to advance stability and peace, and 
as Madame Fu Ying, chairperson of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the National People’s Congress under-
scored, “lessons from history show that unbalanced 
development provides a breeding ground for extremist 
3. US Agency for International Development, USAID 
Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, 
USAID, Washington, D.C., 2013,  p.9; Jon Alterman, 
‘China, the United States, and the Middle East,’ in James 
Reardon-Anderson. ed., The Red Star & the Crescent, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2018, p.45. 
4.  The White House, National Security Strategy of the 
United States, The White House, Washington, D.C., 
2010, p.37.
5. Thomas Hon Wing, "Democracy: A Western tool for 
domination", 2 November 2018. 
ideologies.” 6  Therefore, China’s alternative narrative 
to restore order in MENA is grounded on building 
a ‘community of common destiny’ for peace and de-
velopment, which has been the official party line and 
aspiration for a reshaped international order since Xi 
Jinping became president in 2012.7  The concept is in-
timately associated with the BRI, which ties economic 
development with improved security. According to 
China’s Middle Eastast envoy, Gong Xiaosheng, the 
BRI will be Beijing’s main contribution to Middle 
East peace by providing the much-needed economic 
solutions the region needs, such as post-war recon-
struction, humanitarian aid and local economic and 
social development, instead of only focusing on anti-
terrorism campaigns and democratisation processes as 
Western countries do.8
The provenance of this narrative stems from China’s 
own historical experience as a country traumatised 
by foreign invasions and violent instability that killed 
millions of Chinese – an estimated 3.5 million in 
the Chinese civil war, 45 million in the Great Leap 
Forward, 1.5 million in the Cultural Revolution – and 
a lagging economy for several centuries.9 As a result, 
maintaining stability, or weiwen (维稳), is gospel for 
the Communist Party of China (CPC), which attri-
butes poor economic performance to a lack of social 
stability. At the 2017 World Economic Forum, Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang also stated “a lack of development 
is the greatest risk” in China so weiwen and gradual 
economic and social development is the right path for 
the Chinese.
In contrast to the Western model of instant 
‘democracy’ as narrowly defined by free elections and 
political expression with little regard for long-term 
strategic engagement on counter-terrorism or poverty 
reduction, the Chinese model of governance focuses 
6. Fu Ying, "China's Vision for the World: A Community of 
Shared Future", 22 June 2017.
7.  See http://www.cssn.cn/zzx/zzxzt_zzx/gtt/wz/201705/
t20170516_3519569.shtml.
8. New China, "Israel, Palestine ready to work with China to 
find solution to peace process", 11 July 2017. 
9. Xin Ming. et al., ‘The Institutional Causes of China’s Great 
Famine 1959-6’ Review of Economic Studies 82, 2015, 
p. 1568, 1569-70, 1608; Arifa Akbar, ’Mao’s Great Leap 
Forward ‘Killed 45 Million in Four Years’’, 17 September 
2011, The Independent.
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on improving citizens’ living standards.10 Indeed, the 
fact that China has lifted 800 million citizens out of 
poverty since implementing economic reforms in 1990 
prompted World Bank President Jim Yong Kim to state 
that there are “lessons to be learned” from the Chinese 
experience.11 Now, faced with the aftermath of West-
ern-backed regime change interventions that triggered 
MENA’s descent into chaos and increased unpredict-
ability to the detriment of China’s regional interests, 
the Middle Kingdom has embarked on implementing 
the BRI to help restore order and protect its interests. 
China’s MENA Interests 
and the Implementation 
of the BRI
China’s core interests are sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, continued economic development and 
the survival of the Communist Party, and MENA 
supports these interests by providing energy resources, 
consumer markets and advanced technology, espe-
cially from Israel, for China’s economic development. 
The region is a hub for market access to Africa and the 
EU, which is China’s largest export market, and also 
provides more than half of China’s crude imports. With 
the presence of ISIS, Al Qaeda affiliates and thousands 
of Chinese Uyghur jihadists in Syria and the eastern 
Mediterranean, MENA has also become a forward 
front to counter terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang 
– the bridgehead of the BRI.
Therefore, China is adopting a more robust diplo-
matic and security posture, and proactively support-
ing the ‘peace with development’ narrative to mitigate 
this risk and restore regional order.12 It is implement-
10. Iraq, Libya, Syria and Afghanistan highlight the inef-
fectiveness of using military force and violent regime 
change as a tool to promote democracy. In Egypt, where 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s Morsi won the 2012 election, 
continuing poor governance, economic woes, rising 
terrorism and persecution of minorities precipitated 
another revolution in 2013. See https://foreignpolicy.
com/2016/04/25/why-is-america-so-bad-at-promoting-
democracy-in-other-countries/ 
11. Business Standard, "China lifting 800 million people out 
of poverty is historic: World Bank", 13 October 2017.
12. Christina Lin, ‘China’s Emerging Role as a Security Pro-
vider in the Middle East – The EU’s Response,’ July 2016, 
EU-China Observer, Issue #2.16, College of Europe.
ing this narrative via the BRI and has underscored the 
importance of development aid in preventing Syria 
from being a haven for terrorists, including Uyghur 
militants, and is establishing a new naval base in 
Djibouti to augment its UN peacekeeping and anti-
piracy operations around the Red Sea and the Horn of 
Africa. In so doing, China hopes to ensure energy and 
market access, reduce regional inequalities through 
infrastructure connectivity and economic integra-
tion, and help promote stability as a way to reduce 
the chances of violent regime change. China values 
‘stability maintenance’ (weiwen, 维稳) above all else, as 
it underscored as a theme in the March 2019 meeting 
of the National People’s Congress.13 The BRI subsumes 
China’s pursuit of this goal into an ambitious Eurasian 
strategy that adds institutional frameworks.
Infrastructure Investment and 
Economic Development
China’s narrative of peace with development was 
further supported by a new July 2018 study in which 
a team of Danish economists made a forceful case 
for infrastructure investment as a pathway to longer-
term prosperity.14 Carl-Johan Dalgaard of the Univer-
sity of Copenhagen and his colleagues looked at how 
the density of ancient Roman roads at given points in 
Europe strongly correlates with present-day prosper-
ity, as measured by the modern-day population, the 
density of current roadways and economic activity. 
Places with more Roman roads and connectivity tend 
to have more roads today, more people and greater 
levels of economic development. 
Interestingly, Romans roads in MENA are a less reliable 
predictor of modern road locations in MENA, given 
that roads built in North Africa fell into disrepair in 
the period 500 to 1000 A.D., when wheeled transport 
was replaced by camels. The reasons for this shift are 
unclear and could involve costs, advances in saddle 
technology and an increasing military and political 
13.Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "“Stability Maintenance” Gets a 
Major Boost at the National People’s Congress", 22 March 
2019.
14. Ingraham, C. (August 7, 2018), ‘How 2,000-year-old 
roads predict modern-day prosperity,’ The Washington 
Post; ; Dalgaard, C., Kaarsen, N., Olsson, O. and Selaya, 
P., ‘Roman Roads to Prosperity: Persistence and Non-
Persistence of Public Goods Provision,’ CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. DP12745, February 2018.
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Bosnian War, where according to former World Bank 
president James Wolfensohn the Bank’s involvement 
during the conflict played a role in helping secure the 
Dayton Agreement, which ended three and a half years 
of civil war.17
Thus, rather than seeing political settlement as a causal 
variable in the outcome of reconstruction in the peace 
process, the World Bank report considers develop-
ment institutions an intervening variable in political 
settlement to reach the outcome of reconstruction in 
the peace process. Admittedly, reconstruction cannot 
be solely driven by infrastructure projects, and the 
report argues that the international community still 
needs to address the underlying causes of civil war, 
regional disparities and inequitable resource distribu-
tion. However, inclusive multilateral institutions can 
help rebuild trust and mitigate social tensions, and to 
that end the BRI’s network of cooperative mechanisms 
such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank 
(AIIB), the Silk Road Fund and the New Develop-
ment Bank could perhaps foster friendlier conditions 
conducive to reaching political solutions in the region.
Institutionalising the BRI
In a nutshell, the BRI is a vision launched by President 
Xi in 2013 that seeks to integrate China with the 
Eurasian landmass through a vast network of transport 
corridors, energy pipelines and telecom infrastructure. 
The geographical scope covers 65 countries, 4.4 billion 
people or 62% of the world’s population, and 30% of 
global GDP. It consists of a land route called the ‘Silk 
Road Economic Belt’ linking China, Central Asia, the 
Middle East, Russia and Europe and a sea route known 
as the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ connecting China’s eastern 
ports with southeast Asia, south Asia, east Africa, the 
Middle East and the Mediterranean. 
The two main routes have a series of loops, branches 
and various economic corridors such as the China-Pak-
istan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the China-Cen-
tral Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC) 
that starts from China’s Xinjiang and traverses Central 
Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Arabian Peninsula.18 
17. James D. Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among 
Rich and Poor, from Sydney to Wall Street to the World 
Bank. World Bank Public Affairs.
18. See https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/growth-markets-cen-
ter/assets/pdf/china-new-silk-route.pdf .
might of groups that traditionally relied on camels for 
transport. If carts pulled by oxen were no longer around 
then there was less need to maintain paved roadways. 
As a result, the Roman roads in MENA were not main-
tained the same way they were in Europe, where cart-
based transit remained dominant. Dalggard observes 
“since ancient roads fall into disrepair in the MENA 
region to a much greater extent than in Europe, one 
should expect to see much less persistence in infra-
structure density.”
These research findings that infrastructure invest-
ment in roads and trade corridors can be a driver of 
economic growth add weight to China’s BRI approach 
of promoting infrastructure connectivity and 
economic development as a pathway towards regional 
stability and eventual peace in MENA. This peace with 
reconstruction approach is also corroborated by a 
2016 World Bank report on Syria, recommending that 
development institutions support an inclusive recon-
struction strategy that might foster peace by bringing 
economic relief and appeasement in the short term 
and stability in the long term.
Inclusive Reconstruction as a  
Peace Process
A 2016 World Bank report entitled “Syria: Reconstruc-
tion Could Foster Peace” states “reconstruction and 
peace are two sides of the same coin,” and that devel-
opment institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF can promote an inclusive reconstruction strategy 
to incentivise warring parties to come closer to a peace 
deal.15 While full-scale reconstruction may have to wait 
for peace before it can begin, and given that the war 
economies in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen have weak 
local institutions, development institutions can step in 
and act as substitutes. They can help secure credible 
commitments and provide a means of enforcing 
inclusion clauses and resource-sharing rules in future 
reconstruction plans.16 This is similar to the case of the 
15. Shantayanan Devarajan, Lili Mottaghi, Quy-Toan Do 
and Mohamed Abdel Jelil, , Syria: reconstruction for 
peace (English). Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 






16. Barbara F. Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War 
Settlement,’ International Organization, pp. 335-364. 
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Map 1: Six Economic Corridors
As mentioned earlier, a network of cooperation 
mechanisms will support BRI projects, including the 
AIIB, the Silk Road Fund and other existing bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as 
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the 
China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). It is 
thus a very broad, fl exible and inclusive framework for 
economic cooperation, and in return for cooperating 
in BRI projects countries receive preferential fi nancing 
in terms of grants, interest-free and concessional loans, 
other forms of government funding and a full develop-
ment package to stimulate their economies.
For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is 
China’s second largest trading partner in MENA and 
handles 60% of China’s re-exports to Europe and 
Africa, with an estimated value of $70 billion each 
year.19 In July 2017, China signed a $300 million deal 
to develop a manufacturing operation in the free trade 
zone of Khalifa Port, on the heels of China’s COSCO 
Shipping winning the right ($738 million) to develop 
and operate a new container terminal there for 35 
years. While most shipping companies own/operate 
terminals and ports on foreign terrain as shipping-cen-







and invests in adjoining free trade/special economic 
zones and other development initiatives so that the 
host countries obtain an entire development package.
Moreover, even if Abu Dhabi does not directly eco-
nomically benefi t from this project beyond the initial 
investment capital, it can serve as a catalyst for other 
projects to grow up around it (for example, factories 
need local suppliers, workers, etc.). Th e idea behind 
these places is regional connectivity and for them to 
become international hubs for transport, production 
and commerce and bring in investments from various 
countries around the world.20
What Role for China in 
Conflict Mitigation and 
MENA Stabilisation?
The MENA View of China Policy
MENA countries have generally been welcoming of 
Chinese’s rising economic role, and its authoritar-
ian development model fi ts well with the political 
systems and social contracts in place in large parts of 
20. Christina Lin, ‘Th e Belt and Road and China’s Long-term 
Visions in the Middle East,’ Issam Fares Institute for Pub-
lic Policy and International Aff airs Working Paper #47, 
American University of Beirut, February 2019.
Source: HKTDC Research, ‘Th e Belt and Road Initiative,’ 
September 13, 2017
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the region.21 However, recently Chinese investment 
and the BRI have become part of a wider narrative 
accusing China of being a neo-colonial power by using 
‘debt-trap diplomacy’ to create economic dependen-
cies for military-strategic gains. Critics often invoke 
the 2017 case of Sri Lanka granting a 99-year lease of 
Hambantota port in a debt-equity swap, and concern 
that economic dependency could translate into a loss 
of sovereignty similar to MENA’s colonial experience 
with the West – most notably Egypt’s loss of control 
over the Suez Canal in the 1870s.22 
As a result, countries in the region have been exhorted 
to exercise caution in accepting Chinese foreign invest-
ments, and some analysts propose a multi-stakeholder 
model of lending as one form of risk mitigation. As 
Alessandro Arduino from the Shanghai Academy of 
Social Science argues, international support for China’s 
investments could be a way to share the investment risk 
burden and also to increase the efficiency and positive 
spillovers for all the stakeholders involved.23 Indeed, 
over the past few years the AIIB has partnered and 
co-financed projects in Asia and the Middle East with 
other international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the Asian Development Bank 
to help China improve project governance and stan-
dards.24 At the same time, the multi-stakeholder model 
helps mitigate risk for Chinese companies operating in 
complex and unstable zones, and could help prevent 
future losses, such as the $1 billion loss in the Djibouti-
Addis Ababa railway due to underuse caused by power 
shortages.25 
21. Deborah Lehr, ‘How China is Winning over the Middle 
East,’ The Diplomat. China does not disregard domestic 
components of discontent in social protests and upris-
ings but it is against external interference that hijacks 
and militarises protests into a violent proxy fight for 
dominance. It supports the principle of national sov-
ereignty and believes reforms should be implemented 
domestically within a country’s existing governance 
structure – be it an autocratic, democratic or hybrid 
system – and should not be forced by external powers 
to convert to a democratic structure as a panacea for all 
domestic grievances.
22. Geoffrey Aronson, ‘China is playing the West’s debt 
game,’ The Arab Weekly, 7 April 2019.
23. Alessandro Arduino, 'China sees risks, profits in MENA', 
The Arab Weekly, 17 February 2019. 
24. Wade Shepherd, "The AIIB One Year In: Not As Scary As 
Washington Thought", 16 January 2017; Sara Hsu, "How 
China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Fared Its 
First Year", 14 January 2017.
25. Eric Ng, "Botched Chinese railway project in Africa is a 
warning to belt and road investors", 29 October 2018. 
Others note that China can play a complementary 
political role to fill diplomatic gaps in MENA.26 Gal Luft 
for one has recommended in a Foreign Policy article that 
in the absence of official ties between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, China’s open communication with both capitals 
could become a vital asset, and China could use the BRI 
as a tension-reduction mechanism to promote projects 
that create shared Sunni-Shiite economic interests. 
With both Israel and Iran as members of AIIB and 
aspirant members of the China-led SCO, Beijing can 
also use these regional institutions to promote coop-
erative opportunities between the two countries, akin 
to its current attempts with Pakistan and India within 
the SCO.27 
Moreover, Israel would prefer China to lead the recon-
struction in Syria. Roie Yellinek has argued in a BESA 
paper that “from Israel’s perspective, it would be much 
better to see a Chinese aid programme and Chinese 
companies rebuilding the Syrian Golan Heights rather 
than Iranian ones.”28 Indeed, Sino-Israeli ties have 
been enjoying a boom in recent years, and in fact after 
the 2006 war with Lebanon China contributed 1,000 
peacekeeping troops to UNIFIL at the request of Israel, 
given that the Israelis did not want Arab troops and 
requested Asian troops from China, South Korea, India 
and Malaysia, which were viewed as more neutral in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The Evolving Non-Interference 
Principle and a Rising Political 
Role
Understandably, some sceptics point to China’s non-
interference principle as an obstacle to an increasing 
political role in MENA, but it is important to consider 
this policy in context. From the Chinese perspec-
tive, the principle refers more to intervening in other 
countries’ domestic politics, such as the US/Western 
penchant for intervening to overthrow autocratic 
regimes they dislike. The non-interference policy does 
not mean inaction when China’s security and core 
interests are threatened. As Yun Sun from the Stimson 
Centre clarifies, when it comes to protecting Chinese 
citizens the non-interference policy does not apply, 
and China will exhaust all means possible to protect 
them when they are threatened in order to maintain 
26. Gal Luft, "China’s New Grand Strategy for the Middle 
East", 26 January 2016.
27. Sabena Siddiqi, "Can the SCO Bring India and Pakistan 
Together?", 10 February 2018. 
28. Roie Yellinek, ‘Who Will Reconstruct Syria?’ BESA Cen-
tre Perspectives Paper No. 750, 25 February 2018. 
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the legitimacy of the Communist Party. 29 
In recent years, China has been signalling its long-term 
commitment to MENA and floating its diplomatic trial 
balloon in conflict mediation – whether in the P5+1 
over the Iran nuclear issue, appointing a special envoy 
to the Syrian crisis or issuing a four-point peace plan 
for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.30 It is also taking 
a more proactive role in mediation efforts elsewhere, 
such as Afghanistan, South Sudan and Myanmar, 
where Beijing was instrumental in shepherding all the 
opposition factions into attending a peace conference 
for the first time.31  
China is also testing its role as a partial security 
provider for MENA stability – with its anti-piracy op-
erations off the Gulf of Aden, by deploying combat 
troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in South 
Sudan, providing  $100 million in military aid to the 
African Union, offering 8,000 standby troops for rapid 
deployment to UN peacekeeping operations, whether 
in Africa or Northern Cyprus, Lebanon or the Golan 
Heights in the eastern Mediterranean, and by estab-
lishing a naval base in Djibouti to augment these op-
erations. While peacekeeping is one objective, these 
resources also allow China to project its military power 
to protect its citizens and assets. 
A State-Centric vs. a Regional 
Approach to Peacebuilding
There are also several other reasons why countries in 
the region may perceive China’s MENA approach to be 
more attractive than the US approach. First, China is 
focused on long-term economic investment, whereas 
the US seems more preoccupied with military invest-
ment. Geoffrey Aronson, an expert on Middle East 
affairs and chairman of the Mortons Group consult-
ing firm, observes how Washington and Beijing differ 
in their approaches, with the US spending money 
on dropping bombs or building military infrastruc-
ture while China sees a big opportunity to cash in.32 
“We’re, in a sense,  not in the business of rebuilding 
infrastructure and development not directly related 
to our military presence,” Aronson notes. “We’ll build 
29. International Institute for Strategic Studies, YOUTUBE, 
Launch of ‘China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and 
Assets Abroad', 17 July 2015.
30. Times of Israel, "China pushes four-point Israeli-Palestin-
ian peace plan", 1 August 2017. 
31. Mark Inkey, "China's Stake in the Myanmar Peace Pro-
cess", 15 August 2018. 
32. Tom O'Connor, "China may be the biggest winner of all 
if Assad takes over Syria", 19 January 2018. 
an airstrip, a base. The Chinese will build a railroad, a 
port; they’re investing in the future.”
Second, Washington suffers from a state-centric bias 
in the peace process, despite the fact that international 
conflicts have regional economic spillover effects  on 
neighbouring states, as Kaysie Studdard observes in an 
International Peace Academy Report.33 For example, 
before the war, Syria was a vibrant trading hub that 
linked Turkey, Lebanon and Syria itself with Jordan, 
Egypt and the Arab Gulf states, and was Lebanon’s only 
land-based trade corridor. As border crossings for trade 
with Syria were vital arteries for Jordan and Lebanon, 
ongoing US and EU sanctions on Syria have a negative 
contagion effect on the neighbouring economies. As a 
result of the war and continued sanctions, trade with 
both countries has plummeted and they are now at 
risk of destabilising economic collapse, with Beirut’s 
debt ratio at 150% of gross domestic product.34  With 
Lebanon and Jordan hosting 1.3 million and 660,000 
Syrian refugees respectively, the economic crisis is also 
provoking a new wave of refugees in Lebanon to flee to 
Cyprus and Europe, exacerbating the EU refugee crisis.
This is similar to the contradictory US policies in 
central and south Asia, where Washington’s state-cen-
tric approach to rebuilding Afghanistan and promoting 
regional economic integration while simultaneously 
sanctioning and isolating its large neighbour Iran has 
posed challenges to Afghan efforts at regional con-
nectivity. Moreover, ignoring the regional dimensions 
of conflicts may also create a balloon effect whereby 
instability and conflict is displaced from one country 
to another neighbouring country. Given that Western 
state-centric peacebuilding efforts do not adequately 
address the regional economic spillover effects in many 
conflicts, and given the interconnectedness of conflicts 
and economies, China’s regional approach to MENA 
via the BRI could potentially play a more constructive 
33. Kaysie Studdard, ‘War Economies in a Regional Context: 
Overcoming the Challenges of Transformation,' Interna-
tional Peace Economy Policy Report; Jonathan Good-
hand, Michael Pugh, and Neil Cooper, War Economies 
in a Regional Context: The Challenges of Transformation, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2004; Karen Bal-
lentine andJake Sherman. eds., The Political Economy of 
Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, Lynne Ri-
enner Publishers, Boulder, 2003; Michael E Brown, ‘The 
Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,’ 
in Michael E Brown ed., The International Dimensions 
of Internal Conflict, The MIT Press, Boston, 1996; Peter 
Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, ‘Armed Conflict 
and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-1997,’ Journal of 
Peace Research 35, September 1998 no. 5, p. 621-634.  
34. Lebanon News, "Opening of Syria-Jordan border crossing 
to revitalize economy: Aoun", 11 July 2018.
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role in post-confl ict reconstruction and stabilisation 
eff orts. In the face of the current Western refusal to 
provide aid and Russia lacking the requisite fi nancial 
resources for the estimated $250 billion needed for 
Syrian reconstruction, the BRI’s development insti-
tutions could help foster an economic ecosystem in 
MENA by linking various trading and logistic hubs to 
promote regional stability.35
Cooperative Projects 
with the West to Promote 
Stability
Lebanon, Jordan and Syrian 
Reconstruction
China is already viewing Lebanon as a platform for re-
construction in Syria and Iraq. In January 2018, China’s 
trade body, the China Council for the Promotion 
of International Trade (CCPIT), chose Lebanon as 
its MENA headquarters.36 According to Lebanon’s 
Economy Minister, Raed Khoury, China does not “look 
at Lebanon as a small country of 4 million citizens but 
as a country with huge potential given its geographi-
cal location,” with Beijing eyeing the port of Tripoli as 
a main trans-shipment hub for the eastern Mediterra-
nean.37 Before the war, Lebanon’s ports were used to 
trans-ship goods overland to Syria and even Iraq and 
bypass the longer sea route through the Suez Canal and 
around the Arabian Peninsula. Th ere has also been talk 
of rehabilitating the Tripoli-Homs railway network. 
Coupled with a planned Tripoli Special Economic 
Zone adjacent to the port, Tripoli could be a useful hub 
for Syria and enable China’s BRI to play a constructive 
role in post-confl ict reconstruction and stabilisation 
eff orts.38
35 Oded Eran, "‘Belt and Road Initiative’ can help slowly 
heal divisions in the Middle East", 15 May 2017. 
36  Xinhua Net, "China's trade body chooses Lebanon as 
Mideast, North Africa headquarters", 16 January 2018. 
37  Th e Daily Star, "China looks to invest in north Lebanon", 
12 July 2018. 
38  Philip Issa, "Lebanon prepares for Syria’s post-war 
construction windfall", 17 August 2017. Christina Lin, 
‘Th e Belt and Road and China’s Long-Term Visions in 
the Middle East,’ Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy 
and International Aff airs Working Paper #47, American 
University of Beirut. 
Map 2: Tripoli-Homs Railway 
(built in 1911)
The Jazreel Valley Railway line
Another project that could coordinate with the BRI is 
the Jezreel Valley Railway line. Revived aft er 65 years 
in August 2016, cargo travelling by sea from Turkey 
to the port of Haifa can be placed on the Jezreel line 
and transported to Jordan and the broader Arab Gulf 
region. With China winning a tender to operate Haifa 
port for 25 years, this would facilitate China shipping 
goods from Turkey to Jordan and on to Asia via the 
Red Sea or the Arab Gulf region, and vice versa.39
39  Yoram Evron,  ‘Can China Participate in Middle East 
Stabilization Eff orts by Supporting Regional Connectiv-
ity?’ Asia pacifi c Bulletin No. 363, East-West Centre 
December 2016. 
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Map 3: Jazreel Valley railway
Source: Wikipedia
The Med-Red Railway
In conjunction with the Jazreel Valley Railway, the 
Med-Red Railway connecting the port of Ashdod 
in the Mediterranean to Eilat in the Red Sea, with 
an extension to Jordan’s Aqaba port, would further 
integrate the economies in the eastern Mediterranean 
and the Arab Gulf region. China is also enlarging 
Ashdod port and hopes to construct the Med-Red 
railway. 
A land-based trade corridor can strengthen Israel’s re-
lationship with its treaty partners Egypt and Jordan. 
Th e cargo rail line could facilitate transport between 
the industrial centres in the north and south, thereby 
increasing economic cooperation and strengthen-
ing security coordination to help maintain regional 
stability. Given that Eilat port is not able to receive 
larger vessels (10,000-plus TEU), if the railway line is 
extended to Jordan’s larger Aqaba port facilities, which 
are among the largest and most modern in the Middle 
East, it could involve Jordan in a project to strengthen 
bilateral relations and encourage Arab countries to use 
the Eilat port infrastructure.40
40. Mordechai Chaziza, ‘Th e Red-Med Railway: New Op-
portunities for China, Israel, and the Middle East,’ BESA 
Centre Perspectives Paper No. 385, December 2016. 




Valley of Peace Initiative
Th e Valley of Peace initiative was launched in 2008 by 
the late president Shimon Peres to promote economic 
cooperation between  Israel,  Jordan  and the  Pales-
tinians via joint projects in the  Arava/Arabah Valley 
that runs along the southern portion of the Israel-Jor-
dan border.41
China has traditionally had good ties with the Palestin-
ian Authority and on 17 July 2017 President Mahmoud 
Abbas visited Beijing on a four-day tour to garner 
Chinese political and economic support for the Middle 
East peace process.42 Since China is already investing 
in various infrastructure projects in Israel, Jordan and 
the Palestinian territories, such as the Ring Road in 
Ramallah, the multi-stakeholder model of the Valley 
of Peace initiative could profi t from synergistic coop-
eration with China’s BRI initiative and AIIB funding.




42. Adam Rasgon, "Abbas looking for political and economic 
support in visit to China", 17 July 2017.




Israel is also interested in building an island off  Gaza to 
relieve its isolation while protecting Israeli security.43
Israeli minister of intelligence, Israel Katz, promoted 
the plan and was considering fi nancial partners for the 
$5 billion project, with the Saudis and Chinese being 
possible builders of the port.44 It would be a man-made 
island measuring four square miles and located 
three miles off shore, connected to the mainland by a 
causeway and a bridge. A checkpoint in the middle of 
the bridge would be staff ed by international authorities 
such as NATO or other organisations, and the island 
would have an international legal status with interna-
tional security forces. Israel would be responsible for 
security in the surrounding waters. Less expensive 
options such as a direct shipping line from Cyprus are 
also being considered.
Map 5: Gaza Island
Source: Ministry of Transport and Israel Ports
Th e Palestinians have begged for a small port on the 
shoreline, but Minister Katz fears such an unsecured 











weapons and terrorists. Currently, goods enter Gaza 
through two land crossings controlled by Israel and 
a third – the Rafah crossing – is controlled by Egypt. 
However, Rafah crossing is usually closed so most 
commercial and humanitarian goods bound for Gaza 
enter through Israel’s Kerem Shalom crossing. Heavily 
relying on imported goods for survival presents 
another problem for the Palestinians in the form of 
high prices, due to double taxation by the Palestin-
ian government in Ramallah and the Hamas authori-
ties in Gaza. Chinese goods now comprise more than 
50% of imports to Gaza due to their cheaper price 
which off sets the extra tax, according to the Palestin-
ian Chamber of Commerce.45 Given China’s increas-
ing regional presence and good relations with both the 
Palestinian Authority and Israel, and that Jerusalem 
prefers Syria’s Golan Heights to be reconstructed, the 
Gaza port to be built and UN peacekeeping forces in 
Lebanon to be staff ed by Beijing, it is emerging as a key 
stakeholder that may be more animated to help resolve 
MENA confl icts to protect its interests. 
The Israel-Gulf Economic Corridor 
(IGEC)
It was also within the context of the BRI and the goal 
of broader regional cooperation that Israeli transport 
minister, Captain Yigal Maor, proposed an Israel-Gulf 
Economic Corridor (IGEC) in September 2016 at a 
Herzliya conference. 
He believes that if China can invest in this IGEC, 
which encompasses linking infrastructure projects in 
the Arab Gulf region with Israel and Jordan to trans-
ship Chinese goods, it could push Gulf countries into 
more formal ties with Israel. As a by-product, it could 
jumpstart the Arab peace initiative, which aligns with 
EU and US goals in the Middle East peace process, 
with the added benefi t of promoting broader regional 
cooperation with Turkey and the EU in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Th e IGEC vision can also be a test 
case to promote concrete Sino-US cooperation and 
interdependence in the Middle East, given that China 
can be more successful in promoting economic-based 
regional cooperation among MENA countries while 
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Map 6: Israel and southern corridor/IGEC
Conclusion
China’s rise in a globalised world presents a number of 
challenges and opportunities in the sphere of confl ict 
prevention, post-confl ict reconstruction and peace-
building. However, with realism being the dominant 
conceptual framework for examining Beijing’s 
ascension, this zero-sum perspective combined with 
America’s narrow focus on historic rivalry in east Asia 
risks rejecting cooperative opportunities elsewhere, es-
pecially in MENA where China is a rising power. In the 
face of a rapidly changing security environment and the 
pressing need to exit war economies, the MENA region 
off ers a potential constructive framework for coopera-
tion between China and the West, and for fostering the 
successful integration of emerging powers in the man-
agement of post-confl ict and transitional settings.
Th erefore, China’s involvement via the BRI has the 
potential to create economic value and boost geo-
political relations in the region, and also to provide 
new security and stability. Rather than considering 
how China can supplant the US in MENA, the BRI’s 
‘peace with development’ platform may be a way to in-
corporate China in a constructive role to supplement 
Western eff orts for Middle East stabilisation and re-
construction.
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84 CONCLUSION - A CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: SOME LESSONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS 
Steven Heydemann and Luigi Narbone
The papers in this volume not only diagnose this 
growing gap between tools and approaches, on the 
one hand, and the problems they are intended to solve, 
on the other hand, they also help us understand the 
origins of this disconnect, and why closing it will take 
a considerable investment in new approaches and tools 
on the part of Western actors. No less importantly, 
closing the gap will require the EU, its member states 
and other key actors to acknowledge the urgent need 
to rethink what works and what does not in post-con-
flict reconstruction. 
Heydemann’s chapter offers a starting point for un-
derstanding this gap, highlighting the shortcomings of 
fragility-based models of post-conflict reconstruction. 
If our approaches assume that conflict is a marker of 
state fragility, that it destroys pre-war institutions and 
creates space to build effective responsive governance, 
we will be poorly equipped to deal with conflicts in 
fierce states such as Syria. As Daher’s paper goes on to 
show in vivid detail, wartime political economies in 
states like Syria function much like those that existed 
before the onset of conflict. Post-conflict political 
economies exhibit significant continuity in the norms 
and practices that shape economic behaviour. When 
authoritarian regimes win civil wars, they dominate 
reconstruction processes. The end of violence is not 
seized as a welcome opportunity for reform but is 
exploited to reassert regime control, enrich loyalists 
and cronies, and settle scores. 
Hagood’s chapter offers an additional perspective on 
the changing terrain of post-conflict economic re-
construction. In Iraq, the boundary between what 
constitutes conflict and what constitutes post-con-
flict has been all but erased. So have the boundar-
ies between state and non-state armed actors, and 
between military and political actors. Economic re-
construction is intensely contested among competing 
coalitions organised largely along sectarian and ethnic 
lines. Conflicts over economic reconstruction become 
an extension of competition between Shi`a, Sunni, 
and Kurdish parties that express sharply divergent 
visions of Iraq’s future. In this environment, the way 
reconstruction unfolds will help consolidate social and 
political cleavages and could well become a new driver 
of future violence. 
An ‘authoritarian peace,’ it turns out, is a poor setting 
in which to build good governance. In such cases, 
strengthening state institutions is more likely to 





SOME LESSONS FOR 
POLICY-MAKERS
Steven Heydemann and Luigi Narbone
1. Authoritarian peace 
and reconstruction
What are the key takeaways presented in this e-book? 
In our view, they highlight changes that are reshaping 
the landscape of post-conflict reconstruction in 
the Middle East and North Africa. For those who 
view post-conflict economic recovery as more than 
just clearing rubble we are entering uncharted and 
dangerous territory. 
The conditions now taking shape in conflict-affected 
states present an ominous picture of the obstacles 
confronting Western governments. If the purpose 
of economic reconstruction is not only to restore 
economic infrastructure but also to mitigate the 
economic and social causes of conflict, Western leaders 
now face an environment that is less favourable than at 
any time since the end of the Cold War. As Wennmann 
points out, Western approaches are increasingly out 
of step with conflicts that unfold in domestic and 
global contexts that are increasingly less responsive 
to the standard repertoire of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion treatments. Conflict-affected states, Wennmann 
warns, “no longer respond to the standard treatment 
and what is in the medicine chest no longer seems to 
work.”1 Yet the European Union, the United States of 
America, the United Nations and the World Bank – 
the main pillars of today’s global architecture of post-
conflict reconstruction – are struggling to adapt to this 
changing landscape.
1.  Achim Wennmann, this volume.
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Western peacebuilders have largely failed to take these 
realities into account. How should states be rebuilt if 
state security comes at the expense of civilian popu-
lations? In cases like Iraq, where conflict and post-
conflict have blurred together, how can economic re-





These challenges are further complicated by regional 
and international environments that have eroded the 
capacity of Western actors to affect how post-conflict 
reconstruction will occur. In the not-too-distant past, 
Western donors and international financial institu-
tions in which Western voices were dominant essen-
tially monopolised processes of post-conflict recon-
struction. They controlled funding streams, were the 
arbiters of how states and economies should be rebuilt, 
served as gatekeepers of international legitimacy, and 
possessed the political and economic leverage to define 
the terms on which post-conflict states could gain 
access to critical resources. This is no longer the case. 
Today, the West no longer owns the post-conflict re-
construction space. States such as Turkey, South Korea, 
India, and Brazil, previously recipients of development 
assistance, are now themselves donor countries. The 
governments of the Arab Gulf also have an estab-
lished presence as international donors, providing the 
impetus behind the formation of new non-Western 
international financial institutions such as the Islamic 
Development Bank and the Kuwait Fund for Arab 
Economic Development. In addition, governments in 
the Gulf have leveraged their resources on a bilateral 
basis in support of regional partners. Bahrain and 
Jordan are both recipients of large-scale Saudi support 
intended to stabilise conservative Sunni regimes in 
the face of the 2011 uprisings. Iran too has become 
deeply involved in post-conflict reconstruction in the 
Middle East. Lob’s paper in this e-book offers a com-
pelling account of Iran’s growing role as a source of 
reconstruction funding in Iraq, Lebanon, and now 
Syria. As Lob points out, in creating the Reconstruc-
tion Jihad organisation as an arm of the Iranian regime 
“Iran has instrumentalised reconstruction and de-
velopment to consolidate power at home and project 
influence abroad.” By spring 2019, US sanctions had 
forced cutbacks in Iran’s economic support for neigh-
bouring states. However, it remains a potent presence 
and valuable resource for governments and non-state 
actors that are themselves under Western sanctions, 
including both the Assad regime and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon. 
However, it is the rise of China and Russia as active 
and assertive participants in development lending and 
post-conflict reconstruction funding that presents the 
most significant challenges to the influence of Western 
donors and multilateral institutions. Lin’s contribution 
to this volume focuses on China’s role in post-conflict 
reconstruction. She presents what can be read as an 
official Chinese narrative about the benefits of its Belt 
and Road Initiative, a narrative which is particularly 
attractive to authoritarian regimes looking for ways to 
insulate themselves from the conditionalities that often 
accompany Western assistance. She also reproduces 
the official Chinese critique of US and Western policies 
in the Middle East, echoing the positions expressed by 
Russian officials as well. Readers may view these per-
spectives as one-sided and profoundly distorted but 
should not overlook their appeal. China, like Russia, 
explicitly contrasts its ‘hands-off ’ approach to develop-
ment assistance with what it characterises as the desta-
bilising interventionist policies of the West. China’s pri-
orities are stability and the integration of Arab markets 
into global economic networks dominated by Beijing. 
Like Russia, it is indifferent to the social and economic 
dysfunctions that drive regional conflicts – blaming 
these instead on Western intervention. It is indifferent 
to corruption, and whether reconstruction is linked to 
a fair and inclusive social contract. In Syria, where the 
approach to economic reconstruction will only deepen 
the divisions that drove the country into conflict in 
2011, the approach adopted by China and Russia is like 
throwing a lifesaver to a brutal authoritarian regime 
that rejects accountability for its conduct during more 
than eight years of violent conflict. Neither is Syria 
alone: China and Russia are aggressively engaged with 
other post-conflict countries in the Middle East as well.
To be sure, Russia’s ability to offer development as-
sistance is limited by its own economic difficulties. 
China has proven to be quite risk-averse in its funding 
of post-conflict reconstruction. It prefers to invest in 
projects that have clear economic benefits, and those 
that tighten the economic dependence of the recipients 
on China. Thus far, the Belt and Road Initiative has 
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produced meagre commitments in Syria, despite the 
grandiose rhetoric attached to it by Chinese officials. 
However, as an alternative model of economic devel-
opment via authoritarian stability, the initiative has 
already introduced new complexities and challenges 
into the landscape of post-conflict economic recon-
struction. It gives ruling elites in post-conflict states 
ways around the demands of Western donors. It has 
weakened the influence of the EU, the US, and other 
actors who link access to funds to political, economic, 
and social reforms that autocrats find unpalatable. 
As conflicts have spread across the region, the Middle 
East is now one of the most important global arenas 
in which competing visions of post-conflict recon-
struction struggle for influence. If the West remains by 
far the most important source of post-conflict recon-
struction funding, alternative models of aid without 
political strings – whether true or not – are already 
making their presence felt. They are evident in the 
Assad regime’s pushback against efforts by the EU to 
use such funding to gain diplomatic leverage over the 
terms of a political settlement in Syria. The EU’s former 
leading diplomat, Federica Mogherini, has said that the 
EU cannot accept a “black hole” in Syria. It has taken 
the position that political reform is an essential step for 
ensuring long-term stability and conditioned the com-
mitment of EU funding for Syrian reconstruction to 
it. Buoyed by Russian, Chinese, and Iranian support, 
however, the Assad regime has shrugged off the EU’s 
demands. Thus far, its promise of aid in exchange for 
“meaningful political reform” has not yielded results. 
Meanwhile, the question of what to do to address the 
issue of the human security of the Syrian people, for 
instance by focusing on millions of IDPs and refugees 
and ensuring their safe return, remains dangerously 
without answers. 
In the Middle East, and in other cases too, the future of 
post-conflict reconstruction may well look more like 
Syria than Rwanda or Liberia, examples that are held 
out as more positive instances of the effects of Western 
investments in reconstruction. With the UN and other 
core mechanisms of global governance increasingly 
polarised, as is evident in the Security Council’s delib-
erations about both Syria and Ukraine, a vision of post-
conflict reconstruction tied to the health of a liberal 
international order becomes ever more precarious. 
As we move toward an increasingly multi-polar inter-
national order, one more tolerant of dictatorship, where 
the commitment of Western states to liberal values is 
eroding from within and under growing pressure from 
without, and where publics are increasingly sceptical 
about the value of peacebuilding and development, 
the landscape of post-conflict reconstruction is expe-
riencing rapid and unwelcome changes. Nowhere is 
this more the case than in the Middle East. However, 
in Western capitals practitioners and policymakers 
remain wedded to tools and methods that are increas-




In tackling reconstruction in MENA, Western poli-
cymakers and practitioners face a series of complex 
dilemmas, the resolution of which will have important 
consequences shaping future approaches. First, 
critiques of liberal peace-building increasingly stress 
the importance of ‘doing no harm’ through peace-
building and reconstruction assistance. Aid dependen-
cy and other types of externally induced distortions 
are often characterized as unwanted diseases created 
by peacebuilding efforts. Wary of the failures of past 
interventions, the temptation to minimise involve-
ment is high. However, the option of doing nothing 
is not acceptable. The West and policy-makers, even 
if they wanted to, cannot afford to turn their backs on 
conflict-affected states. Europe is directly exposed to 
the effects of conflicts that drive new waves of refugees, 
generate humanitarian crises, promote radicalisation, 
and inspire terrorists to strike across the continent. 
The economic, political and security costs of conflicts 
in MENA have already been high for Europe and risk 
spiralling out of control if the region remains mired in 
its current instability and violence. 
Second, after years of protracted conflicts around 
the world, reconstruction fatigue is particularly high 
among Western donors. It is widely accepted in the 
West that successful reconstruction can be the key to 
avoiding new conflict cycles in the future and that if re-
construction fails the likelihood of a return to violence 
increases, as has been the case in some fifty percent 
of post-WW2 conflicts. However, the political will 
to engage in a substantive and prolonged diplomatic 
effort to bring peace in the EU’s neighbourhood is in 
short supply, as are the financial resources available for 
a meaningful commitment to the reconstruction of 
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MENA. Current stabilisation policies in MENA mostly 
seek short-term gains, and, as the term suggests, 
emphasise stability rather than the difficult reforms 
needed to ensure durable peace. Western states, like 
many other actors in the regional arena, appear to be 
driven not by long-term strategic visions but by short-
term political and economic considerations.
Third, given the context analysed in this e-book, it is 
doubtful whether traditional top-down state-centred 
reconstruction approaches will work. The liberal 
peace-building model included reform of governance 
institutions, transformation of the economy, and con-
solidation of an inclusive and democratic political 
system. These entailed protracted external assistance to 
accompany efforts to build resilient states, responsive 
democracies and sustainable peace. The approach and 
the related toolbox aimed to promote reconciliation, 
security sector reform, transitional justice, democracy, 
human rights, the rule of law and an open market 
economy. These interventions required a sustained 
comprehensive approach aligning peace, security, and 
development. In the current MENA context, the level 
of ambition in external intervention in support of re-
construction, at least in the short term, will necessar-
ily be more limited. State-based approaches which end 
up strengthening the resilience of states at the expense 
of the human security of their citizens do not neces-
sarily guarantee sustainable peace in the region. If au-
thoritarian states pursue their own security, the main 
drivers of the ongoing conflicts will be likely to persist. 
The struggle over resources will be further entrenched, 
together with widening inequality and the feeling of 
injustice and exclusion among the population, leading 
to continuing contestation, radicalisation and social 
fragmentation. 
In spite of this rather bleak outlook, in MENA conflict-
affected countries there might still be opportunities to 
break cycles of violence through reconstruction efforts. 
Seizing these opportunities, however, will require a 
critical assessment of existing approaches and a will-
ingness to strike out in new directions. This raises a 
number of questions for policymakers. What kind of 
alternative approaches show some promise? Which 
goals are we trying to achieve and what is the end 
situation we should be working toward in our efforts 
to rebuild economies after war? Moreover, very impor-
tantly, how can we strengthen human security when 




The West, and particularly the EU and its member 
states, ought to reflect on the opportunity to engage 
more systematically in bottom-up, people-centred 
reconstruction.  This needs creativity and thinking 
outside the box. But it also needs caution, as the inter-
national system and EU external policies are still pre-
dominantly based on inter-state relationships. Most in-
struments used by donors have a strong state bias and 
need a cooperative relationship with recipient state au-
thorities. This is the case for most international coop-
eration instruments, where programmes and projects 
are negotiated with governments. Funding is over-
whelmingly channelled through national or interna-
tional state-based institutions and humanitarian assis-
tance can only be effectively delivered if governments 
(and other conflict parties) allow it. Working outside 
the state framework inevitably creates difficulties with 
state authorities and bottom-up approaches will never 
be fully able to replace the work done at the national 
level with state-centred actions. Persistent political and 
diplomatic involvement will therefore also be necessary 
to accompany the work done through bottom-up ap-
proaches. However, what is needed, ultimately, is for 
state actors to recognise their own limitations and 
invest in the development of mechanisms that enable 
and empower non-state reconstruction strategies. 
It is too early to have a structured description of what 
such bottom-up mechanisms and approaches might 
consist of – although a systematic effort to put such 
descriptions in place and begin to implement them 
is overdue. At this stage, one can only identify a few 
promising dimensions and sketch a few unsystematic 
ideas, hoping to foster a much-needed debate among 
researchers, pundits, and policymakers.
4.1 The local dimension
Many people on the ground working in municipali-
ties, local businesses, young people’s and women’s or-
ganisations, and people belonging to other communal, 
tribal, or civil society organisations are daily confront-
ed with the problems caused by destruction and dys-
functions and, to the best of their abilities, are forced 
to solve everyday governance challenges one after 
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another.2 During the acute phases of a conflict, these 
local actors have often been instrumental in providing 
their communities with basic security and social or 
economic services, even replacing the state in ensuring 
minimum living standards. External funding and as-
sistance should support the efforts of these actors. By 
empowering local players, international support could 
promote localised reconstruction while at the same 
time fostering societal resilience at the local level and 
reinforcing positive forces, working in a sort of hori-
zontal peer-to-peer reconstruction process. 
Approaches should aim to multiply and strengthen 
smaller scale inclusive targeted actions. While main-
taining the autonomy of each project, they should try 
to move from the micro to the macro by disseminat-
ing success stories and methodologies and creating 
informal networks of actors involved in similar ac-
tivities across conflict zones. The idea would be to 
promote grass-root coalitions for change made up of 
people and organisations with hands-on experience of 
and responsibilities in local reconstruction. In this way 
“reconstruction [will become] poly-centric at micro 
levels in many different spaces, involving limited ‘self-
help’ reconstruction or reconstruction packages.”3 
Bottom-up approaches require refraining from pro-
jecting rigid views of what the governance structure 
or the post-conflict economy should look like. The 
best solutions to strengthen local governance systems 
should emerge from these bottom-up experiences. 
They would still need a broader strategic framework 
shared by both external donors and local partners, and 
to respond to the needs and visions of local actors. But 
this strategic framework should be understood more 
as ‘software’ than as a rigid set of prescriptions. For 
example, rather than over-emphasising elections as the 
only way to build legitimate governance, bottom-up 
approaches could provide space for locally legitimate 
authorities to emerge and establish themselves as 
effective actors capable of creating and promoting the 
common interests of a conflict-affected community. 
This requires support for inclusive, gender-balanced, 
and participatory consensus-building approaches to 
local governance, mediation, and reconciliation activi-
ties.     
2. World Bank Group, United Nations Pathways for Peace, 
Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, 2018.
3. Wennmann, this volume, p.31.
What is needed is to work within the de-facto political 
economy and develop interventions which take into 
account the opportunities and constraints that emerge 
in the field. These need to be designed carefully to 
avoid becoming a source of distortions over time, for 
instance by endlessly perpetuating a class of privileged 
partners who come to monopolise the reconstruction 
scene. At the same time, local players should also be 
able to count on a steady commitment on the part 
of donors to accompany fragile developments on the 
ground. 
In a recent proposal for a new US approach to Libya, 
for instance, some thinking has been devoted to a 
possible city-centric model which would give substan-
tial autonomy to municipalities, empowering them 
to exert control over “most law and law enforcement, 
resources and budgets, local services and even local 
governance structure. [External] assistance would be 
focused on this level of government, building capacity 
and bolstering authority where possible […] the alloca-
tion of resources should be focused more transparently 
and methodically on cities and other local structures” 4 
4.2 Security and mediation
Interventions could also aim to establish an effective 
system of incentives for local actors entangled in 
violence to turn them away from conflict dynamics and 
re-direct them towards local development objectives. 
Grass-roots reconstruction activities should push local 
actors to adopt individual and collective strategies 
which enhance the prospects for peace. For example, 
by using small-scale lending and investment schemes 
to re-start local agriculture or to create alternative 
employment in areas such as the southern regions of 
Libya, interventions could both re-launch the local 
economy and reconstruction process and break the 
business model of migration smugglers, which is the 
predominant source of revenue for the local popula-
tion and armed groups.5 
To become possible antidotes to the cycle of violence 
and its future resurgence, bottom-up approaches will 
need a continual prioritisation of prevention and 
reduction of violence and a granular involvement on 
4. Various authors, ‘Empowered Decentralization: A City-
Based Strategy for Rebuilding Libya,’ Brookings, 2019.
5. Luigi Narbone, Libya’s illegal migration: the urgent need 
for a new strategy, The Conversation, June 13, 2017 
6.58am BST.
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the part of the diplomatic and donor communities. 
This may mean that a continual search for effective 
ways “to engage conflict parties on their partisan 
interests, ensuring vertical linkages within the conflict 
system” will need to be part and parcel of the grass-
roots approach.
As Wennmann avers:
“Within these processes of reconstruction, the 
key is to identify the people managing coexis-
tence and disagreements. Such individuals are 
called different names in different constituen-
cies, including ‘insider mediators’ (in peace 
mediation circles), ‘interrupters’ (in violence 
reduction circles) or ‘transpublics’ (in academic 
circles). What these actors have in common 
is that they are connected to, and trusted by, 
important local constituencies and that they can 
build trust in processes and outcomes where 
the formal authorities or other power holders 
are too weak or illegitimate to do so. They can 
also talk the languages of different constituen-
cies and therefore enable understanding and 
dialogue across divided communities or enemy 
groups.”6
4.3 The economic dimension
The structure of the economy and its performance, 
together with its political economy dynamics, are 
critical factors igniting and perpetuating conflicts. They 
also create resistance against attempts to normalise the 
economy after conflict and can hamper reconstruc-
tion efforts. To exit war economies, conflict-affected 
MENA countries will need sustained efforts and multi-
level policies to re-start sustainable growth, and also to 
promote job creation and fight exclusion and inequali-
ty. However, traditional post-conflict economic recipes 
do not sufficiently address how the political economies 
of these countries can negatively affect progress 
toward these outcomes. For example, contrary to what 
is normally assumed, experience shows that macro-
economic stabilisation is not necessarily followed by 
structural reforms aimed at opening up the economy 
or by profound changes in the economic governance 
structure of a post-conflict country. Deep reforms run 
counter to the interests of the existing economic elite, 
6  Wennmann, this volume, p.31.
power groups, and the regimes with which they have 
symbiotic relationships. 
The problem for bottom-up approaches to economic 
reconstruction, therefore, is how to work with the real 
political economy. How can one counter the economic 
interests of specific groups in maintaining the war 
economy? How can one provide effective incentives 
to reintegrate them in the formal economy in areas 
where localised reconstruction efforts are taking place? 
Optimal policies need to leave space for flexible non-
orthodox policies if they turn out to be opportune and 
strategic.
Working at the subnational level, for example, 
bottom-up approaches could try to focus on assessing 
local economic infrastructure repair needs. This could 
then be followed by small-scale funding for local re-
construction activities and micro-credit to leverage 
efforts by the local population. Donor-funded incen-
tives could be put in place to enhance the role of lo-
cally-oriented public-private partnerships that could 
support the constructive participation of internation-
al investors, such as firms that provide solar energy 
generation equipment, small-scale technologies for 
purifying water, and localized broadband services. 
To attract the necessary investment in local economies, 
schemes aimed at lowering investment risk could be 
used. However, some mechanisms, including legal pro-
tection and amnesty, should also be provided to favour 
investment in reconstruction by actors operating in 
the illicit or black economy. Special reconstruction 
zones aimed at both export promotion and imports 
for local development needs could be set up with an 
eye to the opportunities provided by the new regional 
economic order which has emerged from the conflict.7 
They could provide an opportunity for capital invest-
ment by economic actors, while interested local com-
munities could benefit from newly-created employ-
ment possibilities. 
A new social contract will gradually need to emerge 
from bottom-up efforts, based on a participatory and 
inclusive dialogue process. Bottom-up approaches 
could support such dialogue among economic actors 
and the broader population on reconstruction objec-
tives, or on longer-term issues such as how to divide 
rents in a way that is beneficial for social development 
and the needs of future generations, how to upgrade 
human capital, how to diversify away from hydrocar-
7  Eric Lob, this volume.
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bon dependence, and how to upgrade the country’s 
role in global value chains. A new vision of the state 
and the economy allowing for inclusive reconstruc-
tion, decentralisation and local development would 
then gradually emerge from the process. Donors could 
leverage their reconstruction assistance to help pursue 
these strategic objectives.
4.4 Data and analysis: the impor-
tance of conflict area field-based 
research
Experience has shown that sound field-based research 
carried out by reputable independent organisations 
is important to build new peace-building and recon-
struction software which can be used in bottom-up ap-
proaches. Evidence-based analysis should cover issues 
like the mapping of key actors, the changing dynamics 
of local governance, the trends and players in the war 
economy, the changing local security landscape, and 
what works and what does not in terms of responses 
to the challenges. 
Research outputs should produce data and analysis 
which is perceived as trustworthy and reliable and can 
gradually become a neutral and independent anchor 
for common understanding in a polarised and “ru-
mour-rich information-poor environment.”8 Research 
should also be part of a regular dialogue between re-
searchers, policymakers, donors, and practitioners, 
but also among local stakeholders to dispel misunder-
standings and shape policymaking and the design of 
responsive programmes. Wennmann example of inde-
pendent research on Syria’s land and housing tenure, 
and on urban transformation before and during the 
war as instruments to contrast government abuse, thus 
reducing the space for polarisation on all sides and 
building confidence, is a good case in point.
5. Conclusion
The possibilities we sketch out in the above sections 
are both notional and aspirational. They suggest some 
initial steps that can be taken to begin to put in place 
alternatives to the state-based, state-dominated, formal 
and centralised strategies for post-conflict reconstruc-
tion that define today’s reconstruction orthodoxy. 
What these recommendations also highlight, however, 
8  Wennmann, this volume, p.30.
is how much additional work remains to be done to 
move new models of post-conflict reconstruction 
beyond the notional and aspirational to the real and 
effective. Simply replacing the rather formulaic ver-
nacular of the current reconstruction orthodoxy with 
another will be unlikely to do the job. It would miss 
the opportunity to take meaningful steps to build re-
construction strategies that offer greater prospects of 
being able to address the conditions that drive com-
munities to violence, overcome the effects of conflict, 
reduce its recurrence and strengthen the social solidar-
ities on which inclusive effective governance depends. 
Progress toward these goals will not be easy. It will 
face resistance from entrenched interests in the inter-
national system. However, whether the field of post-
conflict reconstruction is able to overcome the many 
challenges it now confronts may well hinge on its will-
ingness to tackle the fundamental questions raised here 
about the relevance and efficacy of current approaches 
and commit to developing and putting to test new and 
more effective alternatives. 
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